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Developing countries have undergone different development trajectories 
beginning in the 1970s -- a period that coincided with the current form of 
globalisation. Most of these countries have experienced low economic growth, 
poverty, high unemployment, diseases and inequalities. Few others have witnessed an 
unprecedented high rate of economic growth combined with qualitative improvements 
in the living standards of their people.  
The initial and pervasive discourse about these diverse developmental 
outcomes was cast  in terms of the former set of countries having gotten the 
“economic fundamentals” wrong while the latter set of countries got the “basic 
economic  fundamentals” right. A key thrust of this conceptual framework was that 
the market is the most efficient allocator of resources and that integration into the 
global economy depends on the ability of countries to get the fundamental rights.  
Once again, there seems to be a resurgence of the Smithian invisible hand, where 
markets were seen as the best protector of the public good. Within this framework, the 
state becomes almost irrelevant to the process of national economic reforms and 
integration into the global economy – indeed unimportant to successful economic 
transformation and public welfare.   
By the 1980s however, a school of revisionist institutionalists had emerged to 
reassert the centrality of the state to economic transformation. Broadly, this school 
argued that the ability of countries to take advantage of the opportunities flowing 
from economic globalisation depends on the state’s capacity. Consequently, a number 
of state capacity theories were advanced to explain variations in national economic 
  xvii 
outcomes among developing countries. Despite these various attempts, we lack a 
comprehensive state-capacity theory. Furthermore, most of these explanations relied 
on a hodgepodge of case studies, and few were comparative in nature. Although, these 
sorts of case studies are valuable for their mastery of details, most failed to 
operationalise how differences in state institutions lead to variations in national 
economic outcomes. The only existing study that has attempted to develop 
comparative indicators is limited to “Weberianness”, and by so doing excludes an 
important aspect of state autonomy.  Worse, none of the studies provided measurable 
indicators for state-society relations as important domestic institutions. The discussion 
in this study is anchored in measurable indicators of state autonomy and (state-
society) synergy across developing countries. Furthermore, the study focuses on 
equitable growth rather than a narrower concern with growth that has been the major 
preoccupation of most studies.   
This study develops a number of operational indicators for state institutions 
and state-society relations for the purposes of comparing developmental outcomes 
across countries.  It develops and compares the institutional characteristics of twelve 
developing countries.  On this basis, two main hypotheses were tested in this study, 
namely (a) that successful economic performance (that is high economic growth 
combined with low inequality) is highly associated with autonomous state institutions 
that are synergistically tied to its socio-economic partners, and (b) that a country’s 
institutional attributes determine its capacity to effectively engage with the 
globalisation process.  
Through the pursuit and application of comparative indicators, the dissertation 
concludes that, indeed, countries with highly synergistic autonomous (Auto-Synergy) 
institutions have achieved egalitarianism and high economic growth. But contrary to a 
priori expectations, it also concludes that in rare circumstances, such as in countries 
with rich natural resource endowments and initial income and wealth distributions 
that altered the ownership pattern and production relations, countries with low or no 
levels of Auto-Synergy can still achieve equitable growth.  
  1 
 
Chapter One 
 
 
Introduction 
 
1. 1: The Problem 
One remarkable feature of developing countries since the 1970s is the 
variations in their economic performance. We can use the words of Castells (1998) to 
describe these variations in economic performance: most developing countries have 
transited to fourth world status and few others have transited to first world status. 
Therefore the central question that will preoccupy this study is which factors 
accounted for these variations in national economic performance among developing 
countries; I will return to this question shortly.    
 Those developing countries that can be classified in the fourth world category 
exhibit features of underdevelopment including low economic growth rates, low rates 
of savings, low manufacturing bases, extreme poverty, high unemployment rates, high 
illiteracy rates, homelessness, ravaging diseases and high levels of inequalities. The 
majority of people in these countries have no access to basic social and physical 
infrastructure such as potable water, electricity, good sanitation, roads, and healthcare. 
These problems are coupled with high illiteracy rates, especially among women. In 
fact, social exclusion--that is, “a process by which certain individuals and groups are 
systematically barred from access to positions that would enable them to autonomous 
livelihoods within the social standards framed by institutions and values in a given 
context” (Castells, 1998: 73)--is one of the main features of these countries. They are 
also mired in high rates of debt and considerably dependent on foreign aid.  
Furthermore, most of these countries have also experienced a declining share of 
Foreign Direct Investments (FDI). All of the above coupled with technological 
backwardness and increased external dependence have earned these countries the 
unenviable names of the "lost countries" and the "basket cases".  Worse, countries that 
have missed out on the industrial revolution are likely to miss out on the information 
revolution as well. 
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In contrast, those developing countries that transited to first world status have 
witnessed high rate of industrialisation resulting in near unprecedented economic 
growth, coupled with a qualitative improvement in the living standards of their 
populace. Remarkably, these countries have been characterised by both high 
economic growth and egalitarianism (E-Growth). In general, some of these 
developing countries, especially the Newly Industrialised Countries (NICs) of East 
Asia, as well as countries like Malaysia, achieved spectacular economic growth,1 
eradicated absolute poverty and more than doubled real income per head between 
1960 and 1990. These countries have transformed their economies from a heavy 
reliance on the primary sector in the 1960s, to the high-valued-added service sector in 
the 1990s.  They have also experienced substantial inflows of FDI. Development 
scholars of diverse political persuasions and international financial institutions alike 
have lauded the spectacular developmental achievements of the NICs. In applauding 
the NICs’ development model some development scholars note of South Korea that it 
was catapulted from a hopelessly backward nation, with a per capital Gross National 
Product (GNP) lower than that of Ethiopia and Haiti in 1962 to an economic 
powerhouse, highly industrialised, to become the eleventh largest economy in the 
world, and the twelfth biggest trading nation by the mid-1990s.  Within the same 
period, South Korea attained first world levels of human development – in literacy, 
education, and medical care, etc. (Moon and Kim, 1996; and Kim, 1997; cited in 
Bach, 2001). Commenting on the development success of the Asian Pacific, including 
the Asian NICs, Castells (1998: 206) notes, 
I think it is fair to say that the Asian Pacific has become the main centre of capital 
accumulation in the planet, the largest manufacturing producer, the most competitive 
trading region, one of the leading centers of information technology innovation and 
production…, and the fastest growing market.  
In Africa, the developmental successes of Mauritius and Botswana are being 
celebrated as the continent’s miracles. Botswana, achieved sustained annual economic 
growth rates of 14 percent in the 1970s, 10 percent in the 1980s, and 4.7 percent in the 
last decade of the twentieth century (Edwards, 1999: 51). Starting as one of the most 
impoverished countries in the world with a GNP per capital of less than $80 a year in 
                                                         
1
 Even in the phase of the global financial crisis which hit the region in the late 1997, the region 
achieved an annual average growth of 7.2% (World Bank, 2002: 237). 
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1966, Botswana leaped to become a middle-income economy with a per capita 
income of $1,800 in 1996 (Samatar, 1999). 
The variations in national economic performance among developing countries 
are further evidenced when we take a look at economic growth. Between 1973 and 
1992, the change in Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita was 172 percent and 
107 percent in South Korea and Thailand respectively. In contrast, GDP per capita 
declined by 21 percent and 9 percent in Nigeria and Brazil respectively in the same 
period.  In regional terms, while the ten Asian countries in Madison’s (1995) sample, 
have a GDP per capita growth of 89 percent between 1973 and 1992, in the ten 
African countries, GDP per capita declined by 23 percent, and in the seven Latin 
American countries, GDP per capita declined by 18 percent  (see Castells, 1998: 
Table 2.1).  
The variations in economic performance are also noticeable in how various 
countries have transformed their economic base. For example, compared to Malaysia, 
where in 1980 and 1998 agriculture accounted for 22 percent and 12 percent of GDP 
respectively, Nigerian agriculture accounts for 21 percent and 32 percent of GDP in 
1980 and 1998 respectively. In other words, while the share of agriculture’s 
contribution to GDP declined in Malaysia, it has increased in Nigeria.  Also while 
between 1980 and 1998 industry’s contribution to GDP in Malaysia increased from 38 
percent to 48 percent, in Nigeria the share of industry’s contribution to GDP has 
declined from 46 percent in 1980 to 41 percent in 1998.  And most of the industrial 
sector contribution to GDP has been in the oil sector. The contrast between Nigeria 
and Malaysia is even more apparent when we look at the share of manufacturing and 
the service sector’s contribution to GDP. In Malaysia, by 1980, manufacturing 
contributed 21 percent of GDP and it increased to 34 percent in 1998. In both periods, 
the service sector contributed 40 percent to GDP. In contrast, the manufacturing 
sector in Nigeria contributed 8 percent of GDP in 1980 and declined to 5 percent in 
1998. Similarly, the share of the service sector contribution to GDP in Nigeria 
declined from 34 percent in 1980 to 27 percent in 1998 (World Bank, 2000). 
 Before, proceeding to discuss the two main approaches that attempt to account 
for the variations of developmental outcomes in developing countries, it is important 
to note another significant development in the same period (from the 1970s): the 
dramatic and fundamental changes in the world economy: increased integration of the 
global economy; deregulation of financial markets; liberalisation of trade; as well as 
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increased cross-border flows of goods and services facilitated by the emergence and 
dominance of informatics technology.  Together, these changes displaced the space of 
place with the space of flows, characterised by timeless times: the culture of real 
virtuality (Castells, 1998; Karunratne and Tisdell, 1996).  This process is both 
inclusionary and exclusionary, posing dangers and offering opportunities, to 
individuals, territories, nations and regions across the globe. The divergent economic 
performance among developing countries has therefore occurred in the context of 
globalisation. This is not to suggest that globalisation is the cause of the variations in 
economic outcomes, but rather to indicate that they have occurred at the same time.  
The above are indicative of the variations in national economic outcomes in 
developing countries. These divergent developmental outcomes that began in the 
1970s continued in the period covered by this study (1991-2001). The central question 
that motivates this study is: Why have some countries been more successful than 
others in terms of achieving both economic growth and the redistribution of income 
and wealth (equity)? This is a question that should be critically interrogated by both 
policy-makers and scholars alike.  The developing countries’ experience can be an 
analysed in light of the lesson we learn from this interrogation.  My point of departure 
is a hypothesis that states with transformative capacity, which is derived from 
autonomy and synergy (I will elaborate on these concepts in chapters 2 and 3), are 
likely to achieve equitable growth. A comparative institutional approach will therefore 
throw some light on the variations in economic performance of developing countries. 
This approach not only reasserts the continued relevance of the state but also the 
importance of the characteristics of state institutions in national economic 
development.  Institutionalists stress the centrality of institutions and argue that policy 
outcomes and national economic performance reflect the characteristics of these 
institutions.  In Weiss’ (1998) view, to understand why some countries have achieved 
better economic performance than others, we should “in each case look at the 
particular combination of states’ fundamental priorities, its architecture, and its 
linkages with key economic actors” (p. x). In a similar vein, Kohli (2004: 20 - 21) 
notes that: 
A full understanding of why some states are more efficacious than others at 
facilitating industrial transformation has to be centered around a concept of power as 
a societal resource that varies in quantity and can thus grow or decline. Efficacious 
states simply have more power at their disposal than less efficacious ones: …Key 
determinants of this variation in state power for development are organisational 
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characteristics of state institutions, on the one hand, and the manner in which states 
craft relations with social classes… on the one hand.  
 
To the institutionalists, economic growth and development rests on the state's 
transformative capacity.  
This study differs from most existing studies in a number of ways. First, it will 
attempt to articulate a holistic state capacity theory. Second, it will create variables 
and indicators to measure state capacity. Furthermore, the study will develop 
indicators for state autonomy. In doing so, it will build on the Weberian tradition and 
the case studies on developmental states that have stressed the importance of a 
coordinating/super ministry to successful economic outcome. It will also develop 
indicators for state-society synergy. Thus for the first time, these variables and their 
relationship to economic outcome will be tested empirically. Third, unlike most 
existing studies, this study will move beyond a narrow concern with economic growth 
to focus on equitable growth, that is, economic growth and how its fruits are shared by 
all segments of society. In other words, the focus is on equitable growth and not 
growth on its own.2  
Methodologically, most of the variables in this study will rely on cross-
national statistics, derived from public sources.  But this study also employs data on 
synergy that were gathered by way of a survey conducted by the researcher.  On the 
basis of these cross-national data, we will be able to make comparison among twelve 
developing countries drawn from Africa, Asia, the Middle East, Latin America and 
the Caribbean. Through regression analysis, we will show correlations and test for 
significance. However, in order to make inferences about causality, the statistical 
analyses were will be complemented by narrative analyses.  
The regression results reveal three patterns: 1) that autonomy is a significant 
and strong predictor of equitable growth; 2) that synergy is a poor predictor of 
equitable growth; and 3) when both independent variables are combined they produce 
a significant but weak predictor of equitable growth.  
 
 
 
                                                         
2
 I will elaborate more on these issues in the last section of this chapter.  
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1. 2: Conventional Approaches to Explaining the Economic Variations among 
Developing Countries 
 
The variation in outcomes among developing countries has received 
considerable scholarly attention. Some scholars have made a career trying to diagnose 
the sources of variation in economic performance among developing countries.  As 
noted previously, this endeavour can be divided into two broad approaches, namely: 
the neo-liberal and institutional approaches.  
  In the last two decades of the twentieth century, the dominant view on the 
differing developmental trajectories was that those that the successful had gotten the 
market fundamentals right and those developing countries that failed had gotten the 
market fundamentals wrong. In other words, successful countries (success being 
measured in terms of growth) are those that have allowed the free rein of market 
forces through policies of liberalisation, privatisation, flexible labour markets, 
reduction of government spending and the general rolling back of the state. These 
policies are held out as universally applicable panaceas and the only road to 
development in developing countries.   
Consequently, various governments in the developing world, including those 
with previously ‘socialist’ leanings, have ‘opted’ for neo-liberal macroeconomic policies 
since the 1980s. These policies have been touted as the only solution to the 
developmental crisis of developing countries. To a large degree, most developing policy-
makers have in fact fetishized neo-liberal socio-economic policies and globalisation. One 
classical example in this respect is South Africa where within government circles, 
globalisation is seen as being synonymous with an impotent state, or at worst, the end 
of the state, and an era of policy convergence.  From this perspective, South Africa 
must adopt policies in line with the rest of the world.  As an ANC Discussion 
Document states, "South Africa must resist the illusion that it can elaborate solutions 
that are in discord with the rest of the world" (ANC, 1996: 16) Thus South Africa 
must abandon command economics and take on board the globalisation of trade and 
financial markets. In this view, globalisation translates into making South Africa a 
"viable" proposition to investors. Former President Nelson Mandela succinctly 
captured this point thus: the South African government “must abandon its obsession 
with grand plans and make economic growth its top priority” (Mandela quoted in the 
Sunday Times, 30 July 1995).  Economic planning came to be perceived as antithetical 
  7 
to economic growth. I have only used this as an example of how neo-liberalism has 
come to dominate within government circles in developing countries.  
In other words, this school holds that ‘There Is No Alternative’ (TINA) to 
developing countries’ engagement with globalisation. This position was articulated by 
the London-based weekly, The Economist, in its special publication entitled, A Survey of 
the World Economy: The Future of the State: “For poor countries, undeniably, it makes a 
big difference to the prospects for economic development, international integration is 
their fast route out of poverty. With small domestic markets, backward technology and 
inadequate capital, third world countries have everything to gain from ending their 
relative isolation and developing close ties with the rest of the world” (The Economist, 
September 20th 1997: 6).3 In this logic, developing countries should adopt policies that 
are in tune with the rest of the world. In other words, developing countries must engage, 
even uncritically, with the globalisation process as a means to obtain economic growth 
and development.  The needs to build investors’ confidence and to generate economic 
growth have therefore become the dominant factors in recent discourse on developing 
countries’ political economy.  The underlying argument is that for developing economies 
to be competitive in the global economy and to generate the expected growth, these 
countries must adopt free-market economic policies. Swyngedouw summed up the 
dominant logic of this school thus:  
The propagation of this globalisation ideology has become like an act of faith. 
Virtually each government, at every conceivable scale of governance, has taken 
measures to align its social and economic policy to the exigencies and requirements 
of this competitive world (dis)order and the forces of a new ‘truly’ free-market-based 
world economy. In the light of the real or imagined threat of owners of presumed 
(hyper)mobile capital that they might relocate their activities, regional and national 
states feel increasingly under pressure to assure the restoration of a fertile 
entrepreneurial culture. Fiscal constraint has to be exercised, social expenditures kept 
in check, labour markets made more flexible, environmental and social regulation 
minimised, etc.  This, then, is heralded as the golden path that would lead regional 
and national economies to the desired heaven of global competitiveness and sustained 
growth. 
 
… National political elite, both left and right, finds in these arguments an excuse to 
explain away their inadequacy to link political programmes with an increasingly 
disenfranchised and disempowered civil society (Swyngedouw, 2000: 66). 
 
Market fundamentalism has unleashed a major assault on the state, which is 
regarded as an enemy of development. In relation to developing countries, the 
argument is that most have failed to achieve economic success because of their 
  8 
governments’ interventions that have impeded the free operation of market forces.  
Hence the state which was once a major player in developing economic development 
has seen its role diminished. Summers and Thomas (1995: 423 – 424) summed up this 
shift on the role of the state and development thus: 
 
A remarkable transformation in the prevailing views about how governments can best 
promote economic development has occurred in recent years. Where it was once 
thought that government needed to occupy an economy’s commanding heights by 
allocating credit, rationing foreign exchange, ensuring against dependence, and 
operating key industries, today it is widely accepted that government’s responsibility 
for directing the production and distribution of goods and services should be much 
reduced and the private sector’s role much enhanced. It is in those tasks for which 
markets prove inadequate or fail altogether – for example, investment in education, 
health, or physical infrastructure – that government has a central role. 
Policies of market fundamentalism suffer from several limitations. First, in 
spite of the adoption of policies along the lines of the Washington Consensus, most 
developing countries remained impoverished. This raises questions about the 
appropriateness of this approach. Second, the Washington Consensus has largely 
ignored the question of inequality. In his study for the World Institute for 
Development Research of the United Nations University UNU/WIDER, Cornia 
(2004: 1) observed that: 
the policy reforms inspired by the Washington Consensus have broadly ignored the 
issues of high and rising inequality, of its impact on poverty and growth, and of the 
measures required to contain it. Some proponents of the Washington Consensus view 
high inequality either as a non-issue or an important issue about which nothing much 
can be done. 
Third, even when the Washington Consensus recognises the importance of 
governance, it tends to by-pass the state or minimizes its role. It emphasizes civil 
society and decentralisation as alternatives to the state because it conceives the state 
as enemy of development. It is in this regard that the World Bank’s (2000) World 
Development Report 1999/2000 focuses on supra-national and sub-national 
institutions; and on globalisation and localisation.     
 The study before you grows out of a different perspective in three ways. First, 
this study assumes that national institutions matter. Second, it also assumes that the 
variations in economic performance among developing countries may well be due to 
differences in state capacity. Third, this study examines the nature of the relationship 
between economic growth and inequality: economic performance is defined in terms 
of equitable growth -- E-Growth -- rather than the narrow concern with growth alone. 
In other words, this study is also concerned with how the fruits of economic growth 
                                                                                                                                                                  
3
 This special publication was part of the edition of September 20 – 26th 1997.  
  9 
are shared among the different segments of the population in a society. 
 This study is located within the institutional framework, where institution 
implies:  
 
a structural feature of the society … the structure may be formal (a legislature, and 
agency in the public bureaucracy or legal framework), or it may be informal (a 
network of interacting organisations, or set of norms). As such, an institution 
transcends individuals to involve groups of individuals in some sort of patterned 
interactions that are predictable, based upon specified relations among actors (Peters, 
1999: 18).  
This study therefore departs from most existing studies that defined 
institutions as the “rules of the game” (North, 1990: 3). Consequently, the works that 
grow out of this tradition focussed on property rights and the rule of law. The problem 
is that rules might themselves be dependent variables, depending on the nature of state 
internal organisations and state-society relations. For example, if bureaucrats are not 
recruited on merit and there is fragmentation within the internal structures of the state, 
they are likely to be beholden to special interests. In that context, state officials are 
unlikely to observe and enforce the rule of law even when such rules are 
constitutionally entrenched. Corrupt state officials are likely to subvert the rules rather 
than enforce them. It is within organisations that conflicts are mediated, compromises 
made and decisions made on how resources are distributed. Also, it is organisational 
characteristics that shape whether or not rules are enforced. Therefore as Evans 
(1995:1) has correctly argued, “… rules …must have a concrete organizational 
structure behind them”. We therefore need certain organisational structures of the 
state for the rules to be articulated and enforced.  It is for this reason that this study 
defines institutions as organisational structures.     
 The last two decades have seen an increasing emphasis being placed on 
institutional factors to explain variation in national economic performance. This 
resurgence of interest in institutional analysis is partly due to the remarkable 
economic performance of the East Asian Newly Industrial Countries (NICs) and 
partly due to a recognition that the prescriptions flowing from the Washington 
consensus were worsening the development situation in developing countries. 
Consequently, the role of national institutions, especially state institutions and state-
society institutions, were re-introduced into development discourse. Although there 
are differences among institutionalists (a description of which is the subject of chapter 
2), in general this framework places emphasis on both the internal institutional 
characteristics of the state (autonomy) as well as the state’s relations to organised 
interest groups. The thrust of the institutional analysis is that the nature and character 
of the state, as well as the nature of the state’s relationship to socio-economic actors, 
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determine a country’s economic performance, including its capacity to improve the 
welfare of its citizens, attract investment and become globally competitive. It will be 
argued that states with robust, dynamic and flexible domestic institutions achieved 
better economic outcomes than those where such institutions were lacking. 
 In trying to identify the factors that gave rise to these astounding 
developments, institutionalists have outlined conceptual and analytical schema that 
emphasize the centrality of institutions (Amsden, 1989; Wade, 1990; Evans, 1995; 
Silva, 1996; and Weiss, 1998). They point to the role of a relatively strong state with a 
capacity for effective, selective, and sustained interventions. I will show that the 
institutional characteristics of the state are contributory factors to its socio-economic 
performance. This is relevant for developing countries as they attempt to promote 
economic growth and equity concomitantly. Although most of the existing studies 
have not systematically provided variables, this study will show that easily 
identifiable institutional features of successful countries include meritocratic 
recruitment, internal promotion and predictable career paths, as well as the presence 
of a coordinating ministry or body. These features are combined with synergistic 
relations, or strong and cooperative state-society relations measured by the presence 
of intermediate organisations and encompassing societal groups. As we shall see, the 
variations in degrees of these institutional attributes determine a country’s economic 
performance, as well as its capacity to engage with the globalisation process. From the 
perspective of this study, state capacity means not only “the ability of the state to 
design policies and programmes and implement them in an authoritative and binding 
fashion” (Schmitz, 2005: 2) but also the ability to engage with and elicit cooperation 
from societal actors around its developmental project.   
I will adopt three benchmarks to measure coherent and robust state 
bureaucracies (that is state autonomy). Max Weber ([1904 – 1911] 1968) established 
the first two benchmarks that lend themselves to empirical verifiability. These are 
meritocratic recruitment (based on a combination of education and examination) and a 
clear (predictable) career path that provides long term, tangible and intangible, 
rewards (including security of tenure) for bureaucrats. The third criterion used to 
measure state bureaucratic coherence is the presence of a super ministry or 
coordinating body.  These three organisational features, which are easy to measure 
across countries, constitute an important frame of comparison.  In particular, we can 
expect that meritocratic recruitment and predictable career paths generate corporate 
coherence, competence and the ability to pursue long-term goals.  This, in turn, would 
reduce the possibilities of rent-seeking behaviour. Evans and Rauch (1999: 749) have 
eloquently argued that “public administrative organisations characterised by 
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meritocratic recruitment and predictable, long-term career rewards will be more 
effective at facilitating capitalist growth than other forms of state organisations”. 
Furthermore, a competent bureaucracy that is synergistically tied to its economic 
partners may assist the latter to overcome collective action problems.  It can also 
provide necessary information to business and social interests in a way that enhances 
private investment and a distribution of resources to accommodate all interest groups 
in a society. Such relationships allow state agencies, business, labour and community 
organisations to best utilise their comparative advantages and relieve each other of the 
burden of tasks that each cannot do well (on its own).  In other words, the complex 
division of labour between the state, business and society ensures an efficient 
utilization of society’s resources.  
It is important to note that there are differences in the literature on this subject 
(see chapter 2 for a detailed discussion on this issue). One strand of this literature 
emphasizes the repressive nature of the state and weak societal interest groups as 
sources of state capacity. This strand thus argues that what matters is the ability of the 
state to impose its will over society (see Johnson, 1982; Migdal, 1988; and Wade, 
1990). In effect the despotic power of the state, that is its arbitrary control over its 
surrounding social structure, is the primary concern of this school of thought. They 
therefore privilege the internal organisation of the state in the analytical and 
conceptual frame. In contrast, the second strand argues that state capacity is derived 
from its ability to elicit cooperative relations from organised interest groups (see 
Evans 1995; and Weiss, 1998). This is referred to as the infrastructural power of the 
state, that is, “the capacity to penetrate society to extract resources from it, and to 
cooperate with social classes and groups in achieving collective goals” (Hobson and 
Weiss, 1995: ch. 1). This means that this approach emphasizes both the internal 
organisations of the state and its relations to non-state actors. Both schools however, 
have a common position that institutions not only matter but determine the state’s 
transformative capacity. But unlike the former perspective, this second strand 
emphasizes both the internal organisation of the state as well as state-society relations. 
To date, the latter relations have been confined to state’s relationship with business.  
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1. 3: The Approach of this Study 
 
  This study is located within the institutional approach, but it will go beyond 
the aforementioned analytical and conceptual schema by focusing on the 
transformative capacity of the state. By transformative capacity we mean “the ability 
of policy-making authorities to pursue domestic policies adjustment strategies that, in 
co-operation with organised economic groups, upgrade and transform the industrial 
economy. These strategies encompass both structural shifts: from declining to 
expanding sectors, as well as technological diffusion and innovation; and the creation 
of industries, products and process” (Weiss 1998: 5). In this information age, 
transformative capacity also involves the ability of states to strategically upgrade their 
industrial sector, facilitate the location of sunrise industries within their territories, as 
well as aggressively undertake massive investment in Research and Development 
(R&D) since global competitiveness is driven by technological innovation.  One of 
the shortcomings of existing studies is that they limit transformative capacity to state 
capacity to foster an accumulation strategy. In this respect they share a common 
characteristics with the neo-liberals’ framework that primarily concerns itself with 
economic growth (and, as noted above, ignores the question of inequality). This study 
departs from the existing works as it conceives of transformative capacity as the 
ability of states to distribute the gains of economic development to the general 
populace. Therefore, it defines transformative capacity as the ability of the state to 
foster E-Growth.  The transformative capacity of the state, it will be argued, is derived 
from autonomous state institutions and from cooperative relations between the state 
and organised interest groups.  Thus, unlike the existing studies, this study develops a 
holistic state capacity theory that links the state simultaneously to business and civil 
society. In other words, this simultaneity of relations is an important source of state 
capacity. It proceeds to specify how this relationship can be measured. 
It is clear from the above that state-society synergistic relations constitute 
another important level of analysis in this study.  These relationships are determined 
by the presence or absence of intermediate bodies where stakeholders -- business, 
labor, civil society and the state -- engage with one another to formulate, monitor and 
evaluate economic and industrial policies.  Such relations, as noted earlier, are based 
on reciprocity and trust. Through the interactions provided by intermediate bodies or 
consultative mechanisms (CMs), the state and society are able to negotiate and build 
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consensus around a transformative project.  In the process, each carries out activities 
where it enjoys comparative advantages and relieves the other of such tasks. This sort 
of cooperation enhances policy success. 
Another factor that determines state coherence is the presence of a shared 
transformative project between political and bureaucratic elites. In most cases, the 
need to survive in the face of external or internal enemies is the basis of a shared 
transformative project. Economic transformation is thus a means to a political end: 
political legitimacy.  
The success of a transformative project, to a large degree, depends on the 
presence of encompassing private interests: business associations, labor unions and 
civic associations. These are the counterparts of a coherent state. As argued in the 
proceeding section, encompassing societal interests provide for easy interaction, 
information sharing and effective coordination of policy between all stakeholders in 
the society. In such situations, the state is able to tailor services to meet the needs of a 
diverse population. 
At this juncture it is important to note that in spite of the increased consensus 
that differences in national state-society institutions and their relations account for 
variations in national economic performance, existing studies (with few exceptions) 
have not provided comparable indicators to measure state autonomy. Although most 
studies from the institutional perspective stress the importance of state autonomy and 
interest group participation in economic policy-making in particular and public policy 
in general, they have not developed measurable indicators on this important source of 
state capacity.  This has made it difficult to check, empirically, the generaliseability of 
their claims.  This study aims to anchor this discussion in measurable indicators of 
state autonomy and synergy across developing countries.  In the doing, we might hope 
to stimulate further scientific research on these issues. In addition, while the 
importance of equitable growth or shared growth is being recognised, existing studies 
have not developed indicators on how this should be measured cross-nationally. This 
study attempts to fill this void as well.   
Existing studies in the institutional approach have tended to focus on the 
developmental success of certain countries, especially the Asian NICs, at the expense 
of less successful cases.  As a result, they have not shined much light on Africa’s 
developmental failures.  This is the first casualty from the lack of clear comparative 
indicators: otherwise rich case studies lack clear indicators and variables of state 
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capacity. Hence, it is often difficult to make comparisons across countries. In the 
absence of operational indicators, scholars are tempted to dig for evidence to show 
that the East Asian states (for example) had the requisite capacity and therefore the 
foundation for their developmental success, while African and Latin American states 
are said to lack this capacity. Therefore the pre-analytical predisposition of 
researchers may have been informed by the categorizations of countries. The absence 
of cross-country comparable data, combined with neo-liberal attacks on the state, has 
resulted in a situation where African states have been given different labels. 
Mkandawire, one of African leading social scientists, has noticed this trend and 
consequently observed that: 
 
If the state was given a central role in earlier views of the process of development in 
Africa the situation changed dramatically in the late 1970s and 1980s. The African 
state is today the most demonized social institution in Africa, vilified for its 
weaknesses, its over-extension, its interference with smooth functioning of the 
markets, its repressive character, its dependence on foreign powers, its ubiquity, its 
absence, etc. The state – once the cornerstone of development --- is now the millstone 
around otherwise efficient markets. It is now the “rentier state”, the “overextended 
state”, the “parasitical state”, the “predatory state”, the “lame leviathan”, “the 
patrimonial state”, the “prebendal state”, the “crony state”, the “kleptocratic state”, 
the “invented state”, etc…Although this inflation of epithets has reached high 
proportions in more recent years, …The many epithets underscore the fall from grace 
of the African state. It is now argued that not only has the state become dysfunctional 
in terms of management of larger societal issues, but also a real nuisance in la vie 
quotidienne of its citizens, as evidenced by the “withdrawal” from state-dominated 
economic and social spaces (Chazan, 1988a; Chazan, 1988b; Rothchild, 1992). Some 
even go so far as to conceive of the developmental schemes that completely 
circumvent or marginalise the state as non-governmental organisations, the private 
sector and local communities proceed almost surreptitiously with addressing issues of 
poverty and development without the encumbrance of the state (Mkandawire, 1998: 
1 -2).  
 
The point is that in the absence of measurable indicators for the sources of 
state capacity, there is a tendency for scholars to label states that have been successful 
as having the requisite state capacity, and to label states that have not achieved 
developmental success as lacking such attributes. In other words, the evidence may 
have influenced the various categorizations of countries. One way to overcome this is 
through the development of operational and objective indicators, which will enable 
researchers to make cross-country comparisons systematically. In fact, such an 
approach will enable researchers to test the link between institutions and economic 
performance.  This is one of the primary objectives of this study: it aims to develop 
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indicators of institutions as a basis to explain variations in economic performance 
amongst developing countries. This study is therefore an attempt to operationalise the 
link between state capacity (state institutions and state-society synergy) and economic 
performance by developing measurable indicators for the purposes of comparing 
across countries. Development of comparable indicators, and the creation of a dataset 
on state autonomy and state society-relations will enable researchers and development 
agencies to explain variations in national economic performance between developing 
countries. In other words, this study will allow us to conduct a convincing empirical 
test of the posited link between state institutions and E-Growth. It is therefore hoped 
that this study can contribute to an understanding of why some developing countries 
have performed better than others. Such knowledge could be useful to policy-makers 
in designing requisite institutions, as well as to stimulate further research on 
institutional factors that underpin economic development – equitable growth. 
 
1. 4: Significance of the Study 
 
Institutions not only matter but they determine the state’s transformative 
capacity.  Institutions have not only been brought back, but they are alive and well. 
Also, institutional analyses have played a central role in explaining the different 
developmental trajectories of countries, especially developing countries. However, a 
major weakness of the existing studies has been their failure to articulate a state 
theory by which the state is link simultaneously to both business and civil society. 
This study attempts to fill this theoretical gap, a point to which I will return 
subsequently. 
Another major limitation of the existing studies is that they are based on case 
studies (e.g., Evans, 1995; Amdsen, 1989; and Wade 1990).  As such, they did not 
need to operationalise differences in state institutions and their relations to 
surrounding social structures.  Instead, they focussed on the nature of institutions, and 
used this as a basis for explaining economic performance. One of the few studies that 
is comparative in nature is Evans and Rauch (1999), which examines the 
characteristic of state economic agencies in thirty-five developing countries to explain 
differences in economic performance. But even this major contribution is limited to an 
operationalisation of “Weberianness” -- not state autonomy as a whole. Also, the 
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study did not address/operationalise the character of state-society relations as an 
essential variable in national economic performance.  
In addition, there are marked differences within the institutional approach. 
While scholars like Midgal (1988) stress that a strong society undermines state 
capacity, others such as Evans (1997a) call for a strong society.  But here a strong 
society is confined to civil society (to the exclusion of the business society). Evans 
uses the concept of state-society synergy to describe this relation. This study, as part 
of its main contribution, will depart from viewing strong state-strong society relations 
in terms of a zero-sum game, as envisioned by scholars such as Midgal (1988) to 
show that state-business-civil society relations enhance state capacity in a positive-
sum game which enhances state capacity.  The point being that a strong state and a 
strong society could be mutually beneficial to national development – this condition 
might enable both actors to share information, complement each other where they 
have comparative advantages and better utilise resources.  
This study is also significant because of its theoretical contribution to the 
concept of state capacity.  In particular, it adopts the concept of synergy and broadens 
it to include the simultaneous ties of the state to business and civil society, before 
developing ways to measure it.  It departs from existing studies to show that state-
business-civil society relations are a major resource of state capacity and a 
determinant of economic performance. The study is also significant because it aims to 
investigate the relationship between synergy and economic performance. For the 
purposes of this research, state-society synergy will be defined as institutional ties 
marked by the presence of formal institution/structures of interactions (policy 
networks) between the state and encompassing business associations, trade unions and 
civil society organisations. This focus on institutionalised ties is useful because it is 
here where policy decisions are made that shape outcomes. In other words, the 
synergy variable has three indicators: policy networks, encompassing societal actors 
and shared projects. Encompassing interest groups interact with the state via policy 
networks. This type of interaction is likely to contribute to the state’s capacity to 
successfully transform its economy and adapt to a rapidly changing global 
environment. It will therefore depart from existing studies to show that state-business-
civil society relations are a major source of state capacity, and a determinant of 
economic performance. It will also demonstrate, empirically, the link between 
participatory/consultative structures and processes and economic performance. 
  17 
Lastly, most existing studies focus on policy outcomes rather than 
systematically analyzing the workings of institutions in order to draw a link to 
economic growth and equity. This study attempts to operationalise the link between 
state-society synergy and economic performance in developing countries. 
In the course of operationalising these variables, however, I experienced data 
limitation problems that caused me to continually shrink the analytical space of the 
study.  Specifically, the sample size shrunk from forty developing countries (in the 
dependent variables) to sixteen countries (in the autonomy variable) and finally to 
twelve (for the synergy variable). The relative lack of data on the independent 
variables is partly due to the fact that researchers may not have seen the utility of 
cross-country comparable data. It might also be because for years, a neo-liberal 
(hands-off) approach dominated the intellectual discourse. As a result, the role of 
institutions was neglected. The relative lack of data has forced me to limit the study to 
twelve countries – this is the sample for which I have data for both the independent 
and dependent variables. These countries are located in four regions, namely Asia; 
sub-Saharan Africa; the Middle East and North Africa; and Latin America and the 
Caribbean. Of course, I would have preferred to test these arguments on a much larger 
sample (that would have yielded more robust findings), but there is not enough data to 
do this (across all variables). Unfortunately, this is a common problem in the social 
sciences. In spite of this we can still draw some conclusions from the study, even if 
they are somewhat tenuous. These conclusions might be useful coming at a time when 
the Washington Consensus has been considerably discredited and policy-makers and 
academics alike are looking for alternative ways to address the development crisis in 
the developing world.   
Also, this study is timely because of the concerns in both academic and 
development circles that the current wave of globalisation is engendered inequalities 
within nations and among nations, and that if continued unabated, it will be 
unsustainable in the long-run.  
While the study uses statistical methods to test the general relationship 
between independent and dependent variables (as well as their significance), it also 
relies on in-depth narratives to establish causality.   
In adopting this approach, this study does not seek to be institutionally 
deterministic, as there might be several other relevant factors (e.g. geography, history, 
culture, natural resources, and so on). Rather, this study seeks to highlight the 
  18 
importance of institutions to national economic performance – how institutions 
influenced economic outcomes. In addition, while globalisation might reduce the 
scope for national policy autonomy in certain areas, national economic performance is 
-- to a large degree -- still influenced by national institutional configurations, the 
subject of this study.  
 
1. 5: Outline of the Dissertation 
 
This section outlines the dissertation. Chapter 2 reviews the debates of 
globalisation and its consequences for the role of the state in economic development. 
It presents various theories on the sources of state capacity and how they have been 
applied to developing countries. 
Chapter 3 discusses the theoretical and conceptual framework of the study. 
Here a theoretical contribution to the study on sources of state capacity is attempted. 
Against the weaknesses of existing state capacity theories, this chapter introduces the 
concept of the Synergistic Autonomous State (SAS), emphasizing state-society 
relations as an important source of state capacity. This is done with the aim of 
conceptualizing how variations in state capacity account for variations in national 
economic outcomes, that is, equity and economic growth or equitable growth (E-
Growth). This is an outcome where there is not only a high rate of economic growth, 
but that the benefits of growth are shared equally by all segments of society. 
Therefore this study emphasizes both economic growth and equity.  
The subsequent three chapters, 4, 5 and 6 - the methodological chapters, 
attempt to develop operational indicators for the study. Specifically, chapter 4 
operationalises and quantifies the dependent variable, E-Growth. Given the lack of a 
strong correlation between the two indicators, it collapses the two indicators into one 
index to constitute the dependent variable. The data covers forty developing countries 
for the most recent period, 1991 – 2001, derived from accessible, public sources. 
Similarly, chapter 5 operationalises and quantifies the first independent 
variable for capturing the SAS: state autonomy. Based on existing data, derived from 
experts’ surveys, these data constitute the three main indicators of state autonomy: 
namely meritocratic recruitment, predictable career paths for senior economic 
bureaucrats, and the existence of a coordinating economic ministry for sixteen 
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developing countries for the 1970 – 1990 period. This chapter conceives of this 
variable, like the next, in terms of degrees (rather than types) and highlights the 
weaknesses and strengths of the data.  
Chapter 6 operationalises and quantifies the second autonomy variable, state-
society synergy. Because of the absence of existing data, this chapter introduces a new 
index, constituted from an experts’ survey, conducted by the researcher.  These data 
cover twelve developing countries. 
Different time spans (between the data for the independent variables and 
dependent variable) are used with an eye at establishing causality. Specifically, the 
temporal parameters for the independent variables are 1970 – 1990. It is from the 
1970s that the variations in economic performance among developing countries 
become more glaring. The contemporary form of globalisation can also be dated back 
to the 1970s.  The temporal frame of twenty years, 1970 – 1990, is long enough to 
have matured and started to effect the more recent period, 1991 – 2001 (the temporal 
frame of the dependent variables).  
The empirical chapters (7, 8 and 9) are organised along comparative and cross-
national lines with the aim of not only showing correlation but also causality between 
the independent and dependent variables. Chapter 7 discusses the relationship 
between autonomy and economic growth, autonomy and inequality, and autonomy 
and E-Growth with the aim of discovering the effects of autonomous state institutions 
on the dependent variables.  
Chapter 8 looks at the relationships between state-society synergy and 
economic growth, synergy and inequality, and synergy and E-Growth. Here too, the 
aim is to examine the impact of synergy on the dependent variables. The last 
empirical chapter, 9, covers the association between the combined independent 
variable, synergistic autonomy (Auto-Synergy) and economic growth, Auto-Synergy 
and inequality, and Auto-Synergy and E-Growth. Here too, the aim is to establish 
causality between the independent and dependent variables.  
Chapter 10, the concluding chapter, aligns the theoretical and empirical 
discussions of the previous chapters. Specifically, it seeks to do this through a 
discussion of the main findings of the study. I find that most countries with highly 
synergistic autonomous institutions tend to achieve E-Growth. I also find that contrary 
to a priori expectations, some countries have managed to achieve E-Growth without 
synergistic and autonomous institutions. These differences appear to be the result of 
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factors that are not incorporated in this study (i.e., not institution-based).  Lastly, this 
work reveals how autonomy on its own is a better predictor of E-Growth than when it 
is combined with synergy.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  21 
 
Chapter Two 
Globalisation and National Economic Variations: An Institutional 
Perspective 
 
2. 0: Introduction 
 
The justification for this study was provided in chapter one. The present 
chapter reviews the literature on globalisation as it relates to the state (especially state 
capacity), noting that in spite of its diminishing role, the state continues to play a role 
in the globalised world. It also reviews some of the works on state capacity. In the 
process it is shown how existing state capacity theories do not consider how state 
autonomy can be complemented by simultaneous ties with business and society, and 
that their focus has been on achieving a rather narrow economic growth, regardless of 
how that growth is distributed in the population at large.  In short, this chapter serves 
as an important background to the conceptualized framework of a holistic state 
capacity theory in the next chapter.  The remainder of this chapter is divided into five 
sections. The first section briefly discusses the concept of globalisation, especially as 
it relates to the state. Section two focuses on the literature that sees weak societal 
actors as the source of the state’s capacity. The third section reviews the discourse on 
embeddedness, which stresses cooperation but continues to emphasise the state’s 
dominance over societal actors as its main source of capacity. Section four discusses 
state-society synergy, which is a more inclusive concept than embeddedness because 
it focuses on state-civil society relations.  The last section reviews the concept of 
Governed Independence (GI), which stresses cooperation between the state and 
business community as the source of state capacity. 
 
2. 1: Globalisation and National Economic Variations 
 
The meaning of globalisation has become a subject of intense debate and 
theorizing amongst scholars and policy-makers alike, as have the reasons why some 
countries are more successful than others at adapting to the challenge of globalisation. 
For the purposes of this study, globalisation refers to a process of unprecedented 
global economic integration marked by the deregulation of financial markets and the 
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liberalisation of trade. The increased cross-border flows of goods, capital and services 
has been facilitated by the emergence and dominance of information technology, 
which has replaced the space of place with the space of flows and is characterised by 
timeless times: the culture of real virtuality (Castells, 1998; Karunratne and Tisdell, 
1996). These developments have considerably weakened the capacity of the nation-
state to engineer socio-economic transformation.4  Some extreme globalists like 
Kenichi Ohmae (1995), however, erroneously proclaim the demise of the nation-state. 
According to this school, the state has lost its power to engineer socio-economic 
transformation or to be seen as a meaningful unit for managing economic activities.  
Williams (1996) argues that trans-national networks and global authority structures 
erode the autonomy of nation states, dislocating and fracturing national decision-
making. Still, there is now an increased realisation that the state continues to be 
relevant in the process of socio-economic development, in spite of globalisation. Thus 
while there is considerable consensus about the diminishing role of the state, it should 
also be recognised that the state has some role to play in a globalised world.  Indeed, 
according to Helleiner (1994), it is a motif force of globalisation.5  
In particular, comparative institutionalists contend that the state remains a 
major nexus of economic transformation. Some institutionalists, such as Weiss (1998), 
even go so far as to argue that the state is the driving force and the locomotive of 
globalisation.6 Although this research locates itself in the institutionalist framework, it 
will depart from the sort of political determinist conceptualization of globalisation that 
is used by some institutionalists. This thesis posits the view that multifaceted factors 
such as the state, culture, technology, transnational corporations (TNCs), are the 
driving forces of globalisation (Robertson, 1992; and Castells, 1996; 1997).  All of 
these forces reinforce and complement one other.  In addition, the study is not about 
                                                         
4
 Even scholars such as Hirst and Thompson (1995) and Weiss (1998), who tend to dismiss 
globalisation, acknowledge these changes in the world economy. Just as attempts to dismiss 
globalisation are often off-mark, so too are attempts to emphasise just one or two components of these 
complex changes.  See the magisterial works of Castells (1996, 1997 and 1998) for empirical evidence 
of these changes. 
 
5
 It is not the intention of this chapter to argue whether or not globalisation is driven by political, 
economic or technological factors. For the political determinism argument, see Helleiner (1994), Cerny 
(1996) and Weiss (1998); for technological determinism, see Castells (1996). 
 
6
 After all, states have been the authors of such multilateral agreements as the GATT, the WTO rules 
and the recent (but unsuccessful) MAI.  See also Eric Helleiner (1994) for a detailed exposition on the 
state’s role in driving globalisation. 
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state or institutional determinism; rather it is an attempt to show one major factor that 
accounts for why some states fare better than others, in achieving economic growth 
with equity, in spite of their increased integration with the global economy. 
Common to institutionalists is the contention that the state remains a powerful 
player in the global economy and that creating conditions for economic growth rest on 
the state’s transformative capacity. Weiss defines transformative capacity as “the 
ability of policy-making authorities to pursue domestic policies and adjustment 
strategies that, in co-operation with organised economic groups, upgrade and 
transform the industrial economy. These strategies encompass both structural shifts: 
from declining to expanding sectors, as well as technological diffusion and 
innovation; and the creation of industries, products and process” (Weiss 1998: 5).  In 
this information age, transformative capacity also involves the ability of states to 
strategically upgrade their industrial sectors, facilitate the location of sunrise 
industries within their territories, as well as aggressively undertake massive 
investment in Research and Development (R&D), since global competitiveness is 
driven by technological innovation.  As it will be argued later, transformative capacity 
also involves the ability of states to distribute the gains of economic development to 
the general populace.  
Transformative capacity, in turn, depends on a state-society infrastructure and 
institutionalised relations. Put differently, successful engagement with globalisation 
rests and depends on the state-society infrastructure (the capacity of the state and its 
relations to society).  Differences in states’ transformative capacities, it is argued, 
account for differences in national outcomes (Johnson, 1982; Amsden, 1989; North, 
1990; Wade, 1990; Evans, 1995; and Weiss, 1998).  Even liberal economists such as 
Doni Rodrik (1997) concur.  According to him, successful engagement by states with 
globalisation depends on the quality of society’s domestic institutions. 
Most institutionalists have drawn attention to the centrality of state 
interventions -- or to be more precise, its transformative capacity -- to explain the 
unprecedented economic performance of certain countries in the last three decades of 
the twentieth century.  One common feature of these countries, though in varying 
degrees, is the presence of rich state institutions that are insulated.7  This means that 
                                                         
7
 As the World Bank (1997) has argued, the state needs to be insulated “[i]n the technical and often 
sensitive area of economic management… But the process by which broad policy directions and 
standards are set should not be from public discussion” (World Bank, 1997: 116-117). If technicality 
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the state is considerably insulated from immediate pressures from economic agents. 
As Seddon and Belton-Jones (1995) have argued, insulation from special interests 
enables the state to respond swiftly and effectively to changing economic conditions 
and adopt policies that are in the long-run interest of the economy.  Insularity is 
therefore key to flexibility. Flexibility enables state institutions to efficiently adjust 
their goals and allocate resources in the context of changing economic constraints and 
opportunities (Killick, 1995).  Acting swiftly and effectively means that the state is 
able to respond on time to changing global economic conditions with the appropriate 
measures by providing incentives that encourage the efficient allocation of resources 
and signal to firms their comparative advantage. As explained below, its in-house 
capacity enables it to anticipate changes and take measures to adapt to such changes. 
In other words, without such in-house capacity, the state will be unable to anticipate 
changes and to take appropriate measures in response to such changing circumstances.   
Insularity means that the state is relatively autonomous or free from 
particularistic interests. Consequently, it is able to take independent action without 
being captured or unduly influenced by such interests. At the same time, however, it is 
embedded. That is, the state is immersed in networks of ties with its economic 
partners (especially businesses and their associations). This immersion in networks of 
ties reduces problems of collective action amongst partners (on the one hand) and 
between the state and its partners (on the other). Ultimately, this relationship enriches 
government policies. As Seddon and Belton-Jones (1995: 326) put it: 
 
Insulation is not the same as isolation. Insulation is possible only if the relationship 
between the policy-making process and the wider political economy permits the 
effective regulations of both ‘the state’ and ‘civil society’ within certain broadly 
acceptable parameters. Effective insulation from immediate pressures of special 
interests enables policy-makers to respond swiftly and effectively to new 
circumstances; but the capacity to identify and implement appropriate policies to 
promote effective medium - and longer-term development requires the maintenance 
of strategic relations with wider civil society. 
 
The argument goes further: states that are not insulated tend to respond to the 
short-term interests of particularistic groups. This results in policy incoherence, rather 
                                                                                                                                                                  
and sensitivity here means the macro-economic and industrial framework, then this research does not 
accept that the state should be insulated. It however argues that the state needs to be insulated in terms 
of being able to establish its internal structure with in-house capacity for research and to be able to 
negotiate with its partners, as well as international bodies in setting its agenda. This research agrees 
with the Bank that the state needs to be embedded with capital and civil society in setting the 
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than adaptability, responsiveness and flexibility. The goals of such states are likely to 
be derailed by special interests.  
Rich and robust internal institutions8 are able to mediate the effects of changes 
in the global economy.  The presence or absence of rich domestic institutions 
accounts, in all probability, for differences in national outcome. Put differently, it is 
the interactions between internal institutions and the global economic relations that 
considerably shape domestic economic outcomes.  It should be noted that successful 
countries not only react to changing situations; they anticipate changes and act in 
advance.  Consequently, these countries are able to exert considerable control over 
and shape the global political economy. 
As part of their adaptation to changes in the global economy, these states are 
developing various forms of linkages/networks with business, civil society, 
international bodies, local and provincial governments as partners in the 
transformative project. In other words, states enter networks of power-sharing 
arrangements with other centers of authority in order to achieve their transformative 
goals.  In addition, a number of studies have shown that successful states are endowed 
with political elites imbued with a sense of the transformative project.  This is 
necessary for them to build and develop the necessary linkages and organisations 
(Johnson 1982; Amsden, 1989; Wade, 1990; and Evans 1995). Several development 
scholars such as Kieh (1996), and as acknowledged by the World Bank (1997), have 
shown that development projects have foundered due to the absence of a political 
class that is committed to the transformative project. In some instances, there has 
occurred what Michael Burawoy calls “economic involution, that is, an economy that 
eats away at its foundations, by channelling resources from production to exchange 
and, in some cases, to unwanton consumption”  (Burawoy, 1997: 150, emphasis 
added). 
The commonality ends here, as there are divergent views on the nature and 
sources of state power.  Consequently, various theories have arisen concerning the 
state and sources of state capacity.  I now proceed to examine these theories on the 
sources of state capacity.  
                                                                                                                                                                  
broad/overall framework of development. It also needs to be synergistically linked to both capital and 
society in the design and delivery of public services. 
8
 Rich and robust state structures refer to the cohesiveness of the state’s internal institutions.  These 
must, at the same time, be agile to adapt to a changing global economy. These state structures have the 
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2. 2: Dominance over Economic Groups as a Source of State Capacity 
 
Early characterisations of the developmental state tended to equate it to a 
strong state that initiates and imposes policies on a subordinated society (Johnson 
1982; 1987; Wade, 1990; and Castells, 1998).  In this regard, a fragmented and weak 
society is seen as an essential prerequisite for the state’s capacity to initiate and 
implement its economic policy.9 This statist conceptualization of state power is 
premised on the assumption that the state achieves its sets of goals in spite of 
opposition by dominant economic actors. In Johnson’s (1987) view, the 
developmental state interacts with the private sector from a position of pre-eminence 
in the pursuit of its set objectives. The developmental state, according to him, 
privileges policies that favour growth, productivity and competitiveness over 
distribution or consumption.  The importance of the presence of a pilot agency and an 
insulated bureaucracy, as well as a shared ideology of growth between the politicians 
and the bureaucrats, are noted by Johnson as essential factors for successful industrial 
transformation.  In other words, these are attributes of transformatory capacity.  
Wade’s Governed Market Theory (GMT) is a variant of this statist approach.  
According to him, GMT “emphasizes the developmental virtues of a hard or soft 
authoritarian state in corporatist relations with the private sector” (Wade, 1990: 29).  
This is seen as a source of the state’s autonomy. Wade introduces the concepts of state 
followership and leadership. The former means that the state adopts 
programmes/policies that are proposed and initiated by the private sector, while the 
latter implies that the state takes initiatives and steers the private sector to adopt them.  
From this logic, it is only when the state steers or prods industry to do something that 
it would not have done otherwise that the state is seen as making a real difference 
with respect to investment and production patterns. What this distinction attempts to 
show is the dominance of the state over society. Put differently, GMT emphasizes an 
authoritarian and corporatist character of the state, such that the latter is able to 
impose its objectives on its private partners in spite of any opposition by the latter. 
GMT has three central features, according to Wade (1990: 26), namely, “(1) very high 
                                                                                                                                                                  
in-house capacity to gather and analyse data, which enables the state to anticipate and respond to, 
changes in the global economy, be it in technology or market conditions. 
9
 This is following the tradition of Migdal’s (1998) strong societies and weak states thesis.   
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levels of productive investments, making for fast transfer of newer techniques into 
actual production, (2) more investment in certain key industries than would have 
occurred in the absence of government intervention, and (3) exposure of many 
industries to international competition…” 
Through various policy scenarios, the state guides and coordinates the 
economy; it organises the business sector through trade and technology policies, and 
uses credit as a basis for successful upward mobility and competitiveness in the global 
economy. At the initial stages of development, access to and allocation of credit were 
particularly important in the state’s ability to govern the market. Over time, such 
states have undertaken “sustained effort in technological development with 
government-sponsored programmes of technology acquisition, and technology 
innovation, emphasis on manufacturing for exports; industrial policy, shifting from 
low technology to medium technology, then to high-technology industries…” 
(Castells, 1998: 224). Put differently, governments in these countries adopted policies 
that aimed at reducing risks, providing information, promoting R&D, removing 
irrational anti-trust barriers and encouraging the training and retraining of the labor 
force (Johnson, 1984). 
Scholars such as Daniel Okimoto, using policy network analysis, have 
criticized the statist approach.  According to him, policy networks are either more 
important than, or at least of equal importance as, the state in formulating and 
implementing effective policy. In his view, the success of the state is largely due to 
complementary markets’ structures, which provide multiple points of entry for state 
intervention (Okimoto, 1989).   The state and capital utilise these multiple points of 
entry or networks to influence each other.  Often the result is a consensus-building 
process rather than the sort of state dominance emphasized by Wade.  Kuo’s analysis 
falls within the policy networks’ theory approach.  According to him, “The state 
remains the single most important actor in the economy. Yet its impact on economic 
development is determined not simply by the characteristics within the state… but 
ultimately by the networks and institutions that link the state to other actors in the 
economy” (Kuo, 1995: 18).  He further contends that both the state and capital utilise 
these networks to influence each other, resulting in a consensus-building processes 
rather than state dominance. Also, business associations are not only able to resolve 
collective action problems amongst themselves but also between capital and the state. 
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A closer look at Kuo’s analysis reveals that it collapses into a business 
leadership thesis; that is, capital takes the initiatives, while states just follow.  As we 
shall see below, who initiates policy is of less significance than the cooperative 
relationship between the state and its economic partners although the state still plays 
the coordinating role. Kuo’s empirical work acknowledged this coordinating role of 
the state. 
 
2.3: Embeddedness as a Source of State Capacity: The Blending of Dominance 
with Cooperation  
 
Peter Evans’s (1995) embedded-autonomy theory complements and builds 
upon both GMT and policy networks’ theory. In a comparative study of three 
developing countries, Brazil, India and Korea, Evans demonstrates that variations in 
economic outcome rest on what he calls embedded autonomy. Autonomy means the 
presence of coherent state agencies that are able to formulate and implement coherent 
developmental goals.  Expressed differently, autonomy means the ability of the state 
to behave as a coherent collective actor that is able to identify and implement 
developmental goals. Implicitly, the developmental state is not overwhelmed by 
particularistic interest groups.  The Weberian bureaucratic attributes – meritocratic 
recruitment, long-term career rewards and corporate cohesion are essential ingredients 
of the developmental state or a state with transformatory capacity.  Highly-qualified 
and highly-paid bureaucrats resourced these economic bureaucracies.  Cohesion of the 
bureaucracy fosters autonomy in the developmental state. Key features of the internal 
organisations of the state, according to Evans, are the presence of a super ministry 
(which is relatively insulated from key economic groups) that is charged with 
coordinating industrial transformation; prestige-laden economic bureaucrats; and a 
robust intelligence-gathering infrastructure (strong in-house capacity for information 
gathering). These features enhance state autonomy and capacity for strategic policy-
making in response to changing global economic conditions (or policy adaptability).  
Nevertheless, caution must be taken not to overemphasize the significance of 
bureaucratic coherence as the larger political environment also conditions the state’s 
capacity and the success (or otherwise) of a developmental project.  In the absence of 
a political class that shares the same transformative project with the bureaucratic elite, 
the developmental project is likely to founder. 
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Furthermore, according to Evans, bureaucratic autonomy is not in itself 
sufficient, as it must be complimented by embeddedness.  This implies “a concrete set 
of connections that link the state intimately and aggressively to particular social 
groups with whom the state shares a joint project of transformation” (Evans, 1995: 
56).  This type of social tie “binds the state to society and provides institutionalised 
channels for the continual negotiation and renegotiations of goals and policies” 
(Evans, 1995: 12).  According to Evans, it is this seemingly paradoxical combination 
of corporate coherence and connectedness that provides the structural basis for 
successful state involvement in industrial transformation.  
The success of embeddedness rests on corporate coherence and the integrity of 
the bureaucracy.  A state that is autonomous but not embedded is unlikely to achieve 
its transformatory objectives.  This is because in such circumstances the state will not 
be able to take advantage of “institutional ties, policy networks, deliberative councils 
and the like, which link government and industry in the information-exchange and 
policy-making process, as well as ensure effective implementation” (Weiss, 1998: 55, 
emphasis added).  Furthermore, autonomy without embeddedness could easily result 
in a predatory state.10 On the other hand, according to Evans, connectedness without a 
cohesive and dynamic internal state structure will leave the state incapable of 
resolving “collective action problems” of surpassing the individual interest of 
particularistic groups.   The logic is that states which are more effective in 
implementing and achieving their transformative goals are those that combine 
bureaucratic insulation with intense immersion (embeddedness) with key social 
groups. It is such domestic linkages, both formal and informal, between relevant state 
agencies and their private partners, which enable the former to gather sufficient 
information for the purposes of coordinating policy formulation and implementation.  
By extension, these connections enhance the robustness of the state apparatus. 
Embeddedness thus provides a mechanism for feedback and information-sharing 
coordination between the government and capital. Eduardo Silva (1996) came to the 
same conclusion in his study of Chile.  He stresses that where capital participates “in 
                                                         
10
 Evans defines predatory states as those that eat away their resources. Such states are averse to both 
growth and redistribution. Predatory states are but the property of the political leadership. Politicians 
and bureaucrats use the state to promote their selfish interests.  Mobutu’s Zaire and Marcos’ 
Philippines are two examples of predatory states. See Evans (1995) for a detailed analysis of predatory 
states. 
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the agenda setting, formulation, and implementation stages of the policy process 
enhances its belief that the policies will actually work…it will trust that solutions to 
thorny policy problems will be reasonable” (Silva, 1996: 301).  Such a situation, he 
argues, creates/enhances investors’ confidence to invest. 
As it was initially conceptualized, embeddedness suffers from several 
limitations. Evans recognised the first of these, which is that embeddedness was 
limited to state-capital relations to the exclusion of civil society. That is to say that the 
concept of embedded autonomy did not explore how the participation of civil society 
could enhance both the design and implementation of socio-economic policies, a point 
that will be expanded upon later. Cognizant of this, Evans (1995) subsequently called 
for a broadening of the concept to mean state-capital-society relations so that the state 
could be able to take advantages that come with civic or society engagement in the 
transformative project.  This, however, does not address a very fundamental question: 
how is the relationship structured, and as Weiss (1998) has pointed out, how does it 
differ from corporatism?  The differences between embeddedness and corporatism 
can be found in the regime goal. According to Weiss (1998), corporatist arrangements 
privilege (re)distribution of income and wealth, while the analysis of the 
developmental state theory demonstrates the contrary: that is, developmental states 
privilege productivity, growth and competitiveness over welfare issues.  Second, 
embeddedness involves a top-down policy formulation, just like state corporatist 
arrangements, which, I argue, is not sustainable in the long run. It also continues to 
emphasise the authoritarian character of the developmental state. From Evans’s 
theoretical premise, the state only has transformative capacity when its social partner -
- in this case, capital -- is relatively dependent on and subordinated to the state.  Not 
surprisingly, most ‘Asianist’ scholars (including Evans) foresee the demise of the 
developmental state, as capital becomes internationalised and autonomous. This is 
premised on the assumption that a powerful industrial sector would lead to a reduction 
of state capability.  In fact, Evans (1995) advanced the gravediggers’ thesis, arguing 
that the social forces that the state brought to being, become its gravediggers. While 
this might indeed be the case, the key to success is centralised flexibility and an 
administratively-innovative state apparatus. Such rich and robust domestic state 
structures could mediate the effects of globalisation. 
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Before concluding this section, I should draw attention to one basic 
assumption of the developmental state theory. Most writers on the developmental 
state (including Johnson, 1982; Wade, 1990 and Evans, 1995) have concluded that as 
capital becomes internationalised and autonomous, the state’s capability will be 
reduced. The argument goes as follows: the social actors that the developmental state 
brought forth become its nemesis. In other words, at maturation, the social groups that 
the state helps to create develop a distinct interest from that of the state; hence they 
undermine the state’s capacity. This assumption is fraught with several limitations.  In 
particular, it ignores the cooperative dimension between the state and organised 
interests in those societies that were instrumental to their enhanced capacities.  
 
 
2. 4: State-Society Synergy: Cooperation as a Source of State Capacity  
 
In his next book, Evans (1997a), attempted to address the exclusion of civil 
society from the developmental process entailed in embeddedness.  Thus, he came up 
with the concept of state-society synergy or mutual empowerment. By synergy, the 
state enters networks of ties with civil society and taps into community norms, 
informal and formal, in its transformative project. Unlike embeddedness by which the 
state treats capital with mistrust and at arms length, synergy involves state-society 
relations built on “trust and reciprocity” (Evans, 1997a: 2) in pursuant of its 
transformative project: improving human welfare and enhancing productivity. In 
addition, synergy guarantees the autonomy of both the state and society, with the state 
providing the overall guidance. Trust and reciprocity, according to this framework, 
become the basis of the state’s transformative capacity and are a major determinant 
for variations in developmental outcomes across countries. Rather than emphasizing 
dominance over its social partners, synergy emphasizes cooperative relations with 
society (civil society) as the source of state autonomy and effectiveness (or 
transformatory capacity). 
Through the concept of synergy, Evans (1997a) says that the existence of a 
robust civil society reinforces state capacity and vice-versa. In addition, as Heller 
points out, synergistic relations between the state and civil society not only augur well 
for redistribution but also for economic growth or capital accumulation (Heller, 1997). 
This is because synergistic relations, between the state and society, create the 
institutional forms and political processes required for negotiating class compromises 
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through which redistribution and growth are reconciled. Synergy results in the output 
of civil society becoming the input for the state, and vice-versa. In other words, such 
relations are mutually rewarding to both the state and civil society.   
Although it comes from a different ideological orientation, the World Bank 
(1997) has accepted the need for increased participation of civil society in policy-
making and implementation. It says that civic engagement increases openness and 
transparency, increases incentives for participation in public life and consequently 
lessens the distance between citizens, communities and the state. The Bank’s market 
ideology and privileging of civil society was part of the neo-liberal attempt to 
minimise the role of the state in development.  This is what Evans (1997b) calls the 
eclipse of the state thesis. The point though is that, ultimately, through its 
participation, civil society is able to exercise pressure on the state to improve the 
delivery and quality of public goods. 
While the notion of synergy represents a major contribution to the debate on 
the state’s transformative role, and in explaining variations in developmental 
outcomes between countries, synergistic relations are curtailed when confined to 
state-civil society relations, to the exclusion of capital. In this way, Evans failed to 
develop an integrated state theory, that is, a state theory that simultaneously 
accommodates state-business-society relations.  Does this mean that the state cannot 
have relations with both capital and society at the same time in carrying out its 
developmental project? As it will be argued in chapter three, where the state is 
simultaneously linked to capital and wider civil society, it is able to formulate and 
implement coherent policies that accommodate their medium and long-term needs. 
This is likely to provide a stable socio-political climate and, subsequently, continuity 
in economic policy. This is a major condition for policy adaptability. We shall return 
to this debate on synergy in the next chapter so that we could draw on its strengths in 
formulating the theoretical approach that guide this research project. 
 
2. 5: Governed Interdependence as a Source of State Capacity 
 
 
Weiss (1998) has added her voice to the debate on state structures and state-
society institutions as a basis for variations in national economic outcome.  She calls 
her theoretical approach Governed Interdependence (GI), which, according to her, 
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involves central coordination founded on cooperation between government and 
industry.  According to her,  
 
GI refers to a negotiated relationship, in which public and private participants 
maintain their autonomy, yet which is nevertheless governed by broader goals set and 
monitored by the state. In this relationship, leadership is either exercised directly by 
the state or delegated to the private sector where a robust organisation infrastructure 
has been nurtured by state policies (Weiss, 1998: 38). 
 
Unlike both GMT and embedded autonomy, GI rejects the premise that the 
state’s ability to impose its decisions over its economic partners is crucial to its 
transformative capacity.  Thus, it emphasizes cooperation between the state and 
capital rather than the domination of the former over the latter.  According to her, 
what is of central importance is the state’s ability to use its autonomy to consult, 
negotiate and elicit consensus and cooperation from its social partners.  
GI encompasses both the coordinated and cooperative quality of that power. It 
describes a system of central coordination based on the cooperation of government 
and industry.  “Policies … are not simply imposed by bureaucrats and politicians, but 
are the result of regular and extensive consultation, negotiation and coordination with 
the private sector…” (Weiss, 1998: 39).       
Consequently, the presence of a strong capital sector may not be inimical to 
the state’s transformative capacity. Indeed, the state requires a strong and well-
organised private sector in its transformative tasks (this is in contrast to the concepts 
of GMT and embeddedness).  This requires more complex bargaining and 
negotiations than when the latter is relatively weak (a condition that made it easy for 
the former to impose its agenda on society) and better economic outcomes are likely 
to be achieved under such arrangements. But as society advances and global 
competitiveness is driven by technological innovation, the role of the state has 
become more complex. However, this does not require a weak private sector but 
rather a strongly organised private sector that can engage the state in constant 
(re)negotiations, information-sharing and coordination. 
This is a major contribution to the analysis of the factors that account for 
variations in developmental outcomes between countries.  Weiss, in contrast to 
Johnson and Wade, contends that the ability of the state to impose its will on society 
is a poor predictor of developmental effectiveness, although this might be useful at the 
early stages of development.  She opined that, “Over the long run, what really matters 
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is whether the state is able to use its autonomy to consult and to elicit cooperative 
responses from the private sector” (p. 49).  This emphasis on cooperation between the 
state and capital is one major contribution of Weiss to the debate of the state’s 
transformative capacity and subsequently one of the most important factors that 
account for variations across countries - this study will attempt to verify this claim. 
Cooperation not only confers credibility on the state and its policies, but it also allows 
for policy flexibility.   
An emphasis on the cooperative approach entails a truism.  Although Evans 
(1995) did not put it this way, he alluded to this by his use of the concepts of 
demiurge, midwifery and husbandry as the categories of roles performed by the state. 
According to him, the role(s) performed by the state depend on particular sectors 
because some roles are more suitable to certain sectors than others.  Furthermore, the 
role(s) performed by the state might also be conjunctural.  A major factor for 
explaining variations in economic outcome is therefore flexibility by the state’s 
economic bureaucracy in its response to rapidly changing global conditions.    
Dore (1987; cited in Weiss, 1998) notes that this collaborative approach to 
industrial and economic policy-making not only enhances the transparency of 
economic policies but also subjects them to public scrutiny.  Public policy is thus 
unlikely to degenerate to clientelism, although some scholars such as Olson (1982) 
make a contrary claim. The point however, is that the institutionalisation of a 
cooperative relationship between the state and organised interest groups is likely to 
minimise state capture.  It also has the advantage of capital claiming ownership of the 
policy and would therefore work for its successes. Furthermore, the state would be 
better positioned to determine the new frontier of technological innovation and areas 
of global competitiveness. Such a collaborative approach increases openness and 
transparency in government policy-making and thereby lessens the possibilities of 
rent-seeking or government policy being captured by individual business interests.  
Investors tend to be attracted to countries where the rules of the game - incentives 
structures, tax structures, and so on - are clearly defined, are not subject to arbitrary 
decisions of government officials, and are accessible to the public. Put differently, 
rather than being a zero-sum game, relations between a strong state and robust capital 
sector could become a positive-sum game.  The absence of a strong state would make 
it difficult for capital to achieve its set goals, and vice-versa. 
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The usefulness of GI, in addition to its emphasis on autonomy, is what I will 
call collaborative embeddedness as a major factor that enhances the state’s 
transformative capacity, not only in policy formulation but also in its implementation. 
In this context, Weiss contends, the initiator of a policy is less relevant than the 
negotiated relationship between the state and business. The state however, continues 
to play the guiding and coordinating role. This puts to rest the leadership-followership 
logic associated with Wade’s GMT.11 This is because under GI, the relationship 
between the state and capital takes the form of what Weiss calls disciplined support, 
public risk absorption, private-sector governance and public-private innovation 
alliances.12  According to her, 
 
In a context where the hammering out of policy measures and the constant 
negotiation over details are the norm not the exception, it is not a question of ‘who 
gets their way in spite of opposition’, but rather, from the point of view of the state 
agency, whether a business proposal fits within the state-defined guidelines, and from 
the point of view of business, whether a government proposal can be collectively 
agreed upon (Weiss, 1998: 79). 
 
What is clear from this discussion is that GI places less emphasis on who 
initiates policy, unlike GMT and embedded autonomy or policy networks theory 
which emphasize state dominance and business dominance respectively. This is 
because both the state and capital often take initiatives, but within a defined and 
negotiated framework.  The state however, retains a coordinating and guiding role 
either by exercising leadership or delegating authority to business interests. What is 
crucial here is the existence of an interdependent relationship between the state and its 
economic partners. 
Another essential feature of transformative capacity, according to Weiss, is the 
presence of encompassing industrial associations. The presence of encompassing 
associations provides for easy interaction, information exchange and effective 
coordination not only amongst business associations but also between the state and 
capital. Because cooperation with its social partners is so crucial for the success of its 
transformative task, the state deliberately nurtures business associations where they 
                                                         
11
 This would also refutes Kuo’s (1995) assertion that the state does not initiate developmental policies 
but by corporatist business associations. If the assertion of GI is correct, it will also make irrelevant his 
contention that state capacity increases through pressures from the business community. 
 
12
 See Weiss for a detailed discussion of these forms of government-business relations and 
consequently the role of the state in industrial transformation. 
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are weak and facilitates their creation where they are not in existence (Edigheji, 
1997). Encompassing associations, as the literature on corporatism has shown, make it 
easier for intra-industry consensus on the one hand, and agreements between capital 
and the state on the other (see Katzenstein, 1985; and Scharpf, 1991).  Through such 
collaborative networks, the state facilitates the sharing of technology and market 
information between firms, as well as the pooling together of resources. In addition, it 
enables the state and capital to share the cost of economic transformation such as 
training and retraining of workers, acquisition of new technology, etc. This is all the 
more important in the informatics age characterised by the astronomical costs of 
R&D. 
Kuo succinctly captured the importance of government relations with an 
encompassing business association.  According to him:  
 
[e]ncompassing associations resolve collective action problems such as coordination 
of production and sales, provision of club goods (e.g. sharing of technology and 
markets information), negotiation between upstream and downstream producers, and 
networking with foreign buyers and sellers. In terms of state-business relations, these 
associations, as representatives of their respective business sectors, provide a forum 
for their members to articulate their interests.  Then the associations can conduct 
research, engage in internal negotiation, filter out unrealistic and inconsistent 
demands, and finally, formulate concrete policy recommendations. The association 
also routinely participates in the decision making and implementation of national 
economic policies, monitors against detrimental policies and distorted 
implementation, and offers policy feedback to decision makers (Kuo, 1995: 36).  
  
Through the state-informed coordinated public-private cooperation, the state is 
thus able to socialize the risk of transformation by relieving capital from bearing the 
entire cost of raising capital, finding new markets, developing new products and 
upgrading of skills (Weiss, 1998: 48). In such circumstances, the state or capital could 
take initiatives and negotiate with the other. Similarly, the state could take initiatives 
and delegate to industry or business associations to implement them.  As Kuo has 
shown, the Taiwanese state delegated to the Taiwanese Electric Appliance 
Manufacturers’ Association (TEAMA) the power to issue export licenses and to 
control the import of certain products. TEAMA was able to carry out this task because 
of its cohesive nature. Such coordinated state-capital relations helped Taiwan to 
transform its industrial structure, upgrade its technology and capture new markets, as 
well as upgrade both the technical and management skills of its workforce.  
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A major weakness of the concept of GI, like the concepts of GMT and 
embeddedness, is that it conceives of state connectedness only in terms of capital, to 
the exclusion of broader society. The evidence presented by Weiss indicates that 
where the state is only linked to civil society, the state has been more prone to 
redistributive policies than those that emphasize production. Implicitly, GI suggests 
that state-civil society relationship is unfavourable to economic growth. This study 
will test whether or not this is the case, empirically.   
Weiss attempts to make a distinction between transformative capacity and 
distributive capacity. In her view, transformative capacity means the ability of the 
state to coordinate industrial change to meet a changing global context, while 
distributive capacity refers to the state’s capacity to distribute income and wealth.  
Accordingly, she contends that states with transformative capacity achieve better 
economic performance, both in terms of economic growth and equity, than countries 
with distributive capacity.  In between lay states with dual capacities, which combine 
both transformative and distributive capacities. From this logic, we would expect that 
such states perform better than those with only one of the two capacities.   
However, on a closer examination of her thesis, it is clear that the distinctions 
between both sets of capacities are blurred since almost all states have an element of 
transformative and distributive capacities, making it difficult to test empirically. By 
contrast, this study takes as its point of departure a reference to the transformative 
capacities as states with capabilities to engineer both growth and redistribution 
simultaneously. This study therefore offers an alternative conception of 
transformative capacities. In other words, it can be hypothesized that states with 
transformative capacity do not only ensure the promotion of industries that are 
essential for its long-run welfare, but also ensure that the fruits of transformation are 
distributed to the vast majority of its population. 
Borrowing from Linds (1992), Weiss’ analytic framework leads her to the 
concept of a catalytic state in the era of internationalisation (she disputes the concept 
of globalisation).   According to her, “Catalytic states seek to achieve their goals less 
by relying on their own resources than by assuming a dominant role in coalitions of 
states, transnational institutions and private-sector groups” (Weiss, 1998: 208). The 
concept of a catalytic state confines the sources of state power to regional, global 
alliances, as well as cooperation with business.  This fails to recognise the importance 
of state alliances with other centres of power.   
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In contrast to Weiss, Castells’ (1998) concept of a network state suggests that 
state capacity is also derived from alliances between the national state with provincial 
and local governments, in addition to regional and international alliances.  
Consequently, sources of state strength may not be confined to upward alliances, but 
may also include downward alliances. This involves considerable decentralisation and 
delegation of power from the national to the provincial and local governments. 
Through the concept of the network state, Castells shows that variations in national 
economic outcomes are derived from the state’s ability to recognise these other 
centers of powers and to enter networking arrangements with them in promoting its 
developmental project. These networks with regional and international bodies, as well 
as the decentralisation of powers to provincial and local government, are other sources 
of state capacity. Consequently, we might expect that the ability of states to establish 
linkages with these other nodes of authority can account for much of the variation in 
national economic outcomes or differences in economic performance between 
countries. This is the subject of the next chapter. 
Although this is an important contribution to the debate on national variations 
and state capacity, Castells did not theorize it in any detail.  In addition, another 
limitation of the network state thesis is that it provides no room for civil 
society/community engagements, nor does it see these engagements as additional 
factors that enhance state capacity.  
 
2. 6: Conclusion 
 
This chapter began by arguing that state institutions determine national 
economic outcome. It is clear from the literature that there lacks a holistic theory on 
state capacity. In the developmental state literature, especially Evans’ contribution, it 
is clear that state autonomy enables bureaucrats to act in a coherent fashion and 
commits states to a long-term view of their economies, rather than a focus on short-
term gains. In addition, corporate coherence enables the state to strategically engage 
with its social partners. The impact of autonomy on economic performance is one of 
the primary concerns of this study. Among most of the theories, however, there are 
major differences on how the relationship with society impacts state capacity. While 
Johnson and Wade would see state dominance over society as a source of its 
transformative capacity, Weiss’ GI and Evan’s concept of synergy see state capacity 
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being derived from cooperative relations with society. In synergy, the state is linked to 
civil society to the exclusion of business, while GI links the state only to business.  
In terms of objectives of the state, most of the existing theories, GMT, 
embeddedness and GI focus more on the process of accumulation, with little regard 
for how the fruits of economic success are shared among the various population 
quintiles in society. Although, the concept of synergy has equity concerns, it has 
limited applicability in that it is an exclusionary process: business is not conceived as 
one of the stakeholders in the development process. This study will therefore explore 
the association between synergy and economic development, that is, growth and 
equity.  
It is therefore clear from the above literature reviews that there exists no 
holistic theory of state capacity, a theory where the state is simultaneously linked to 
business and civil society. It should also be clear that here are good reasons to expect 
that such a theory could be useful.  It is to this need that I turn in chapter three: to 
develop a holistic theory on state capacity.  
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Chapter Three 
 
Synergistic Autonomy: Towards a Holistic State Capacity Theory 
 
3. 0: Introduction 
 
This study of the state’s transformative capacity and its role in social and 
economic transformation will go beyond most current analytical frameworks. In all of 
the theories discussed in chapter two, the state is either linked to capital or to civil 
society: such linkages are seen as sources of state capacity. These state theorists share 
one thing in common: they fail to articulate a state theory that simultaneously 
accommodates capital and civil society as the basis for equitable growth (E-Growth), 
also referred to as shared growth (Campos and Root, 1996). Does this mean that there 
is no analytical framework that can link the state to both civil society and capital at 
the same time that will have positive economic outcomes?  Put differently, can the 
state’s alliances with both capital and civil society not be a source of its capacity and 
consequently economic growth and equity?  
It is this void that the theory of the Synergistic Autonomous State (SAS) is 
meant to fill. It should, however, be noted that the concept of SAS is built upon and 
complements the existing theories discussed in chapter two. This will become evident 
in the argument that follows.  This chapter seeks to demonstrate that the sources of 
state capacity lie in the state’s internal institutional structures (autonomy) and its 
simultaneous ties with capital and civil society - synergy.  Therefore, unlike Evans 
(1997a) who limits the concept of synergy to state-civil society relations, I offer an 
alternative conceptualization of synergy. In this study, state-society synergy is defined 
as the sharing of power and collaboration between the state, capital and civil society 
within an institutional framework that enhances the capacity of the state to foster 
equitable growth. At the same time, this conceptualization places limits on the ability 
of the state and social actors to act arbitrarily, and thus promotes accountability of 
state officials to broader societal interests. Compared to existing studies that limit 
synergy to government-civil society relations, this study adopts a more inclusive 
approach to the concept of synergy in terms of both its objectives and institutional 
configurations. By synergy, I mean four-part relations, including: 1) the state; 2) 
business; 3) trade unions; and 4) civil society. In addition, and unlike existing studies 
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where the economic effects of synergy are located on the redistributive side, this study 
argues that synergistic state-society relations generate both economic growth and 
equity effects. It is however, important to note that existing studies have not tested 
whether synergy or a coordinating ministry can explain growth and equity. This test 
will be provided in chapters 7 and 8 of this study.  
A central argument in this chapter is that a synergistic autonomous state (SAS) 
is immersed in concomitant networks of relations with different nodes of power. This 
is especially the case in an era of globalisation characterised by “multiplicity of 
linkages and interconnections between the state and societies” (McGrew 1992: 23). 
This approach is the most useful conceptual tool to explain these relationships and 
thus the sources of state capacity to engage with the globalisation process. In other 
words, the SAS is best suited to tap into these various networks engendered by 
globalisation. How these relations are structured however, vary across countries, over 
time and sectors.  
This chapter is divided into two sections. The first section explains the need 
for equitable growth (E-Growth) or shared growth.13  Section two sets out the 
underlying theoretical framework of the study. The concept of the SAS, with its two 
complementary institutional structures (autonomy and synergy), are seen as the 
sources of its transformative capacity; that is, the state capacity to promote E-Growth.  
 
3. 1: Institutional Character of a Synergistic Autonomous State and Equitable 
Growth 
 
This section attempts to define the institutional character of the synergistic 
autonomous state (SAS), which are the sources of its transformative capacity. By 
transformative capacity, I mean the state’s capabilities to engineer/promote E-Growth.  
It should be remembered that all the state theorists introduced in chapter two were 
unable to articulate a theory that simultaneously accommodates capital and civil 
society, the main subject of this chapter. The main proposition of this study is that 
states with coherent bureaucracies that are synergistically tied with their surrounding 
social structures tend to achieve better economic performance – E-Growth. Flowing 
from this, I postulate that variations in state institutions and variations in state-society 
                                                         
13
 The terms equitable growth or shared growth will be used interchangeably throughout this study.  
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relations account for differences in national economic performance. The reminder of 
this chapter is an attempt to set out the theoretical context for this hypothesis. 
 
3. 1. 1: Equitable Economic Growth (E-Growth) 
 
In the last two decades, the discourse on economic restructuring has been 
dominated by the neo-liberal approach, which emphasizes markets as the most 
efficient allocator of resources. John Williamson (1990) has coined the now popular 
phrase to describe this approach. According to him, the Washington Consensus “had 
little to say about social issues…and almost nothing to say about the environment” 
(Williamson, 1990: 83). As he subsequently explained, “I deliberately excluded from 
[my 1990] list [of Consensus tenets] anything that was primarily redistributive 
…because … I felt … that it was contemptuous of equity concerns” (Williamson, 
1993: 1329). The main but narrow concern of this paradigm was to get the 
fundamentals right– fiscal discipline, labour market flexibility, privatisation and trade 
liberalisation—as the vehicle for global competitiveness and economic growth. The 
benefits of growth will then trickle-down to the vast majority of the population. The 
state should therefore avoid a direct redistribution policy, which they argued would 
undermine the growth prospect of a country. But quite the contrary, investment in 
human capital have the potential to lead to social inclusion and economic growth. In 
general, the Washington Consensus paid lip service to issues of redistribution and its 
negative political and economic consequences. If it was worried about question of 
equity, this worry was relegated to the background – something that has to be 
addressed later. Its main and immediate concerns were technical views of economic 
development – liberalisation, macroeconomic stabilisation and privatisation. Given 
the little attention paid to equity by the Washington Consensus, it is not surprising 
that income inequality has risen in most developing countries since the 1980s (Cornia, 
2004). 
Since the 1980s, the trickle-down approach informed the World Bank –IMF 
imposed structural adjustment programmes (SAPs) in most developing countries. 
From Africa to Latin America, the adoption of neo-liberal policies was followed by 
socio-political upheavals, in some cases food riots. The protests were due to the fact 
that policies based on market fundamentalism did not address issues such as mass 
poverty, disease, pervasive illiteracy, and income and wealth inequalities that plagued 
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much of the developing world. In some cases, such policies not only exacerbated 
these crises but also threatened democratic governance.  This suggests that although 
economic growth is important, it is not a sufficient condition for democratic 
development.  
This study departs from the neo-liberal approach. Consequently, I will argue 
that although economic growth is important, the vast majority of the population 
should share in its benefits through provision of a social safety net for the poor.  The 
motivation for focusing on distributional issues is not just normative: such a strategy 
can generate potential economic and political benefits.  These are grounded on recent 
thinking in development economics. 
Until recently, most observers assumed that there was a negative correlation 
between inequality and economic growth and that a high level of equity is bad for 
economic growth. Hence, some scholars and development institutions focused on the 
trade-off between inequality and growth, the argument being that redistributive 
policies tend to hamper growth. This tendency is aptly captured in the title of a journal 
article by Li and Zou (1998), to wit, “Income Inequality is not Harmful for Growth: 
Theory and Evidence”. But recent research points to the complementarities or synergy 
between equity and growth: that high equity is good for growth. This research is 
grounded on sound theoretical foundations. The main arguments, which I will discuss 
subsequently (although not in any particular order) have been grouped by Knowles 
(2005) into three main models, namely: the political economy model, the socio-
political instability model, and the imperfect capital markets’ model.  
The argument is that equitable distribution of income and wealth has positive 
spin-offs on investment and growth. In a review of twenty-three empirical studies, 
Benabou (1996: 2) concluded that “initial inequality is detrimental to growth” and is 
bad for poverty reduction. I will highlight the reasons for this significant negative 
correlation between inequality and growth. Similar conclusion has been reached by 
other scholars such as Ravallion (n.d: 16) who points out that “On balance, the 
existing evidence using cross-country growth regressions appear to offer more support 
for the view that inequality is harmful to growth than the opposite view, which was 
prevailing in development economics for decades”.  
To explain this relationship, the first, political economy, model points out that 
a low level of inequality creates conditions for growth as it is likely to result in higher 
rates of savings and investment. Conversely, “Unequal distribution will lead to 
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pressure through distortionary taxes, hence reducing growth” (Knowles, 2005: 2). The 
second, model, the imperfect capital model, argues that high levels of equity are likely 
to result in efficient use and development of human resources, with positive effects on 
economic growth. We are reminded by Bardhan and Bowles (n.d: 3) that “recent 
developments in inequality itself may have adverse incentive effects, leading to lower 
levels of work effort, less on-the-job learning, restricted opportunities to undertake 
productive investments in both education and business, while limiting the scope of co-
operative problem-solving…”  
The third model, the socio-political stability model, points to the positive 
socio-political benefits of E-Growth: E-Growth is likely to have positive spin-offs on 
economic growth. These potential effects have been articulated by the Managing 
Director of the International Monetary Fund, Mr Michel Camdessus.  He points out 
that “greater income equality…can help secure support crucial for reform and 
sustainable growth” (Camdessus, 1995: 3). In a similar vein, Gershman and Irwin 
(2000: 19) point out that: 
 
…recent studies suggest that greater initial equality, not inequality, is beneficial for 
growth itself. Initial equality also enhances the degree to which GDP growth enables 
poverty reduction. One study estimates that annual per capita GDP growth of 10 
percent “would reduce the incidence the incidence of income poverty by 30 percent in 
relatively egalitarian societies… and by only 10 percent in less equal societies. 
 
A growth where the fruits are not equally shared and the vast population 
continues to live in poverty would result in domestic social and political instability. 
This in turn could adversely impact economic growth as has been seen in both 
Indonesia in the late 1990s and Argentina at the turn of the twenty-first century. 
Taking the argument of the likely adverse effects of inequality on economic growth 
further, Benabou argued that “socio-political conflict reduces the security of property 
rights, thereby discouraging accumulation” (Benabou, 1996: 4). Insecurity of property 
rights discourages investors, and consequently leads to low growth.  
The social and political crisis that led to the eventual fall of the Suharto 
dictatorship in Indonesia in 1998 was partly due to the fact that, in spite of decades of 
economic growth, the country’s income and wealth remained concentrated in a few 
hands with the majority of the people living in poverty and misery. In turn, socio-
political instability, as in the Indonesia case, adversely impacted on the economy as it 
  45 
undermined investor confidence and the growth prospect of a given country.14 In 
addition, in order to optimally utilise its resources and achieve overall efficiency an 
economy may require a shared growth (although there might be exceptions such as the 
US).  The words of Stiglitz (2000: 5) are apposite in this regard: 
 
… an economy in which wealth is concentrated in few hands may not only be less 
productive—as agency costs lead to undermining of productivity—but there is actual 
scope for government intervention to make both workers and capitalists better off. 
There are pecuniary externalities that arise that have real consequences. The 
distortions associated with static resource allocation may be increased over time, 
through distorted incentives to innovative….   
 
  The recent socio-economic crisis in Argentina must forewarn those, especially 
in emerging economies, that are pursuing growth without paying attention to the 
social and political impacts of unbridled liberalisation and globalisation.  This also 
brings to mind the question of socialization of risks that comes with economic 
liberalisation and competitiveness measures — policies aimed at improving the living 
standards of the vast population needs to be addressed. As Rodrik (1995) warned, if 
the tension between the imperatives of economic liberalisation and the need for the 
provision of social insurance for the vast majority of people is not managed 
intelligently and creatively, it is possible that the domestic consensus favouring open 
markets may erode, and be replaced by a generalised resurgence of protectionism. A 
number of commentators and scholars from diverse ideological backgrounds are 
expressing concerns about the adverse negative social and political effects of 
globalisation, and are consequently advocating that states must devise mechanisms to 
share the fruits of economic growth with the vast population (Rodrik, 1995; Castells, 
1998; and Stiglitz, 2002). In fact, Stiglitz (2002: 4) has gone so far as to argue that the 
goal of development should be “sustainable, equitable and democratic growth”.   
Earlier, in a paper delivered at the World Institute of Development Economic 
Research (WIDER), Helsinki, though not using the same phrase, Stiglitz (1998) made 
the case for what I term E-Growth. In his words, “We seek equitable development, 
which ensures that all groups in society, not just those at the top, enjoy the fruits of 
development” (Stiglitz, 1998: 46). This, among other things, is to ensure economic, 
social and political stability.  In other words, to ensure social cohesion and political 
                                                         
14
 FDI flows to Indonesia fell from a peak of $4.7 billion in 1997, which was the beginning of the 
socio-political unrest), to less than $0.4 billion in 1998 (UNCTAD, 2001). 
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support for economic reforms requires that all share the fruits of growth. As Campos 
and Root (1996: 2) put it,  
 
Sharing gave the less fortunate a stake in the economy, thereby discouraging 
disruptive activities and diminishing the risk of regime failure. It enabled the regimes 
to concentrate on promoting rational economic policies by reducing the need to 
constantly contend with the issues of redistribution: when everyone starts out under 
less desperate conditions, there will be less concern with choosing policies strictly for 
their distributional consequences. Growth-promoting policies were more durable over 
the long-term and more credible to the business community. Shared growth resulted 
in broad support for the regimes. The regimes, then, could avoid standard interest 
group pressures to provide privileges and thus could mitigate capture by narrow 
interests. A virtuous circle was ultimately affirmed: investment increased, spurring 
growth and higher real incomes, which reinforced the credibility of the regime, 
further stimulating investment and economic expansion. 
 
Equitable development is therefore desirable for sustained growth. But there 
are contrasting cases. Uganda and Botswana, countries that are held up by the World 
Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) as African success stories, have 
achieved economic growth without equity. Indeed, their growth has come in the midst 
of increasing poverty, marked by increasing unemployment, underemployment, 
inequalities and the informalisation of their economies. Inequalities are also growing 
in these countries. In Uganda for example, the share of income received by the highest 
10% income quintile increased from 27.2% of total income in 1989/90 to 31.2% in 
1992/93. In the same period, the share of received income received by the lowest 20% 
income quintile decreased from 8.5% to 6.6% of total income (World Bank, 1993; 
World Bank 2000).  In Botswana, often hailed as “an African miracle” (Samatar, 
1999) by virtue of being one of the fastest growing economies in the world in the last 
two decades, the growth has been marked by increasing inequalities, with the richest 
20% receiving 59% of total income and the poorest 40% receiving 12% of the total 
income and a Gini coefficient of 0.54 (Kerapeletswe and Moremi, 2001).  Inequitable 
growth in Botswana results from three related features of the country: 1) the political 
leadership’s inclination not to radically address social inequalities; 2) the absence of a 
strong and encompassing civil society that could engage the state in addressing issues 
of equity; and 3) the unwillingness of the political leadership to nurture strong civil 
society and form synergistic relationship with it (Samatar, 1999). Whilst the 
Botswanan state is autonomous, strong and encompassing, the country lacks both civil 
society groups and synergy. However, the jury is still out as to whether these 
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countries will continue to pursue quantitative growth while ignoring the qualitative 
improvement of the material conditions of their people.   
I will add a fourth model, which I term the equity-poverty nexus. This is 
because equity probably has a poverty-reduction effect. Thus, in addition to its 
contribution to growth and socio-political stability, high levels of equity can reduce 
poverty and make qualitative improvements in human conditions. In this study, equity 
means that all groups in society benefit equally from economic growth. Although 
there is no consensus yet in the empirical work, some studies point to the fact that a 
reduction in inequality seems to lead to a reduction in absolute poverty. In other 
words, high inequality could undermine efforts at poverty reduction.  According to 
Ravallion (n.d: 11) “there is ample evidence to support concerns that high or rising 
inequality is putting a break on the prospects for poverty reduction through growth”. 
Birdsall (2005) has persuasively demonstrated the harmful effects of inequality on 
growth, using developing countries as examples. According to her:  
 
In developing countries inequality is usually economically destructive; it interacts 
with underdeveloped markets and ineffective government programmes to slow 
growth – which in turn slows progress in reducing poverty. Economic theory suggests 
why: weak credit markets and inadequate public education mean only the rich can 
exploit investment opportunities. Middle income and poor households cannot borrow 
and miss out on potentially high returns on their own farms and small business 
ventures for example – often higher returns than the rich are getting on their capital. 
The most able children of the less rich miss on education and skills that would 
maximize their own economic prospects and their countries’ own growth (Birdsall, 
2005: 1).   
 
Both Benabou (1996) and Birdsall (2005) suggest the initial high 
concentrations of income and land in Latin America were significant impediments to 
growth. In contrast, the equal distribution of income and land were instrumental to the 
high growth rates in East Asian countries. Hence Benabou persuasively argued that 
“initial inequality is detrimental to long-run growth” (Benabou, 1996: 2).  
There are therefore strong theoretical grounds for focusing on E-Growth rather 
than the narrow growth concerns of neo-liberalism. Against this background, the 
remainder of this chapter focuses on the institutional characteristics of SAS and the 
likely interactions between the institutional characteristics and institutional objectives.  
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3. 2. 1: State Autonomy and Equitable Growth 
 
State autonomy is one of the major sources of the transformative capacity of 
the Synergistic Autonomous State (SAS). Autonomy here is defined by the Weberian 
bureaucratic attributes of the state models discussed in chapter two, that is, its 
insularity, coherence and the fact that it is staffed by qualified and highly-paid human 
resources who are committed to corporate goals. Meritocratic recruitment, predictable 
career paths and the presence of a coordinating ministry are likely to have important 
positive impacts on economic equitable growth.  In this section, I will set out the E-
Growth imperatives of state autonomy. I will begin by discussing the possible effects 
of autonomy on growth and then proceed to discuss its likely associated impacts on 
equity.  
In a competitive global economy, bureaucratic elites must have the requisite 
knowledge and expertise to analyze complex economic information and advise the 
political elites on the global economy. In addition, these elites must take the necessary 
steps to be taken for their economy to attract investment, create jobs, extend basic 
services to the general populace, as well as mitigate the adverse effects of 
globalisation. Given that political leaders appointed to cabinet positions do not often 
have a background in their policy area, they must rely on the expert advice provided 
by the economic bureaucratic elites.  
The importance of skilled economic bureaucratic elites to fostering economic 
growth and equitable development cannot be overemphasized. Especially in 
developing countries—where the state is an economic planner, regulator, and provider 
of basic services—the state requires knowledgeable and insulated bureaucratic elites 
who are capable of proposing solutions to its problems, as well as effectively utilising 
national resources to meet shared needs.  
There is a convergence of views in academic and development circles that 
meritocratic recruitment is likely to ensure efficiency and to minimize corruption.15 
Also, meritocratic recruitment is likely to foster esprit de corps – the camaraderie 
spirit that will enhance the capacity of the state. Such a bureaucracy, however, needs 
to be complemented by a political leadership that sets the context for transformation 
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  Although from a different ideological orientation, the World Bank has increasingly come to 
recognise the importance of institutions to efficiency in government.  See World Development Report 
2000/2001.  
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and ensures the accountability of the bureaucratic elite. This, in turn, ensures that 
resources are allocated to meet economic and social needs, improves service delivery 
by the state and facilitates growth in the private sector. Bureaucratic coherence would 
enable the state to mobilize the collective, aimed at expanding market share (Weiss 
and Hobson, 1995), and thereby enhance global competitiveness. The contrasting case 
would be one where recruitment is based on patronage. In the latter, inefficiency is 
likely to be the norm as officials are more likely to be loyal to their mentor(s), rather 
than to organisational goals. Such bureaucracies would divert resources from 
productive, income-generating and life-improving activities to wasteful consumption 
activities.  Meritocratic recruitment therefore minimizes corruption. In contrast, where 
bureaucratic recruitment is based on patronage, there is greater degree of corruption.  
This is a drag on economic growth. 
Where bureaucratic elites have predictable career paths, they are likely to 
identify with organisational goals, which would create disincentives for the individual 
maximization that comes through corrupt practices. They are therefore more likely to 
effectively utilise resources for the well-being of the nation – expanding the 
productive economic base of the country and gearing resources that will improve 
peoples’ lives.  In contrast, even the best-conceived policies are likely to fail in 
countries where the bureaucratic elites are more concerned with their own protection 
and individual maximization than the success of the programme (Peters, 1989: 191). 
Such a condition fosters rentierism and public policies will not be predicated on any 
rational economic sense or collective well-being of the society. Instead, policy 
becomes largely a function of particular special interests and individual maximization. 
In fact, there are numerous stories where the state has become the source of primitive 
accumulation for state officials in the developing world, with adverse effects on E-
Growth. In the absence of autonomy, the state tends to be overwhelmed by 
particularistic economic interests and is, therefore, less responsive to broad interests. 
The collapse into clientelism could further undermine the capacity of the state to 
formulate policies that promote collective goals.  
Evans and Rauch (1999) have powerfully argued the strong connection 
between state autonomy and economic growth thus: 
 
…predictable and rewarding career path, and meritocratic recruitment, increases the 
propensity of state officials to advocate public infrastructural investment rather than 
consumption expenditures. Since the returns from public infrastructure investments 
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depend essentially on their “systemness,” the coherence … should enhance their 
effectiveness. Likewise, the reduction in individual maximizing (i.e. corrupt) 
practices should reduce the implicit tax on the private sector that such practices 
represent… shared perceptions of the state… as dependable, predictable, minimally 
competent and itself committed to long-term growth makes investment appear less 
risky. Competent bureaucracies can help individual entrepreneurs overcome 
coordination problems that may be especially crucial in instigating new activities. 
They can also turn informational resources into public goods in ways that increases 
the likelihood and effectiveness of investment. Respected bureaucracies could act as 
‘honest brokers” in overcoming collective action problems among exporters (Evans 
and Rauch, 1999: 8). 
 
It however needs to be pointed out that where the state uses its autonomy to 
promote narrow interests or promote the wrong sectors, such as the Malaysian state 
promotion of heavy industries in the 1980s, it is likely to have negative consequences 
on national economic development. Also, the state is likely to face opposition from 
actors not favoured by its policies, which in turn may impede growth. It is for this 
reason that the state needs to build cooperative relations with social actors (I will 
return to this subject in the next section).  In addition, it is important that rents are not 
only transparently allocated but that beneficiaries meet certain performance 
requirements. As Aoki et al. (1996:14) have persuasively argued that “if policy-
induced rents are provided on the condition of fulfilment of an objective criterion, 
they may induce private agents to supply more goods that are undersupplied in the 
competitive process”. In fact policy-induced rents that are transparently distributed are 
likely to force private agents to act to further the development objectives of the state.  
A super ministry, or intelligent state agencies, is another component of 
autonomy that has important growth imperatives. The literature on developmental 
states generally recognises a super ministry as one of the major factors that account 
for their success.  A super ministry is likely to enhance the capacity of the state to set 
a clear vision of transformation, align programmes from various 
ministries/departments with the national vision, and build consensus around its 
transformative agenda. The presence of a super ministry enhances state coherence. 
This in turn would enable bureaucratic elites to take a long-term view of 
transformation and channel investments from declining sectors to sunrise, 
technological innovative sectors that will enhance a country’s competitiveness in the 
global economy. State coordination is another important factor for successful 
economic transformation. As has been succinctly argued by both Johnson (1982) and 
Evans (1995), industries are able to successfully anticipate change in the global 
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economy due to the coordinating role of pilot agencies. That Japan and Korea have 
excelled in, and dominated, the global informatics sector is because this sector has 
been targeted by the pilot agencies. In other words, in both countries, the state created 
a focal point and channelled resources towards its attainment. As Chang (1994) notes, 
where the state creates a focal point or consensus around which decisions are made, it 
helps to reduce transaction costs, adapt to changing local and global conditions, as 
well as shape the global economic conditions. 
Equitable advantages are also derived from an autonomous state bureaucracy. 
Because state officials identify with national goals, they minimize corruption with 
potential positive effects on E-Growth. Implicitly, autonomous state bureaucracies 
reduce taxes that would have been imposed on citizens where state officials are 
corrupt. Furthermore, bureaucratic elites are more likely to utilise resources efficiently 
and provide services to meet the needs of the population. Autonomous state agencies 
would be able to extract resources, e.g., taxes from the population, and channel them 
to provide services such as healthcare, education and other basic infrastructures that 
will improve the welfare of the population. In contrast, as we have seen in most 
African countries, the endemic corruption by states officials reduce the tax base as 
citizens avoid paying taxes to governments they see as diverting public funds into 
their private pockets. Weder (2002) reminds us that corruption also increases the costs 
of doing business and raises the break-even point for investment projects, thereby 
lowering economic activities. This, in turn, serves as a disincentive to invest with a 
negative effect on growth.   
Autonomy would not only enhance the capacity of the state to promote global 
economic competitiveness and technological upgrading/innovation but autonomy is 
also likely to enhance the state’s capacity to adopt measures that enable the fruits of 
such changes to be shared by the larger society. In fact, it can be argued that 
autonomy combined with synergistic relations would enable the state to promote 
equitable development, including programmes to transform and improve the skills of 
the workforce and the promotion of life-long learning. It does this by either 
facilitating access to training programmes or subsidizing training by firms. In 
addition, autonomy tends to enhance the state’s capacity to facilitate sunrise industries 
to invest in its territories and thus increase demand for labour.  The latter results in an 
increase in workers’ skills and income, which in turn leads to an improvement in the 
general standards of living. The casual observer may not appreciate the significance of 
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these types of redistributive/equity policies. As Weiss (1998: 153) has correctly 
argued: 
 
… distributive outcomes involve more than simple welfare benefits.  More important 
than outright transfer per se,  … they include measures that promote greater equality 
of income distribution, such as those aimed at keeping people in jobs (rather than 
social security) or supporting the retraining and relocation of workers in declining 
industries, or initiatives sustaining self employment … active labor-market measures 
… 
 
This is not to say that all state intervention leads to development success and 
the location of sunrise industries. History abounds with states that have misdirected 
investments and overstretched their capacities, with catastrophic consequences for 
national development. But state institutional dynamics and composition, including the 
presence of a political leadership that clearly understands and defines the need for 
transformation, makes a huge difference. Coherent within its institutions, these 
institutional dynamics can enable the state to plan carefully, anticipate change, ratify 
mistakes immediately, be focused and not overstretch its capacity and resources, and 
signal to the private sector about new opportunities. This was the case in both 
Malaysia and Korea, which were able to review policies and adjust programmes to 
meet changing circumstances in order to be globally competitive. In fact autonomy is 
a likely candidate to enhance the capacity of the state to embark on systemic planning 
(at times by trial and error), prodding entrepreneurs to invest in new sectors, 
signalling new markets and in some cases, to use Peter Evans (1995) words, mid-
wifing new industries—all of which have strong economic growth imperatives.  The 
literature on the East Asian region has shown that autonomy was instrumental to the 
state’s capacity to encourage both local and international capital to invest in high-
value-added economic activities that propelled them to high growth economies. With 
capable internal institutions and coordination of economic policy, the East Asian 
states were not only able to articulate their goals but also “fostered growth by 
encouraging the business community, … to make long-term investment and upgrade 
organisation and management”  (Campos and Root, 1996: 29). 
Scholars such as Campos and Root (1996) have also drawn attention to the 
likely relationship between autonomy and E-Growth. They argued that autonomous 
states are able to induce the non-elites “to make short-term sacrifices in exchange for 
larger benefits in the long-term” (Campos and Root, 1996: 29). Pointing to East Asia 
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for example, they argued that the state fostered and implemented “highly visible 
wealth-sharing mechanisms – such as land reform, free primary education, and free 
basic health care”(p. 29), through which they secured the support of the non-elites for 
the growth process. In turn, this discouraged the non-elite from embarking on 
disruptive actions that could have undermined investors’ confidence in the economy, 
unlike the situation in most transition economies in the developing would. 
Furthermore, wealth sharing is a virtuous circle – it increases the income and wealth 
among citizens which in turn leads to higher savings and an increase in domestic 
capital formation.  
Another important component that is worth highlighting is the autonomy-
profit- investment nexus. Although there are exceptions, it is generally recognised that 
high profits (accumulation of capital) generate vigorous investment activities (You, 
1999). Autonomy tends to enhance the capacity of the state to formulate and 
implement policies that would improve the profitability of investments. These include 
policies to reduce investment costs through, among other things, low interest rates, 
low import duties for investment goods, provision of industrial infrastructures, etc. In 
addition, autonomy is likely to enhance the capacity of the state to successfully 
formulate and implement policies to reduce the risks of investment, particularly in 
targeted sectors seen as crucial for the state’s project of rapid economic 
transformation. These include greater coordination of policies and regulation of 
investments. You (1999) has eloquently captured this as follows: 
 
East Asian governments reduced risks by coordinating private sector investment 
according to their carefully planned development strategy. This coordination went 
beyond simply indicating which areas to invest in to regulating the overall amount of 
investment to private excessive investment and organizing recession cartels. All these 
reduce risks considerably… (You, 1999: 54). 
 
This discussion suggests that autonomy enhances the capacity of the state to 
promote E-Growth.  
 
3. 2. 2: Synergistic State-Society Relations and Equitable Growth 
 
Unlike the concepts of developmental and catalytic states, the concept of state-
society synergy stresses the importance of the state’s simultaneous relations with 
business and civil society, as well as to regional and international bodies, as the 
source of its capacity. Put differently, synergistic relations are characterised by a 
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multiplicity of alliances, interconnectedness and linkages with these other centres of 
power. The traditional tripartite relations are an apt example of these multiple ties. In 
certain instances, however, civil society organisations are being included. Such as in 
the case of Barbados, where civil society groups – the churches and retired persons’ 
associations – participate as observers (Fashoyin, 2001). The same is true of Mexico, 
beginning in 1987.  These multiple linkages have become important sources of the 
state’s capacity.  In the remainder of this section, I will set out the argument for the 
likely E-Growth imperatives of synergistic state-society relations. 
I will begin with the conceptual frame of synergy. Unlike Evans (1997a), who 
defines synergy in terms of state-civil society organisations and a focus on equity, the 
concept of synergy in this study implies institutionalised relationships between the 
state and multiple nodes of power. At the national level, synergy encompasses state-
business-civil society relationships. In other words, the conception of synergy in this 
study is more inclusive and has a more holistic objective. Therefore, in terms of 
objective, my conception of synergy accords with that of Heller (1997), but differs 
from him and Evans (1997a) in terms of the institutional characteristics of synergistic 
state-society relations. This is because I have adopted a more inclusive approach, 
which, as I have noted earlier, invokes synergy as collaborative power-sharing at the 
state-business-civil society nexus.  It should be pointed out that the degree of such 
relationships with either capital or civil society groups can vary over time, and 
different policy issues.  The concept of synergy implies state immersion of ties with 
multiple centres of power based on trust and reciprocity. Such relations are 
characterised more by cooperation and inducements by the state of its partners than by 
discipline or the imposition of the state’s will over the former. Such linkages, coupled 
with the coherence of the internal state structures, are the defining features of 
synergistic autonomous states. These would enable it to act independently and resist 
pressures from powerful socio-economic interest groups. But this is unlike the 
concept of Governed Market Theory (GMT), or Johnson’s (1982) conception of the 
developmental state that emphasizes the authoritarian character of the state. It is an 
inclusive and democratic policy process and the state is unlikely to resort to positive 
repression. Rather, the state mobilizes inputs from its social surrounding and produces 
outputs to respond to that environment – business and civil society participate in 
agenda setting and policy formulation. In effect, this is a democratic policy process 
that involves both the state and society in policy-making and implementation. 
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Like Governed Independence (GI), synergy is based on cooperative 
relationships, but it departs from GI in that the concept of synergy stresses state-
society relations that go beyond business and trade unions to include NGOs and 
community groups. In addition, I depart from GI, which defines transformative 
capacity only in terms of industrial transformation. In this study, transformative 
capacity denotes the abilities of the state to engineer growth and equity – a shared 
growth. 
Furthermore, the concept of synergy stresses that the state establishes 
downward, upward and sideward alliances with robust, dynamic and voluntary, 
business, community, trade unions, community organisations, and so on, on the basis 
of reciprocity and trust.16 The presence of a robust and dynamic capital sector and 
civil society groups is of crucial importance because they are likely to complement the 
state in its transformative task. As will be argued subsequently, where the state’s 
socio-economic partners are absent or fragmented, a synergistic state brings into being 
or nurtures the same institutional and cultural resources to enhance its capacity to 
promote shared growth.  
It should be pointed out that such relations are not free from conflicts. On the 
contrary, they tend to be contested relationships. However, conflicts are likely to be 
mediated, minimised and resolved within the cooperative alliances. As Yeatman 
(1993: 230; cited in Bakker and Miller, 1996) puts it, policies are “informed by 
ongoing and openly contested politics of voice and representation”.  Nonetheless, 
conflicts are minimised and resolved through cooperative alliances, constituting a 
basis for an organised consensus over the transformative project. Bingman (1989) 
came to the same conclusion in his writing on government-business relations in Japan.  
The relative openness and transparency of the process, as well as its being rule-bound, 
are some of the strengths of this contested relationship.  They are democratic and 
competitive processes. As a result, public policy is subject to greater public scrutiny 
and state officials are more accountable. In addition, the inclusion of civil society 
organisations, especially those representing the poor, has an important equity 
imperative. As White (1998) argues, elite groups, by means of their concentrated 
organisational resources, may serve to intensify inequalities in society, both in 
economic and political arenas, rather than correct them. They tend to support existing 
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 See Putnam (1994) for a detailed discussion of the concepts of trust and reciprocity. 
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social, economic and political inequalities, as well as being more disposed to top-
down policy-making and elite pacts. Elite pacts may not coincide with the needs of 
the poor and the socially excluded, as they tend to reinforce existing inequalities. 
Participation of civil society in the policy process could provide an important 
counterweight to capital, which is mostly concerned with the bottom line - profits.  It 
can be argued that a broad coalition of the state, business and civil society is more 
likely to tackle the problems of poverty, inequality, and low growth. This point is 
buttressed by Heller (1996) in his study of the Indian state of Kerala.   
I will therefore argue that countries with synergistic state-society relations are 
more likely to achieve E-Growth than countries where synergy is lacking. 
Consequently, we can hypothesise that the low economic growth, the low 
technological base, and the low infrastructural base of most developing countries, 
coupled with mass poverty and high income inequalities, result from the lack of 
synergistic relations.  
In fact, an inclusive process will not only enhance associational activities but it 
will also give greater legitimacy to democratic regimes, their policies and outcomes.  
These are products of inter-class accommodation, compromises and at times 
consensus, rather than those based on exclusion of key sectors of society, be it 
business or civil society, which in turn fosters conflicts among competing interest 
groups in society. Thus one advantage of synergy is that it is likely to foster contested 
cooperation between business and civil society. Working together in state-coordinated 
consultative mechanisms is likely to engender trust between these two usually 
conflicting sides.  
Furthermore, because synergy is based on institutionalised relationships 
around specific policy areas –  for example macro-economic policy, industrial policy, 
sectoral policy and poverty eradication policy,17 and so on – that are structured and 
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 In countries such as Ghana where state-society relations were on the agenda, but the relationship was 
confined to narrow issues such as traditional labor market issues, the outcome of such mechanisms 
were limited. By implication, therefore, state-society relations should be structured in a way that they 
could address broad national policy such as macroeconomic policy and industrial policy. This position 
departs sharply from that being advanced by staff of the World Bank such as Nick Manning (2001) 
who argues that macroeconomic policy should be driven by insulated national and international 
technocratic elite and that consultative forums and deliberation councils should confine themselves to 
social and sectoral policy.  I take as a point of departure that because the macroeconomic policy 
conditioned the environment in which sector policies take place, macroeconomic policy should come 
under the purview of national institutions of dialogue and consultation. Even in procedural democracy, 
debate and contestation of ideas are seen as important democratic processes. If that is the case, no issue 
should be ruled out a priori as not being subject to debate by stakeholders.  This should be especially 
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rule-based – it enhances the capacity of the collective (i.e., organised interest groups), 
while imposing constraints on individuals in the design and implementation of public 
policy. This minimizes corruption and enhances the effective provision of public 
goods. This would enhance the chances of success for a transformative project. 
Through information sharing between the state and the aforementioned stakeholders, 
the state would be able to better channel resources to where they are most needed. 
Consultation and negotiations would enable stakeholders to listen to each others’ 
positions and to make decisions after due consideration. As a general rule, such 
policies would be more acceptable and lend legitimacy to the policy outcomes. This, 
in turn, could avoid the disruptive behaviour of stakeholders when they are not party 
to policies that affect their members and constituencies. Consultation, consensus 
seeking and information sharing among stakeholders have the characteristics 
generally associated with a good investment climate, and consequently economic 
growth. 
Another central feature of a synergistic state is that, at the national level, the 
state would privilege relationship between the government and encompassing 
business associations and civil society organisations. A synergistic relationship of the 
state with encompassing business associations and civil society bodies has several 
social and economic benefits. Encompassing societal interests – business associations 
and civil society – have the potential to assist government-business-civil society to 
resolve inter-sectoral disputes, share information on economic and industrial 
transformation, provide business managers and leaders of civil society with a state-
like perspective on economic activities, for example, trade opportunities, new source 
of technological innovations, employment generating possibilities, etc. The points 
made by Durand and Silva (1998) about encompassing business associations are 
applicable to other encompassing societal interests. They observed that:  
 
encompassing business associations aggregate sectoral and regional interests, they 
generate policy consensus among business elites with divergent points of 
view…encompassing organisations help to overcome debilitating and 
developmentally counterproductive distributional struggles born of the selfish, narrow 
concerns of sectoral and regional associations…encompassing associations help to 
generate and train…leaders able to articulate and defend general interests instead of 
sectoral interests (Durand and Silva, 1998: 6). 
 
                                                                                                                                                                  
so in a participatory democracy. Only an inclusive process will give macroeconomic policy greater 
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Indeed, through encompassing business associations and civil society groups, 
the state would be able to promote popular participation and forge a broad coalition in 
support of a vision of national transformation. Relationships with encompassing 
societal interests also reinforce the internal coherence and capacity of the state that 
would enable state officials to focus on the goal of national transformation. 
Synergistic relationships between the state and encompassing business associations 
and civil society groups thus have both economic and political benefits. 
Encompassing societal interest groups are able to pull resources together and because 
of their in-house competence to undertake sophisticated analyses on social and 
economic issues. Through such analyses, they are able to make more informed 
contributions to national policies. It also needs to be stressed that encompassing 
associations have potential political benefits: they are able to mobilize their members 
around policies emanating from the institutionalised relationship with the state and 
thus create a stable socio-political environment, which as I have noted above is a 
necessary condition for growth.  
Because such a relationship combines the technical competence of participants 
and the presence of competing sides (e.g., business and civil society organisations), it 
gives legitimacy to adopted policies and smoothens their implementation.  This is 
because the necessary trade-offs are made between setting conditions for increased 
investment, technological change, economic growth and job creation, infrastructural 
development, and issues of poverty alleviation. As Heller (1997) has poignantly 
argued, synergistic relations between the state, business, and civil society create the 
institutional forms and political processes required for negotiating class compromises 
through which the needs for growth and equity are reconciled. This trade off between 
technological innovation (some of which might bring job losses) and retraining of 
workers may be difficult to achieve without synergistic state-capital-society relations. 
State-business-civil society relations are thus a mechanism for negotiating 
compromises through which growth and redistribution are reconciled. Synergistic 
relations also promote accountability and transparency in socio-economic governance 
and thereby enable citizens to monitor state officials more effectively and thus reduce 
the risk of purely rent-seeking or self-serving policies. The resultant outcome is socio-
political stability, as well as democratic socialization of material and cultural life. 
                                                                                                                                                                  
credibility and legitimacy. 
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But synergy may raise the spectre of institutional capture with its associated 
rent-seeking that might undermine a reform agenda. Critics of cooperative alliances 
between state and society, such as public choice theorist Mancur Olson (1982), have 
argued authoritatively that such cooperation with economic actors generates 
“distributional coalitions” with the aim of securing from government private benefits 
for members to the detriment of the broader society.  A state that is synergistically 
autonomous is likely to avoid the danger of institutional capture and rent-seeking 
precisely because of its internal institutional characteristics of meritocracy, insulation 
and stable/predictable career paths for bureaucrats, and the resultant identification 
with organisational goals. These institutional attributes, the openness and transparency 
earlier referred to and the fact that some of the consultative processes have built-in 
monitoring mechanisms, may not only lead to the reduction of bureaucrats’ 
susceptibility to rent-seeking pressures from interest groups but also might dissuade 
socio-economic actors from using institutional ties to seek personal favors. 
Commenting on the Malaysian experience of consultative relationships between the 
state and business (with token participation by labor and NGOs), Biddle and Milor 
(1999: 42) note that: 
 
…the structured and relatively transparent discussions between government and 
business sectors made possible under the Malaysian Inc. policy has facilitated 
information-sharing and helped generate trust among economic stakeholders, has 
enhanced policy credibility in the eyes of the business community, and has 
diminished opportunities for gross corruption within the public sector. 
  
Also, synergistic relations enable the state, business and civil society groups to 
share the costs of economic transformation such as training of workers, R&D, 
acquisition of new technology, as well as being able to tie wage increases to 
productivity.  
Since the policy decision is an outcome of a consultative process, it is likely to 
enjoy wide support from interest groups, as the encompassing interests would be able 
to mobilize support for such a policy, leading to social and economic stability, a 
necessary condition for attracting investments. Because the rules that govern a 
particular industry, labour market issues, employment creation, technological 
innovation, and so on are set out through synergistic relationship of the state with 
(encompassing) business associations and civil society organisations, members are 
assured that the rules will not be arbitrarily changed.  This brings predictability to the 
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economic environment. In those circumstances, industry would tend to concentrate on 
their business, and civil society will more likely work for the success of such policy. 
This would eliminate or at least reduce the tendencies of these societal actors to 
engage in rent-seeking activities and wastage of productive resources to curry favours 
from government officials. Since encompassing business associations and civil 
society groups have a large membership base they are able to mobilize support for 
outcomes of deliberations and negotiations with the state. Also, this tends to impose 
self-regulation on actors and thereby eliminates disruptive behaviour that could 
undermine national transformation. Encompassing business organisation and civil 
society groups are also motivated by their participation in policy making to comply 
with decisions taken, even in the face of adverse decisions in the short run. Such a 
state is likely to achieve better economic outcomes, including E-Growth. 
By contrast, in states where state-society synergy co-exists with fragmented 
societal interests, the process of social compromises is likely to be impeded and 
would therefore achieve limited developmental success. This is because state officials 
have to contend with the narrow and sectional demands of societal actors, with the 
potential to derail the state from its goal – goal displacement. This is the case in most 
developing countries whereby state-societal relationships are with narrow and 
fragmented societal interests that have captured the state. For example, one of 
Africa’s leading political economists, Claude Ake (1996), lamented that African states 
have alienated organised interests from the policy and democratic process, thereby 
spreading resentment, inefficiency and corruption, and, consequently, the people do 
not support the state or its developmental project. Others have similarly noted that 
citizens and their organisations were seldom consulted about public policies (Bratton 
and Walle, 1997). At best, only societal interests with approved memberships were 
consulted by the state. Citing Kashir (1972), they concluded that the post-colonial 
African state tried to circumscribe political participation by shrinking the public 
arena.  In most of postcolonial Africa, like a large number of developing countries, the 
state-society relations can at best be described as paternalistic. In addition, in most 
developing countries business associations and trade unions (and indeed civil society), 
are relatively weak, fragmented, and with limited resources to effectively engage the 
state. As a consequence, most states in developing countries demonstrate very little 
transformative capacity. 
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In such circumstances, the outcome is likely to be the distortion of policies and 
outputs as the state acts as a canteen: distributing favours to its clients rather than 
working for the long-term development of the economic and redistribute resources to 
meet the needs of the general populace. This is what one might call the privatisation 
of public policy or the privatisation of everything. Under such circumstances, the 
outcome is likely to exacerbate economic inequalities. The consequence would be 
social instability, a situation that would deter both local and foreign investors.  Indeed, 
these conditions often lead to capital flight. Of course, there are exceptions—as the 
case of the emerging “little African Tiger”, Mauritius, demonstrates. Ethnically 
heterogeneous, and despite the consequent fragmentation of civil society groups, 
Mauritius has enjoyed shared growth. Brautigan (1997) attributes this to a shared 
ideology of Fabian socialism and export-led growth with equity by the Mauritian 
elites. A shared project by the political and bureaucratic elites can therefore be an 
important variable for ethnically-heterogeneous countries to reduce conflicts that 
might threaten and indeed undermine national development.  
An additional advantage of synergy is that it strengthens and enhances the capacity 
of civil society, with likely positive economic impacts. Noting the complementarity of 
an autonomous state and a strong civil society, Evans argues that:  
 
a sustained efflorescence of civil society may well depend on the simultaneous 
construction and presence of robust, competent organisational counterparts within the 
state. Conversely, a state-society synergy view implies that a move toward less capable 
and involved states will make it more difficult for civic engagement (Evans, 1997b: 82). 
 
Likewise, global companies, according to Evans, require sophisticated and robust 
states for the enforcement of their property rights since such rights are critical to 
profitability. There is also a likely positive correlation between rich/robust state 
institutions that are synergistically immersed with their socio-economic partners and a 
high rate of economic growth with equity. Countries with such institutional 
infrastructures and a unified national agenda are better placed to negotiate with TNCs 
in general (and sunrise industries in particular) to be located within their national 
borders (gaining with it associated benefits - technological innovation, high skills, 
learning organisations and high valued added production). Kuo succinctly (1995: 42, 
emphasis added) puts it thus:  
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countries with such institutional infrastructure, have been able to facilitate linkages 
between FDIs and local producers. Close cooperation among producers and between 
the state and local producers gives the host country a better bargaining position vis-à-
vis FDIs with regard to technology transfer and linkage effects… FDIs can benefit 
from cheap and timely local supplies by providing local producers with necessary 
management and technology know-how.  
 
These factors are crucial both for the attraction and retention of FDI. This is 
particularly so because market agents require economic decisions to be predicated on 
reliable and predictable institutional frameworks. Predictability here implies a stable 
political climate: that the rules of the game (such as the incentive structures, tax 
system, competition policy, etc.) are coordinated, explicit, stable and accessible to 
investors and other economic actors. These become the basis for testing decisions of 
both private and public officials. States with such institutional infrastructures are able 
to facilitate alliances between TNCs and domestic capital. The reverse is the case 
where this is lacking. In this context, a synergistic state limits its role to what Gordon 
(1996) calls interstitial intervention, that is, relying less on direct substantive support 
than on organizing the interface of relatively independent sources of innovation so as 
to maximize its capacity.   
Central to interstitial interventions, which are a product of globalisation, is the 
provision of incentives to the business community and the capacity of the state to 
monitor their compliance (incentives that are both market enhancers and would enable 
the state to achieve the goals of its transformative project). Asianist scholars have 
shown that the interactions between the state and the business community can 
enhance the effectiveness of economic policy (MacIntyre, 1994; Evans, 1995; and 
Campos and Root, 1996).   Through various incentive mechanisms, the state is able to 
systematically monitor the performance of beneficiary firms. Penalties are meted out 
to those that fail to meet set targets while those that achieved set targets are highly 
rewarded by the state. Consequently, such countries are able to upgrade their 
industries, undertake technology innovation and capture (and even dominate) new 
markets (Johnson, 1982; Amsden, 1989; Wade, 1990; and Evans, 1995). Through this 
system of disciplined support, Weiss contends that such countries are able to create 
world-class industries, which are able to secure market share and minimize costs in 
the long run. Disciplined support is also a means for better utilization of public 
resources.  This is because it ensures that public resources are geared towards the 
attainment of the most productive outcomes, either in the form of upgrading products, 
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lowering prices or expanding exports, upgrading skills, etc. Hence it is able to take 
advantage of the creative impulses that flow from globalisation.  
In his study of countries in transition, Encarnacion (1996) notes that strong 
alliances between the state and other economic actors not only serve to improve the 
technical quality of economic transformation but also help to build a political basis of 
support for the particular reform strategy. This imposes self-regulation on actors and 
is conducive to E-Growth because it is in such situations that the state: 
  
is capable of imposing the choices made by groups through a bargaining and 
negotiation process, the decisions are likely to be taken from one group and given to 
another. This means of policy making is, however, a relatively safe manner in which 
to adopt redistribution policy, since it ensures the participation of both winners and 
losers as well as ensuring the application of technical knowledge to the choice. These 
two characteristics - the technical knowledge of participants and the presence of 
competing sides – were important in legitimizing decisions. In Sweden, for example, 
the inclusion of all competing groups is important for the smooth implementation of 
policies adopted by pressure group representatives cooperating with government. 
Participation in policy making may be a sufficient motivation in itself to produce 
compliance with decision taken, even in the face of adverse decisions in the short run. 
In a situation in which elites may lack the cohesion and consensus necessary to 
implement decision, these legitimate interactions between interest groups and the 
state may result in policies of self-regulation and avoidance of disruptive activities 
(Peters, 1989: 162).  
 
Again, policy-making predicated on synergistic relations is likely to both 
deepen democracy and create favourable climate for the investment community, both 
domestic and global. It is not controversial to suggest that a stable socio-political 
climate is a major attraction for foreign investors. 
Similarly, successful participation and the ability to avail of advantages that 
flow from regional trading blocs and multilateral organisations is, to a large extent, 
dependent on cohesive and dynamic domestic institutions – autonomous state 
agencies linked synergistically to business associations and civil society 
organisations. This is more so as “[A]t present world trade, investment, and 
technology transfer are all cast in regional terms” (Edoho, 1997: 19). Successful 
transformation (achieving shared growth) is also contingent on state participation in 
(and interaction with) the various nodes of power including regional and global 
agencies of economic governance. This enables the state (and capital) to be able to 
gather the most up-to-date information, both in terms of market opportunities and 
technological advancements and signal to the private sectors to take advantage of such 
opportunities.  Countries where this exists would be more successful in transforming 
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their technological basis, capturing new markets, undertaking infrastructural 
development and upgrading skills (than in countries where the state is unable to tap 
into these other nodes of power). Autonomy and synergy are however the basis for its 
capacity to successfully engage in regional and global institutions and processes. 
Synergistic relations have important equity imperatives. Production and 
delivery of public goods (services) occur through a process Ostrom (1997) calls co-
production, that is, the active involvement of citizens and their communities in the 
“process of defining and delivery of collective services” (Bakker and Miller, 1996: 
352).  Especially in an era of globalisation (with the drive towards outsourcing and 
privatisation of important social services), business associations and civil society 
bodies become important complements to the state. In the context of synergy, 
business associations and civil society groups play a complementary role to the state 
as implementing agents of public policies in areas where they have expert knowledge 
and skills. This ranges from direct delivery of basic services to enforcing particular 
policies on behalf of the state, as well as mobilization of citizens support for public 
policy. Citizens and their organisations therefore become agents of transformation 
rather than mere recipients of income transfers. The ability of the state to effectively 
engage civic associational life in the process of co-production depends on the 
existence of autonomous state institutions. Service delivery in such societies are more 
likely to “take into account the fact that norms and networks are marked by gender, 
race and other relationships of subordination and domination and are therefore more 
likely to adopt polices aimed at addressing these imbalances” (Bakker and Miller, 
1996: 353, emphasis added). In other words, state-society synergy leads to equitable 
distribution of basic services. 
E-Growth is more likely to be achieved in countries where governments tap 
into community norms of trust and reciprocity and involve citizens in the production 
and delivery of public goods than in countries where these phenomena are lacking. 
Through civic participation in the design and implementation of services, especially 
public goods, the state is able to assess the needs of the people and to channel 
resources to meet those needs. Furthermore, as has been acknowledged by the World 
Bank (1997), civil society participation in the design and implementation of policies 
reduces information gaps and transaction costs. It also leads to the smoother 
implementation of state policies, as well as the enhancement of their credibility and 
sustainability. Also, such civic norms, it is argued, could help to overcome market 
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failures and hence lower transaction costs and consequently improve the efficiency of 
the economic system (Ashan, 2001).   
Another structural feature and source of the capacity of synergy is the 
presence of intermediate associations – statutory bodies (trade associations, industrial 
promotion agencies, advisory bodies, deliberative councils, etc.) made up of 
bureaucrats and representatives (of both labour and capital) of affected industries.  
Because they are crucial to the success of E-Growth, the state facilitates the setting up 
of such bodies as platforms where policy are negotiated and fashioned out. These are 
what the International Labour Organisation (ILO) generally refers to as social 
dialogue institutions, which may be permanent or ad hoc, and -- as rightly observed 
by Biddle et al. (2000) -- may be organised along industrial, sectoral, functional and 
even national lines. But unlike classical corporatist institutions, these may not only be 
composed of membership of peak organisations or limited to the national level but are 
widespread in the society from local to national, from specific to a wide range of 
issues, from sectoral to multi-sectoral and from micro to macro issues. 
Policy networks or intermediate bodies are also important avenues for the 
systematic monitoring and evaluation of policies. If set targets are not met, 
adjustments are made through these avenues. Emphasizing the significance of these 
decision-making mechanisms, Weiss notes, “In so far as public and private decision-
makers get together to exchange information and to coordinate actions, information 
gaps are minimised and each generally ends up making better decisions than if 
trapped in isolation” (Weiss 1998: 58). Policies designed and implemented through 
private-public cooperation also gain wider legitimacy than those that do not. There is 
a positive correlation between credible policies and high rates of investment and 
growth, as well as sustainability of programmes. 
The attractiveness of the concept of synergy is that state relations to its socio- 
economic partners are not limited to the national government and apex organisations, 
as was in the social democratic states, but that such relations permeate the whole of 
society, from the national through the provincial to the local levels. Where these 
attributes exist, according to Bakker and Miller (1996), Burawoy (1997) and Castells 
(1998), local and provincial governments exercise considerable autonomy over socio-
economic and industrial policies rather than being mere implementors of central 
government policies.   
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Decentralisation of power to local and provincial governments does not 
necessarily entail subtraction of resources from the centre but rather it leads to the 
creation of new sources of revenue. Also, it does not mean the hollowing out of the 
nation-state as seems to be suggested by the World Bank (2000) in its World 
Development Report. Castells, writing on China, notes that “provincial and local 
governments invested in new market-oriented businesses, often in joint ventures with 
foreign investors, and became the source of “private” capitalist accumulation, as 
collective entrepreneurs who shared in the benefits of their enterprises” (Castells, 
1998: 298).  Burawoy (1997) came to the same conclusion in his work on China. 
According to him, rather than concentrating on resources they could obtain from the 
central government, provincial and local governments focused on the generation of 
resources from below.  In other words, the nature of the relationship provided scope 
for investment opportunities (including local economic development) and 
subsequently, the creation of more national wealth. 
The contributions of regional and local governments to national economic 
development are immense and indeed immeasurable. They provide vital supports and 
collective services to industry. In particular, according to Hirst and Thompson (1999: 
274): 
 
regional governments are the public articulation of industrial districts composed of small 
and medium sized firms, and are a major reason why such firms can be internationally 
competitive and enjoy advantages comparable to the economies of large firms. The 
existence of regional economic governance, of thriving industrial districts and of an 
effective partnership and division of labour between national states and regional 
governments is a central component of the success of national economies in world 
markets.  
 
One of the foremost students of institutions, Robert Putnam (1993) illustrates the 
centrality of local and regional governments to local and regional economic 
developments in his path-breaking study of modern Italy. As he observes, local 
governments provided necessary social infrastructure and services, such as training, 
information on exports and technology firms located in the industrial districts.  Firms 
in the industrial districts were encouraged to compete for innovation and efficiency, 
while cooperating in R&D, administrative services, raw materials purchases and 
financing.  Coupled with the presence of active industrial associations, these firms 
combined both low vertical and high horizontal integration, which accounted for the 
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successful regions’ technological advancement and their flexible economic structure, 
the basis of their competitiveness in a globalising world. 
Decentralisation is not without its problems.  For example, we often find a lack of 
resources and skills in local communities and local civil society organisations to 
engage in the policy process, as well as the problem of coordination between various 
levels of government in developing countries. Still, decentralisation has distinct 
developmental benefits. As we noted above, it tends to make government responsive 
to their needs, strengthens associational life and political participation at the local 
level, and promotes bottom-up while de-emphasizing top-down inputs in political 
institutions and developmental processes. In addition, decentralisation encourages 
citizens to monitor and evaluate development projects, and through their participation 
would, in all probability, own such projects. 
As part of the decentralisation process, front managers are given considerable 
leverage (and scope for initiatives) rather than being constrained by the rigidity that 
characterised the Fordist state model with its mass production and centralised state 
administration.  
In concluding this section, I argue that synergistic state-business-civil society 
relations reduce collective action problems amongst industrial interests, on the one 
hand, and between capital and the state, on the other. Cooperation that flows from 
synergy would lead to the sharing of information and R&D cost. Ultimately, state-
informed synergy would enhance the quality of policy. This is because negotiations 
and renegotiations of policy between business and state foster a culture of learning-
by-doing on both parties, which in turn enhances the quality of economic policy. 
Consequently, through its interactions with other nodes of power, identified above, 
and through its independent actions, the state is able to provide the basic ingredients 
for global competitiveness and economic growth. These include health, education, job 
training, R&D policies, infrastructural development, competition policy, etc. 
Furthermore, synergy is likely to enhance the capacity of the state to ensure that the 
fruits of economic growth are equally shared by all segments of society.  This thus 
entails a commitment to alleviation of both absolute and relative poverty. And 
because the policy process is inclusive, all the social partners make specific 
commitments to the attainment of the goals of shared growth. 
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3. 3: Conclusion 
 
From the foregoing discussion, we can expect that the Synergistic 
Autonomous State (SAS), due to its internal institutional framework – autonomy and 
synergistic relations with society – is likely to achieve E-Growth.   
The main contribution of this chapter has been to suggest that the explanation 
for state transformative capacities lie in the internal capacity of state institutions and 
in their synergistic relations with various networks of power, nationally and globally. 
Variations in national economic outcome (growth with equity) therefore tend to 
depend on domestic institutions. These include insularity of a coherent and competent 
state bureaucracy staffed by qualified and highly-paid human resources and 
complemented by the presence of political elites with whom it shares a transformative 
agenda. Furthermore, this includes the existence of centralised yet flexible 
coordination, the presence of core economic ministries that are responsible for 
planning, gathering and analyzing information in-house, targeting of industries which 
the state deems as necessary for the long-term welfare of the economy, etc. In sum, 
autonomy and synergy, as the sources of SAS capacity, will lead to equitable growth.  
This research intends to go beyond the existing research on the state’s 
transformative capacity by recognising that state relations are no longer confined to 
either capital or civil society. It takes as its point of departure that the state enters 
networks of ties (cooperative relationships) with various nodes of power including 
capital, civil society, provincial and local governments, as well as regional and 
international bodies in its transformative task.  
States that can tap into these networks should achieve better economic 
outcomes - better utilization of resources to meet the needs of their population, 
increased investment and growth, etc. Consequently, the central hypothesis here is 
that the ability of the state to successfully engage with the globalisation process 
depends on society's domestic institutions, and it is institutional differences that 
account for variations in national economic outcomes. 
Having set out the conceptual framework of this study, I will in the next 
chapter define and operationalise the dependent variable: E-Growth.  
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Chapter Four 
 
The Dependent Variable: Equitable Growth 
 
4. 0: Introduction 
 
In the previous chapter, I set out the conceptual framework for this study 
where I hypothesized that the Synergistic Autonomous State (SAS) brings shared 
growth or Equitable Growth (E-Growth). This means that E-Growth is the dependent 
variable of the study. In the present chapter, I will proceed to operationalise E-
Growth. The first step in the process of operationalisation is to discuss what is meant 
by E-Growth and thereafter proceed with its empirical manifestation.  
 
4. 1: Defining the Variable 
 
In the theory chapter, I highlighted the centrality of economic growth and 
equity to an informed understanding of SAS. For operational purposes, it is therefore 
appropriate that I clearly define these indicators in order to delimit the boundaries in 
which they are used. In doing so, my interest is to create indicators that can be 
validated.  This is necessary in order to overcome one of the main shortcomings of 
previous work in the field of institutional analysis and economic development, 
especially those on the developmental state. 
As I argued in chapter 3, E-Growth means a high rate of economic growth and 
equitable distribution of income and wealth. Following Sen (1997), equity here 
implies equality of benefits. E-Growth therefore means that the fruits of economic 
growth are shared equitably by all segments of society. This variable, E-Growth, 
therefore has two indicators, namely growth and equity. A description of these is the 
subject of the next section.  
 
4.1.1: Economic Growth  
 
The rate of economic growth is an important indicator of any country’s 
economic performance and it is generally measured by calculating the percentage 
change in real Gross Domestic Product (GDP) from one year to the other. It is 
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commonly acknowledged that the most important and widely used indicator to 
measure a country’ economic performance is GDP. It refers to the total value of goods 
and services produced or the wealth created in a country in a given year.  
There are three methods of measuring GDP, namely, the product approach, the 
income approach and the expenditure approach. The product approach measures the 
value added of all the participants in an economy. In other words, this measures the 
total output of final goods and services (but does not include inputs/intermediate 
goods and services as that would amount to double counting of a country’s economic 
activity). The income approach measures the income received by all factors of 
production. This is constituted by adding compensation to employees, gross operating 
surplus, gross mixed income, and taxes minus subsidies on production and imports. 
The expenditure approach captures the spending on final goods and services (total 
output) by the different participants.  The expenditure on GDP is constituted by 
consumption expenditure by households, investment spending by capital, government 
spending and expenditure on exports minus expenditure on imports. Suffice it to say 
that the production, income and expenditure methods all yield the same answer. As 
Mohr et al. (2004: 65) correctly observed, “the three methods essentially measure the 
same thing, albeit at different points in the circular flow”. 
Both the income and expenditure measures are expressed in monetary terms at 
market prices that prevail, that is, at current prices or in nominal terms.  GDP can be 
expressed in current prices (or nominal GDP) or at constant prices (real GDP). 
Nominal GDP measures the prevailing prices at the period in which GDP is being 
calculated. In other words, it is the total amount of money spent on GDP, while real 
GDP adjust/control for this value taking account of the effects of inflation in order to 
determine the actual quantity of goods and services making up GDP.   
GDP can also be measured in international currencies, and these measures 
mostly employ one of two conversion methods: the current currency exchange rate 
(also known as the market exchange rate) and the purchasing power parity (PPP) 
exchange rate.  The market exchange rate method calculates the value of goods and 
services using global currency exchange rates while GDP (PPP) accounts for the 
relative effective domestic purchasing power of the average producer or consumer 
within an economy. In other words, it measures the PPP of each currency relative to a 
selected standard, usually the United States dollar. The following statement by the 
World Bank is illustrative: “PPP measures the relative purchasing power of different 
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currencies over equivalent goods and services. They are international price indexes 
that allow comparisons of the real value of consumption expenditure between 
countries…The resulting PPP indexes measure the purchasing power of national 
currencies in ‘international dollars’ that purchasing power over GDP as the US dollar 
has in the United States” (quoted in Reddy and Pogge 2003:11).18 One advantage of 
the GDP (PPP US$) measurement is that it allows for a standard comparison of real 
output between countries. 
All of the various measurements have an economy-wide version, and a per 
capita version. The latter, GDP per capita, allows us to measure the size of the 
economic activity relative to a country’s population. It is often used as an indicator of 
standard of living in an economy. Its use to reflect the standard of living has been 
criticised. After all, this is not—strictly speaking—a measure of standard of living. 
GDP is intended to be a measure of particular types of economic activity within a 
country.   There are many types of economic activity (house-work, or informal 
markets, for example) that are not captured by the GDP measure.  
Despite these shortcomings, I have decided to use the GDP measurement for 
this study because it measures the overall productive capacity of a society/economy.  
The focus on GDP by social scientists is premised on the assumption that, all things 
being equal (ceteris paribus), the expansion of the national cake, that is, its productive 
capacity, will lead to improvement in the material conditions of citizens. But we know 
in everyday life that “all things are not equal”, hence there is a strong need to focus on 
how the national cake is shared among citizens. But even if GDP leads to an increased 
standard of living, it does not address how various segments of society share the fruits 
of growth. In other words, GDP does not take inequality into account. But as 
discussed in chapter three, shared growth means that every segment of a country’s 
population should benefit equally from economic growth. This provides an important 
background to the next section which focuses on the equity. 
Before proceeding to the next section, the list of countries for which I 
collected data on GDP growth (annual %) will be presented. The source of the data is 
the World Bank online, which is widely utilised as a reliable data source on GDP. The 
data are for forty developing countries (excluding the former Soviet Union and East 
European countries). These are the same countries for which I have data on the equity 
                                                         
18
 For a critique of current PPP measurement, see Reddy and Pogge (2003).  
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indicator. They are located in four main regions, namely Asia, sub-Saharan Africa, 
Middle East and North Africa, Latin America and the Caribbean.   
 
Table 4. 1: GDP in 40 Developing Countries, 1991 - 2001 
 
 
High Growth Countries  
GDP Growth 
(annual %), 
1991 – 2001 
 
 
Low Growth Countries 
GDP Growth 
(annual %), 
1991 – 2001 
 
China 
 
9.9 
 
Guatemala 
 
3.9 
Vietnam 7.5 Pakistan 3.8 
Singapore 7.0 Gambia, The 3.7 
Malaysia 6.6 Bolivia 3.5 
Mozambique 6.5 Malawi 3.3 
Chile 6.2 Honduras 3.2 
Korea, Rep. 6.0 Mexico 3.2 
Dominican Republic 5.6 Morocco 2.8 
India 5.5 Nigeria 2.7 
Cambodia 5.4 Colombia 2.6 
Yemen, Rep. 5.4 Brazil 2.6 
Jordan 5.1 Madagascar 2.2 
Costa Rica 4.9 Ecuador 2.2 
Bangladesh 4.8 Paraguay 2.0 
Burkina Faso 4.7 Kenya 1.6 
Guyana 4.6 Jamaica 0.5 
El Salvador 4.4 Burundi -1.2 
Thailand 4.4   
Indonesia 4.3   
Ghana 4.3   
Iran, Islamic Rep. 4.2   
Egypt, Arab Rep. 4.2   
Ethiopia 4.2   
Mean                                                                                                                                   4.2 
Source: World Bank (2003) WDI Online 
 
Table 4.1 is constituted from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators 
(WDIs) online. The GDP data is the average for each country for the period, 1991 – 
2001. Based on the sample of forty developing countries, we find that the sample 
mean for GDP is 4.2%.  This mean can be used to establish a cut-off or threshold 
point for growth.  This is, in effect, what Table 4.1 does: it cuts the sample of forty 
developing countries into two groups: those countries that have experienced higher 
than average growth rates; and those that have experienced lower than average growth 
rates.  Thus, any country that enjoyed an annual GDP growth rate of 4.2% or more 
will be understood to have enjoyed high economic growth whilst a country with a 
growth rate lower than 4.2% will be said to have low growth.  From the sample, and 
as evidenced in Table 4.1, twenty three and eighteen countries could be described as 
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having high and low economic growth, respectively.  In the sample, a majority of the 
countries with high growth rate (ten) are located in Asia. This means that of the 
eleven Asian countries in the sample, only one, Pakistan, has a low economic growth 
rate. In contrast, a majority of the countries with low growth rate (nine) are located in 
Latin America and the Caribbean region.  Therefore of the fourteen countries from the 
region, only five have high rate of economic growth.  Of the nine sub-Saharan African 
countries, six are marked by low growth rates, while three of the four Middle East and 
North African countries, three experienced high rates of high economic growth.  
 
4.1.2: Equity 
 
Because there is no easy indicator to measure equity, one of the major tasks of 
this project is to specify how I intend to measure equity (and the justification(s) for 
such a choice). The first thing to note is that a number of indicators have been 
developed to measure inequality. These include the Inequality-Adjusted Human 
Development Index (IAHDI) developed by Douglas Hicks (1997). The IAHDI is an 
attempt to incorporate distributional concerns into the United Nations’ Development 
Programme’s (UNDP) Human Development Index (HDI) - an aggregation of three 
key elements of human well-being and quality of life, namely knowledge – measured 
by adult literacy, and the average number of years of schooling; longevity – measured 
by the average number of life expectancy; and income – measured by trying to 
construct a Gini coefficient (a concept that will be defined subsequently in this 
section) for each of these indicators. In other words, through the IAHDI, we can 
measure equity and inequality in other property spaces, e.g. longevity and education, 
rather than by income alone.  
These multidimensional indicators of equity are useful but problematic. 
According to Klasen (2001: 4), “there are close causal linkages (with causality 
running both ways) between income … and most other non-income 
measurements…In particular… better health and education of the poor will improve 
their chances to escape income poverty; conversely, higher incomes will typically 
allow the poor greater access to health and education services.” 
Higher inequality, he points out, increases poverty and reduces other welfare 
measures such as education and health. Reducing income inequality has positive 
impacts on these other measurements of inequality. Several empirical studies (e.g., 
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Deininger and Squire, 1998) have shown that there is a very close correlation between 
income inequality and the average and the distribution of human capital. These have 
positive spin-offs on poverty reduction by giving the poor more resources and 
enhancing their human capabilities. In sum, lowering inequality has what Klasen 
calls, triple effects – it reduces poverty, increases growth and enhances the poverty 
impact of such growth. In an econometric study of twenty developing countries by 
Bruno, Ravallion and Squire (1998), in which they regressed the rate of the change in 
poverty on both change in growth (change in the survey mean) and the change in 
inequality (as measured by the Gini coefficient), they find statistically significant 
coefficients of -2.28 for the growth variable and 3.86 for the inequality variable. This 
implies that even a small change in the overall distribution of inequality can lead to 
sizeable changes in the incidence of poverty (Adams, 2003). It is in this context that 
we need to understand any reference in this study to poverty reduction – I assume that 
the greater the decline in inequality, the greater the reduction in poverty (reduction of 
income inequality and poverty reduction often go hand in hand, but not the other way 
round).  
While multidimensional indicators of equity and inequality measurements are 
useful, such an approach faces a number of problems.   
 
Surely the construction of inequality measures in these three dimensions based on 
Gini coefficients face conceptual as well as empirical difficulties. Inequality of 
longevity is a difficult concept intuitively… it is neither fully “objective” nor does it 
respond completely to transfers. “Rankings” of countries for inequalities by their Gini 
measures depends on their implicit welfare function of the Gini calculation. The data 
for distribution in all three dimensions have comparability and reliability problems 
(Hicks, 1997: 1293). 
 
Consequently, in this study, I will use income inequality, which is a 
commonly utilised indicator in most empirical work in the social sciences on 
equitable distribution of income and wealth. A Gini index will thus be used as a proxy 
for equity. There seems to be an increasing consensus among academics and 
development practitioners that income inequality seems to be an appropriate way to 
measure inequality in a society.  Income inequality is measured by using the persons, 
families, or households units in rank order, from the poorest to the richest, then 
dividing the hierarchy into fifths (quintiles) or tenths (deciles); and then computing 
either the average income deciles or quintile or the share that each groupings has of 
the society’s total income. This becomes a basis to compare the shares or average of 
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the rich and the poor. In other words, the Gini index measures the degrees to which 
incomes among households and individuals within a given society deviate from a 
completely equal distribution. It measures the area between the Lorenz curve and a 
hypothetical line of perfect equity. Defined in this way, the Gini index of 0 (zero) 
would represent perfect equity, and an index of 1 (one) implies perfect inequality. 
One might ask why the focus on relative inequality instead of another form of 
inequality, that is, absolute inequality. These are two different concepts and they 
measure different things. Absolute inequality measures dollar differences in real 
income. By contrast, relative income inequality is measured in terms of ratios (Fields, 
2001). I focus on relative inequality for three reasons. First, relative inequality is 
conceptually appealing because it measures the income of one group against another. 
It enables us to focus on the shares of each income group. Because it focuses on 
income ratios, it therefore enables us to compare the income of say the highest 10% 
deciles against the lowest 10 % deciles. Relative income inequality is therefore a 
useful comparability tool enabling researchers to measure the income of say the rich 
against that of the poor, that is, the portion of the total income that goes to each group. 
But there is another reason why I have used the income inequality in this study. The 
dominant trend in the social  sciences literature on distribution and development, from 
Simon Kuznets (1955)  seminal work onward, uses such measures, hence I want to 
situate my study within this tradition, and by so doing  ensure that my findings can be 
compared with others in the field. Lastly, I have not chosen absolute inequality 
because it always leads to the conclusion that economic growth must lead to an 
increase in income inequality.  As one leading expert in the field of income inequality 
measurement, Fields (2001: 16), points out:  
 
if absolute inequality measures were to be used, we would have to conclude as a 
practical matter that economic growth raises income inequality and economic 
recession always lowers it, because empirically the dollar differences in real income 
of the rich and the poor and the variance of incomes always increase with economic 
growth and decline with recession. If you choose an absolute inequality measure, you 
will get an answer, but if you choose a relative inequality measure, you will as often 
as not get a different one.  
 
For these reasons, I have chosen a relative inequality measure for the purposes 
of this study.  
Against this background, I proceeded to collect data on equity.  Unfortunately, 
there is a lack of time-series, cross-country data on income Gini coefficients for 
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developing countries (that is, low to middle income countries).  Consequently, I 
assembled a sample of developing countries in which data for the income Gini 
coefficient is available for the most recent period, 1991 – 2001. These data cover forty 
developing countries, excluding the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, for 
which income inequality is measured in the range of years 1991 to 2001. Each of 
these countries has data for only one year in the period covered.19 The source of this 
data is The World Bank’s World Development Indicator (WDI) Online (World Bank, 
2003). This data on income Gini coefficients are therefore not in time-series form, 
they represent (approximately) the same time period, 1991 – 2001 in each country. 
This is to say that the country data are from different years in the reference period, 
1991- 2001. But these single year data for my sampled countries are representative of 
the period because income inequalities do not change fundamentally from year to year 
or over a short space of time (Adam, 2003), unless where there are fundamental 
interventions by the state to rapidly change the income inequalities. Several recent 
empirical studies have all reached the same conclusion that income distributions 
generally do not change much over time – it remains very much inelastic (see, e.g., 
Adams, Jr, 2003). For example, in the developing world, GDP per capita grew by 26 
percent between 1985 and 1995 (World Bank, 1997 cited in Fields, 2001) but the Gini 
coefficients barely changed over the same period (Deininger and Square, 1998, table 
5). Hence I assume that data for any given year within the defined period, 1991 – 
2001, would appropriately reflect the income distribution level in a society. I should 
also point out that it is common procedure in the social sciences to use Gini 
coefficients from different (but close) years as a basis of comparison. 
However, the World Bank indicators have to be interpreted with some caution. 
They suffer both reliability and comparability problems. First, some countries’ 
distributional data are based on household data and others are based on personal 
(individual) data. One of the limitations of household data is that they tend to obscure 
intra-household distributions. Second, the data rely on estimates based primarily on 
household surveys, data obtained from national government statistical agencies and 
World Bank country departments. The problem with this is that the country surveys 
may differ in methods, definitions of income (and consequently the type of data 
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 This approach is consistent with that of the World Bank, in its celebrated publication, The East Asian 
Miracle, where it used the decade average because Gini data were available for different years in the 
Asian countries (World Bank, 1993b: 3).  
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collected), all of which make strict comparability difficult. Nevertheless, this problem 
is greatly minimised with the improvement and standardisation of survey methods. 
Third, although the WDI online did not indicate whether the data were based on 
consumption or income, I assume that like all World Bank’s WDIs, some of the 
country data are based on consumption, while others are based on income. This poses 
comparability problem. In particular, income tends to be more unequally distributed 
than consumption, and the latter is a better indicator of welfare than income. Due to 
the lack of consistent data on consumption, it is relatively common to combine both 
income and consumption data. Therefore, Hicks (1997) reminds us that in the social 
sciences there is precedence for using income and consumption in comparative 
exercises such as this. In spite of all the shortcomings with the World Bank's data, 
they are the best income distribution data available for research of this nature. The 
country Gini score for the sample are established in Table 4.2 below. 
 
Table 4.2: Gini Scores for 40 Developing Countries, 1991 – 2001 
Country 
GINI 
(1991 - 2001) Country 
GINI 
 (1991 - 2001) 
Low Inequality   High Inequality  
Indonesia 0.30 Guyana 0.45 
Bangladesh 0.32 Bolivia 0.45 
Korea, Rep. 0.32 Kenya 0.45 
Yemen, Rep. 0.33 Costa Rica 0.46 
Burundi 0.33 Madagascar 0.46 
Pakistan 0.33 Dominican Rep. 0.47 
Egypt 0.34 Burkina Faso 0.48 
Vietnam 0.36 Gambia, The 0.48 
Jordan 0.36 Malaysia20 0.49 
India 0.38 Malawi 0.50 
Jamaica 0.38 El Salvador 0.51 
Cambodia 0.40 Nigeria 0.51 
China 0.40 Mexico 0.52 
Ghana 0.40 Guatemala 0.56 
Mozambique 0.40 Ethiopia 0.57 
Morocco 0.40 Colombia 0.57 
Iran, Islamic Re 0.43 Chile 0.58 
Singapore 0.43 Paraguay 0.58 
Thailand 0.43 Honduras 0.59 
Ecuador 0.44 Brazil 0.61 
Mean                                                                                                   0.44 
Source: World Bank (2003) WDI Online 
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 The Malaysian score has to be read with caution. Official Malaysian government data show income 
inequality has declined consistently from 0.52 in 1970 to 0.44 in 1999 (quoted in Khan, 2002). If we 
were to take this into consideration and to remove the impact of the Asian financial crisis which tends 
to lower its growth rate in the period on which Table 4.1 is based, the Malaysian score would have 
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The mean income inequality coefficient for the forty developing countries in 
the sample is 0.44. I have used this (the mean value) to establish a cut-off point for 
equity. Countries with a Gini index lower than 0.45 will be classified as enjoying low 
inequality and countries with an income Gini index or more than 0.44 will be 
classified as having high inequality.  
Half of the countries in the sample can be classified as egalitarian while the 
others are inequitable. Eight of the twenty equitable countries are in Asia. This means 
that majority of the Asian countries in the sample are highly egalitarian societies. A 
majority of countries (thirteen) that are highly inequitable are in Latin America and 
the Caribbean. Only three of the ten sub-Saharan African countries are highly 
equitable. Interestingly, all of the four Middle East and North African countries are 
highly equitable.  
Having collected data for the two indicators, growth and equity, I will now 
proceed to construct the E-Growth variable.  
 
4. 2: Constructing the E-Growth Variable 
 
In chapter three, I argued that while growth is desirable, growth by itself is not 
enough. I set out the socio-political and economic reasons for this position. Growth by 
itself does not lead to equitable development. As argued in chapter three, the absence 
of the latter is likely to lead to socio-political unrest with the potential to undermine 
democratic consolidation. I also highlighted the economic reasons why there is a need 
to go beyond narrow concerns for economic growth by focusing more on the 
distributional effects of growth. These arguments might be summarized again, briefly.  
In the first place, socio-political unrest, due in part to income inequality, will 
undermine investor confidence. Low investment levels lead to a slow down or decline 
in economic growth. In addition, socio-political upheavals will lead to macro-
economic volatility with adverse effects on economic growth. Other than that, 
inequitable growth is unlikely to lead to maximum utilization of national resources 
necessary to ensure expansion of the productivity capacity of a nation and could thus 
be a drag on economic growth. For example, when the poor are deprived of 
opportunities to enhance their productive capacity to the fullest (due to the skewed 
                                                                                                                                                                  
changed to 4, that is, it combined growth with equality. However, for consistency, I will retain its score 
based on the World Bank data. 
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distribution of income and wealth), society as a whole is the loser - it is depriving a 
potential segment of its population that could have enhanced its productive capacity. 
Thus there are efficiency reasons to focus on equity.  It is for these reasons that I have 
given more importance to equity in the analysis.  Against this background, I have 
created a 4-point index, depicted in Figure 4.2 below, for mapping out the conceivable 
variations in E-Growth. But before proceeding with that discussion, the point needs to 
be reiterated that my dependent variable has two indicators, growth and equity that are 
not correlated with one another.  
We can begin by documenting the nature of the relationship between growth 
and equity. The next step is to conduct a correlation test on income Gini coefficient 
and GDP in order to verify whether or not these two indicators co-vary, that is, 
whether they move together in the same direction. This will enable me to score 
countries according to my 4-point index.  
Based on World Bank data, I conducted a correlation test on growth and 
equity. The Pearsons correlation for this test is -0.172. This result means a negative 
and weak correlation between growth and equity.  This is illustrated in Figure 4.121 – 
a scatter plot of equity and growth, which shows that there is no correlation between 
these two indicators.  
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Figure 4. 1: Scatter Plot of Income Gini and   
GDP for 40 Developing Countries, 1991 - 2001
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 See Appendix 1 for the raw data used in Figure 4.1.  
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I should emphasize that this relationship raises a number of serious issues 
when trying to create a common indicator on the basis of two unrelated sub-
indicators.  Consequently, I collected more GDP data (expanding to fifty-nine 
countries) to run another test.  In addition, this new data, the GDP per capita annual 
growth rate data, was for a longer duration, 1990 – 2000 (that is eleven years 
compared to the five-year period for the data used in the first test).  The source of this 
data is the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) World Development 
Report (WDR) 2002. I relied on the same source, the 2002 WDR, for its most recent 
data on Gini coefficients for the same countries. Again, like the previous test, the 
results show a negative and weak correlation between economic growth and equity. 
The Pearson correlation of the test is -0.279. 
These findings are supported by empirical works of leading experts such as 
Deininger and Squire (1997), who show that there is no systematic link between 
growth and changes in aggregate inequality. But they do find a strong positive 
correlation between growth and reduction of poverty.  In the same vein, Fields (2001: 
62) surmised that “income inequality is no more likely to rise or fall when economic 
growth is low or negative”.  
Thus, my dependent variable thus has two aspects/indicators, growth and 
equity, that are not positively correlated. In order to proceed with the 
operationalisation of this variable, I will need to collapse these two indicators. By so 
doing, I will create my own index for measuring equitable growth. Through such an 
index, I will be able to measure whether or not a country is said to have equitable 
growth. Through this process, I will be able to determine which countries have 
economic growth, equity and which have combined these two indicators, that is, those 
that have E-Growth.  
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Figure 4.2:  Four Main Types of E-Growth Countries22 
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The discussion above provides us with a conceptual mapping of countries. 
From the discussion, we can assume that the world can be divided into those that are 
rich and poor, equal and unequal. Four major trajectories then emerge, demarcating 
different countries based on their socio-economic performance, as in the following 
classification in Figure 4.2. The rows show the equity index and the columns depict 
the growth index. The negative sign in the rows can be interpreted as inequality and 
the positive sign as equity. In the columns, the negative sign can be interpreted as low 
economic growth while the positive sign means high growth. We can see from Figure 
4.2 that there are four types of countries.   
The first theoretical possibility, which I have assigned Country A, enjoys 
neither economic growth nor equity. Such a country is not only unable to expand its 
productivity capacity but is also not able to ensure an equal distribution of existing 
resources (income). The second hypothetical situation, Country B, enjoys economic 
growth but no equity. This is a country that is able to expand its productive capacity 
but unable to ensure that the benefits of that growth are equitably shared by all 
members of society. History is replete with such countries. The next possibility, 
Country C, enjoys equity but low to no growth.  The fourth possibility, Country D, is 
marked by both high economic growth and is highly equitable – E-Growth.   
This 2x2 matrix provides us with a basis for creating an index for E-Growth. 
Clearly, country D enjoys the best conditions, and Country A is worst off. The 
question is how to rank the middle countries (B and C). From the theoretical 
discussion in chapter three, the better situation is found in country D because it 
combines both growth and equity (score value of 4), followed by Country C which 
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 Krongkaew (2003: 14) has applied the same schema in his work.  
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has equity but with low to no growth (score value of 3), Country B has an inequitable 
growth (score value of 2) and Country A, the worst scenario, has neither growth nor 
equity (score value of 1). These scores will be used subsequently in ranking countries 
in my sample. Giving the score value of 4 to countries with E-Growth status will 
generate less controversy. This would be the ideal case for most countries. In light of 
this it is unlikely that any country would want to combine low growth with high 
inequality. Therefore the score value of 1 assigned to countries in this category will be 
generally accepted by policy makers and academics alike, across the ideological 
divide.  However, my ranking of countries that are highly egalitarian with low growth 
above countries with low growth and high inequalities might be controversial.  The 
theoretical justification for this choice has been set out in chapter 3. Among other 
things, egalitarianism has some political and economic benefits, which growth, on its 
own, does not have. The higher ranking of egalitarianism over high economic growth 
can be justified on social justice grounds – it means equitable treatment of all persons 
in society. The political justification for the ranking includes the fact that it may lead 
to political stability, with likely positive effects on democracy and economic 
development. In addition, Boix (2003) has persuasively argued and has empirically 
demonstrated “that democratization and, particularly, democratic consolidation have 
been systematically bolstered by high levels of income equality” (Boix, 2003: 11). 
Importantly, equity also has some growth imperatives, which I have discussed in 
chapter 3. It is for these reasons that I have ranked equitable societies (although) with 
low growth higher than countries with high growth and high inequality.     
Using the cut-off point provided by the mean values for growth and inequality 
as previously depicted in Tables 4.1 and 4.2, I can categorize developing countries 
according to the E-Growth index described in Figure 4.1 above.  Countries that have 
more than 4.2% annual GDP growth and an income Gini coefficient less than 0.45 
will received the highest score or value of 4 (equitable growth). Countries with an 
income Gini of less than 0.45 and a GDP growth rate less than 4.2% will be given the 
next highest score of 3 (equitable but with low to no growth).  Countries that have a 
GDP growth rate and Gini coefficient that is above the mean will score 2 (inequitable 
growth).  Finally, countries that have less than 4.2% GDP growth with an income Gini 
coefficient of .44 or more will be ranked 1 (low to no growth combined with high 
income inequality). This ranking is reflected in Table 4.3. 
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Table 4.3: GDP, GINI Index and E-Growth of Selected Developing Countries, 
1991 - 2001 
Country 
GDP Growth (annual  
%) 1991 – 2001 GINI 1991 - 2001 
E-Growth 
Categories 
 
Countries with E-Growth 
      
China 9.9 0.40 4 
Vietnam 7.5 0.36 4 
Singapore 7.0 0.43 4 
Mozambique 6.5 0.40 4 
Korea, Rep. 6.0 0.32 4 
India 5.5 0.38 4 
Cambodia 5.4 0.40 4 
Yemen, Rep. 5.4 0.33 4 
Jordan 5.1 0.36 4 
Bangladesh 4.8 0.32 4 
Thailand 4.4 0.43 4 
Ghana 4.3 0.40 4 
Indonesia 4.3 0.30 4 
Egypt 4.2 0.34 4 
Iran  4.2 0.43 4 
 
Countries with Equity and Low Growth 
  
Pakistan 3.8 0.33 3 
Morocco 2.8 0.40 3 
Ecuador 2.2 0.44 3 
Jamaica 0.5 0.38 3 
Burundi -1.2 0.33 3 
 
Countries with Inequitable Growth 
  
Malaysia 6.6 0.49 2 
Chile 6.2 0.58 2 
Dominican Re 5.6 0.47 2 
Costa Rica 4.9 0.46 2 
Burkina Faso 4.7 0.48 2 
Guyana 4.6 0.45 2 
El Salvador 4.4 0.51 2 
Ethiopia 4.2 0.57 2 
 
Countries with Low Growth & High Inequality 
  
Guatemala 3.9 0.56 1 
Gambia 3.7 0.48 1 
Bolivia 3.5 0.45 1 
Malawi 3.3 0.50 1 
Mexico 3.2 0.52 1 
Honduras 3.2 0.59 1 
Nigeria 2.7 0.51 1 
Brazil 2.6 0.61 1 
Colombia 2.6 0.57 1 
Madagascar 2.2 0.46 1 
Paraguay 2.0 0.58 1 
Kenya 1.6 0.45 1 
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Table 4.3 shows that of the forty countries in my sample, fifteen can be 
categorized as having E-Growth (equitable growth), five countries have equity 
without growth, eight countries have inequitable growth and twelve countries have 
neither growth nor equity. Most of the E-Growth countries are in Asia (indeed a 
majority (nine) of the Asian countries in the sample are notable for their high growth 
rate combined with egalitarianism).  In contrast, a majority (seven) of the most 
unequal countries with low growth rates are in Latin America and the Caribbean.  No 
country in this region has equitable growth. Only two of the eleven sub-Saharan 
African countries in the sample are marked with E-Growth while five from the region 
are highly inequitable and have very low economic growth rate.  Four of the five 
Middle East and North African countries experienced E-Growth. 
 
4. 3: Conclusion 
 
In this chapter, I have defined the indicators for growth and equity, and 
proceeded to collect data on them.  I then conducted a correlation test in order to 
determine whether or not they are related. The test, supported by other empirical 
works in the field, shows a negative and weak correlation between economic growth 
and equity. Consequently, I collapsed the two indicators into one by developing a 4-
point E-Growth index. This index constitutes the basis upon which the countries were 
ranked into four E-Growth categories.   
Having operationalised my dependent variable, the next chapter, 5, will 
operationalise my first independent variable, autonomy. The aim is to create 
operational indicators for measuring state autonomy.  
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Chapter Five 
 
The Autonomy Variable 
 
 
5.0: Introduction 
 
In chapter three, I stressed that the Synergistic Autonomous State’s (SAS) 
capacity is derived from its two component parts: the autonomy of its institutions and 
its synergistic ties with socio-economic actors. In the present chapter I will attempt to 
operationalise the first of these independent variables: state autonomy. 
The first task in the operationalisation is to identify the indicators that can 
measure the autonomy variable. As noted in chapter three, autonomy implies the 
capacity of the state to act independently – to have an in-house capacity to formulate 
its policy positions – and on the strength of that capacity engage with societal actors. 
Autonomy has three main indicators, namely: meritocratic recruitment, predictable 
career paths for bureaucrats, and the state’s ability to coordinate its policies. The latter 
is marked by the presence of a coordinating ministry. In other words, the autonomy 
variable is defined by its Weberian attributes (meritocracy and career path) and the 
centrality of a coordinating ministry in shaping overall economic policies and 
programmes. This focus is grounded on an intellectual tradition (the new institutional 
approach to political economy) that gives primacy to institutions as organisations. 
This tradition covers areas such as the theory of the state (Levi, 1988), government 
organisation (Shepsle and Weingast; 1987), public administration (Weingast, 1984; 
and Moe, 1990) and international organisations (Keohane, 1984).  This is unlike the 
dominant literature of new institutional economics that focuses on institutions as rules 
(see Furubotn and Richter, 2000). As a result, some conceptual background is 
necessary as a basis for the operationalisation that will follow in the remaining parts 
of this chapter.  
This chapter is primarily intended to operationalise and quantify state 
autonomy, the first independent variable in this study.  Quantification enables us to 
assess the effects of state autonomy on economic performance across different 
countries. The autonomy variable is conceived of in terms of degrees rather than 
types. 
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5. 1: The Data on State Autonomy 
 
This section provides an overview of the sources of data on state autonomy as 
a basis for constructing the autonomy scale.  As noted above, although very rich case 
studies exist on state institutions in general and state autonomy in particular, there is a 
lack of adequate data for operational and comparative purposes. This lack of data and 
its implications for cross-national comparison is increasingly being recognised by 
scholars. At a time when international development agencies such as the World Bank, 
the IMF and the UNDP, as well as a range of academics from diverse ideological 
traditions, are stressing the importance of state institutions and public sector reforms 
as being fundamental to development, I expected it to be relatively easy to gather data 
on state autonomy. I was proven wrong. Indeed, the Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD) stresses the essence of statistics: statistics are an 
essential element of policy-making in democracies, for decisions as well as policy 
evaluations (OECD, n.d). One is therefore puzzled that in spite of the emphasis on 
state institutions and recognition of the importance of measurable indicators, there is 
little (available) data on this crucial institutional infrastructure. While it is possible to 
find very rich case studies that document the state’s autonomy in the developing 
world, in the absence of data, it is difficult to make systematic cross-country 
comparisons.  
This recognition has fuelled the need to develop cross-country comparative 
data on state institutions as a basis for understanding the source of state capacity or 
effectiveness. Most existing data on state institutions in the developing, as well as the 
developed world - with the exception of Evans and Rauch (1999), on which this study 
is based - have focused primarily on the nature of the political regime, electoral 
system, etc. More recently, however, a team of researchers from the World Bank 
(Thorsten Beck, George Clarke, Alberto Groff and Phillip Keefer) and their partner 
from the Swiss Department of Foreign Affairs (Patrick Walsh) developed a dataset 
that focused exclusively on political institutions, such as political systems and 
electoral competitiveness; preferences and parties; tenure, turnover and popular vote 
share of the Chief Executive and the Chief Executive’s Party; the legislature, electoral 
rules, checks and balances, and federalism, that is whether or not there are 
autonomous regions (Beck et al., 2001). Other World Bank staffers (Daniel 
Kaufmann, Aart Kraay and Massimo Mastruzzi, 2003) have developed their own 
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dataset of six Governance Indicators, covering 1996 – 2002. These indicators are 
clustered around three areas, namely: (1) the process by which governments are 
selected, monitored and replaced; (2) the capacity of the government to effectively 
formulate and implement sound policies; and (3) the respect of citizens and the state 
for the institutions that govern interactions.   
These datasets share a number of commonalities: they both focus on the nature 
of the political regime, the manner of selecting leaders, civil and political liberties, 
and the rule of law.  Kaufmann et al. were an exception in that they provided some 
indication on state capacity. There are indeed a host of international organisations that 
are primarily trying to develop data on state institutions. These include the Freedom 
House and Polity but from a more narrow conceptual frame of democracy. Such an 
approach -- while important -- might lead to investigations that have no clear 
relevance for the concerns of this thesis. Consequently, there is a need to focus on 
institutions within the state where economic policies are fashioned.  
The dataset by Kaufmann et al. has an immediate appeal as it refers to 
“government effectiveness” and “institutions that govern the interactions between the 
state and society”. On closer inspection, however, institutions in this case are defined 
in the tradition of Ostrom (1986) and North (1990), which conceived of institutions as 
rules and legal norms. They define institutions as rules that govern and constrain the 
actions of actors. Hence the emphasis is on the rule of law and enforceability of 
contract. But the emphasis of this study is on institutions as state’s 
structures/organisations and consultative mechanisms between the state and societal 
actors. These are organisational arrangements that govern and structure the interaction 
between state and society because they are the arena for shaping and determining 
policies and their outcomes. They can take the form of organisations within the state 
or policy networks between the state and society, (although in this chapter, I am 
concerned with the state institutional arrangements). Towards this end, I situate my 
study within those such as Peter Evans that conceive of institutions in terms of 
structures. 
As noted above, this study relies on the data of the path-breaking work by 
Evans and Rauch (1999). This dataset23 represents the first attempt by scholars to 
collect data on state autonomy, including its Weberianness, in order to ensure cross-
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 The dataset can be located online at:  http://weber.ucsd.edu/~jrauch/webstate. 
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national comparisons. It focused on the institutional/organisational characteristics of 
core economic agencies and covers thirty-five countries. This focus on core economic 
agencies is pertinent for the study because it deals with agencies that have a greater 
role in shaping and determining overall economic policies in the respective countries. 
The survey, from which the data was constructed, covers the period 1970 – 
1990. In other words, the dataset is not a time series, but it covers a single but long 
period.  Some might criticize this on the grounds that such a long temporal span tends 
to hold the indicators as constant rather than time varying. This would be a wrong 
assumption. As the authors of the data point out: 
 
Since bureaucratic structures are notoriously resistant to change, we felt secure in 
assuming that differences we discovered among bureaucratic structures could be 
considered characterise the beginning of the period (and, indeed, had probably been 
in place for some time prior to 1970), and were, therefore temporally antecedent to 
growth during the 1970 –90 period). Despite some … deterioration in the situation of 
bureaucrats over time…the bureaucratic structures antedated 1970 –90 economic 
growth (Evans and Rauch, 1997: 8). 
 
They concluded that for the temporal frame of survey data, the bureaucratic 
structures in the population were relatively stable. They were, therefore, not oblivious 
to the time-varying nature of indicators of state autonomy but their survey was an 
initial step at quantifying state autonomy, and subject to replication by other scholars 
for different time periods. It is precisely on this basis that Court et al. (1999)24 not 
only elongated the Evans and Rauch dataset but also extended it to six African 
countries with different time spans incorporated into it. For the purposes of this study, 
the point is that the autonomy data represent or approximate an aggregate for the time 
period.  
The Evans and Rauch dataset was constructed based on external expert 
surveys, in most cases with a minimum of three experts per country. Surveys that rely 
on external experts have their drawbacks. In particular, they tend to have problems of 
reliability and compatibility—making cross-national comparisons difficult. Experts 
from different contexts are likely to interpret even identical survey questions 
differently, which make cross-country comparisons a bit difficult. Indeed, the present 
dataset by Evans and Rauch gives room for different interpretations by respondents 
from different countries. For example, there are separate indicators for the Ministry of 
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 The Court et al. dataset is located at http://www.unu.edu/hq/academic/pg_area4/excel/denmark.xls. 
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Finance; the Ministry of Economics (which covers Economic and Finance, Economic 
Affairs, National Economy) and another indicator for the Ministry of 
Trade/Commerce/Industry. Although consistent with Wade’s narrative of the 
Taiwanese experience (where the Ministry of Economic Affairs was a separate 
ministry), this is certainly a case of different and overlapping definitions. This is 
because in most contexts, all of these ministries are treated together as economic 
ministries. These classifications by Evans and Rauch therefore give room for double 
counting/classifications of certain ministries. For example, the Ministry of Finance 
might be counted twice, once as a separate ministry, then again as a Ministry of 
Finance and Economics. There are, therefore, some ambiguities that make cross-
cutting comparisons somewhat problematic. In this format, coordinating ministries 
might be limited to a Planning Ministry, Secretariat, Commission or Board. But as we 
have seen in Chalmers Johnson’s (1982) path-breaking work on Japan, super or 
coordinating ministries might also include the Ministry of Trade and Industry.  This 
highlights the problem of concepts that can have different meanings in different 
contexts, geography or time space. Consequently, using the same indicators in each 
context may lead to erroneous interpretations and inferences.  
There are other problems with the Evans and Rauch data. For example, the 
duration of the period covered by the survey is between 1970 and 1990. The problem 
is that because these data are not in the form of a time series, they may not have 
captured institutional changes that are taking place within and across countries 
(although they alluded to the fact that there were not many institutional changes 
within the period). While students of institutional economics will point to the fact that 
institutions do not change radically over time, twenty years is a long enough period 
for noticeable institutional changes to take place. Also, since the 1980s, public sector 
reforms inspired by the paradigm of new managerialism are taking place across the 
globe, including developing countries where donor agencies and countries have made 
development aid conditional on the implementation of public sector reforms 
(Wohlmuth, 1998). This being the case, there might be some institutional changes that 
occurred which are not captured by the Evans and Rauch dataset. Therefore, a major 
problem is whether or not the respondents covered the same timeframe and also 
whether the responses can be taken as an average in terms of the bureaucratic 
structure for the period covered by the survey. We could therefore raise the following 
questions: (1) Did the respondents take into consideration some of the bureaucratic 
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changes taking place in the respective countries? (2) Did the responses only capture 
pre-changes or post-changes, or even both periods? Both of these questions beg for 
answers. Though we cannot address these questions in this study, we need to be aware 
of them.   
Another problem with the dataset, common to surveys, is whether the 
respondents objectively answered the questions before them. For example, the dataset 
suggests that the Ministry of Finance is ranked as the most influential ministry in 
Nigeria. Those familiar with the Nigerian bureaucracy and policy-making terrain 
might pose two questions. First, what period did such responses cover? Second, do the 
respondents really provide an objective assessment of the Nigerian situation? All of 
those familiar with the Nigerian political economy would recognise that post-
independent Nigeria has been characterised by military rule. Successive military 
regimes in Nigeria were marked by the personalisation of decision-making by the 
various heads of state (military presidents) and the centralisation of power in their 
offices. The literature on the Nigerian state bears testimony to this, to the extent that 
the Nigerian state has been described as a neo-patrimonial state (Edevbaro, 1999). 
This then raises the question of whether the survey and the data it captured reflect the 
situation on the ground in the various countries. Nevertheless, it is not uncommon for 
survey results not to meet a priori expectations.  
In spite of these problems associated with the dataset, it is the only data on 
Weberianness available in the world. Consequently, the dataset constitutes a major 
intellectual public good provided by its authors. A new dataset on state autonomy that 
covered a more recent period has been developed by Court et al. (1999) for the United 
Nations University-World Institute for Development Economic Research (UNU-
WIDER) based in Helsinki, Finland. This new dataset is, however, an extension of the 
Evans and Rauch data. It extended the coverage of countries from Evans and Rauch’s 
35 to 50 countries. In addition, the period covered is 1970 – 1998.  I have not used 
this latter data because of a number of factors. First, it did not have data for all the 
countries for the two indicators of Weberianness. It only has data for career paths for 
all the countries. Also, although the Court et al. dataset covers a more recent period, 
on closer examination, it shows that, for most of the countries, there is an apparent 
over-reliance on the Evans and Rauch data. In short, the Court et al. dataset only 
standardized the Evan and Rauch data. Consequently, there is a very significant 
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positive correlation (of 0.98) between the Evans and Rauch career and those of Court 
et al. for thirty-four countries.25  
Court et al.’s normalisation and extension of the Evans and Rauch data (before 
1998) is perhaps based on the assumption that not many institutional changes 
occurred between 1990 and 1998. In other words, the conditions on career pathing 
(and, consequently, bureaucratic structures) remained virtually the same in the 
selected countries. For this reason, I rely on the Evans and Rauch dataset: clearly, 
following the logic of Court et al., we can assume that not many institutional changes 
have occurred over time. As a result, under conditions when my independent variable 
does not cover exactly the same time period as my dependent variable, I can assume 
that any institutional changes will not have an immediate effect. Consequently, we 
can assume that the institutional arrangements of the earlier 1990s may only begin to 
have an impact on economic growth and equity a decade later. It is because of this 
assumption of institutional rigidity that we can (and should) employ different time 
frames for the independent and dependent variables. 
Having obtained data for the state’s level of Weberianness, I attempted to 
secure data for the remaining aspect of state autonomy: the presence of a super 
ministry. Again, I have relied on the Evans and Rauch data. But in doing so, there is a 
need to address further caveats: for instance, how do we identify a super ministry? 
What are its institutional attributes? Although there might be some slight variations in 
the institutional make-up of countries, super ministries or pilot economic agencies 
have some common identifiable characteristics which students of institutional 
economics have to look for in constructing their data on the subject matter. In addition 
to their Weberianness, super ministries play a central role in guiding and shaping the 
overall direction of their economies. However, this does not imply that super 
ministries are the only agencies affecting economic policies, as there might be 
competing ministries that also contribute to shaping the overall economic direction of 
a country. But super ministries are usually the leading state actor in the economy. 
Johnson alluded to this in his work on Japan when he noted that “Although MITI was 
not the only important agent affecting the economy…the particular speed, form, 
consequences of Japanese economic growth are intelligible without reference to the 
contributions of the MITI…The history of MITI is central to the economic and 
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political history of modern Japan” (Johnson, 1982: vii – viii). And as Evans (1999) 
reminds us, super ministries also serve as coordinating units, resolving jurisdictional 
competing policies among different ministries, while at the same time ensuring a 
coordinated and centralised approach to economic management. In some instances, 
these agencies exercise control over line ministries.  
Furthermore, as the literature on the developmental state tells us, super 
ministries are usually not line ministries. Cheng et al. (1999: 91) note with respect to 
the East Asian developmental states that “all major economic planning units…were 
constructed outside of the formal bureaucratic structure”, at least in their early stage 
of development.  The benefits of initially having these economic agencies outside the 
normal bureaucratic structures is that it ensures their independence and enables 
government to attract highly qualified people to such agencies through offering them 
higher pay outside the bureaucratic scale. But given their nature, as coordinating 
agencies, ministers of line ministries are also members and do indeed attend meeting 
of economic planning agencies. Nevertheless, they do normally have their own staff.   
These are the sort of important considerations that I have in mind when 
utilising Evans and Rauch dataset to construct the super ministry component of my 
state autonomy indicator. It is therefore important to understand the rationale that lays 
behind the way they have grouped various agencies/ministries in the dataset.  Against 
this background, I argue that the grouping of the agencies under variable Q105 (in the 
codebook) has a strong theoretical foundation and justification.  The agencies 
clustered together in this option are Planning Ministry, Secretariat, Commission or 
Board (Development Board or Council or Development Bank). This variable has been 
derived from question in the questionnaire (see attached Appendix 2).  
 
5. 2: Constructing the State Autonomy Indicators 
 
Although they may not represent all facets of autonomy, the three indicators of 
autonomy in this study, are meritocratic recruitment, career pathing and the 
establishment of a super ministry. At this juncture, we can proceed to construct three 
indices. The central proposition is that recruitment of civil servants and their 
promotion should be based on merit and that there should also be clear and 
predictable career paths (rather than positions being awarded through patronage).  
These conditions are coupled with the existence of a super ministry that plays a 
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central role in shaping and coordinating government overall economic policy and 
programmes. These three indicators of state autonomy are crucial for the development 
of, and commitment to, corporate ideology/vision and the consequent coherence of the 
state bureaucracy as a necessary condition for its effectiveness to engineer equitable 
growth.  In other words, meritocracy and predictable career path are key sources of 
the capacity of the state to foster growth and equity. 
Meritocratic recruitment: This indicator measures whether recruitment into 
the public service is based on merit. It is constructed from two questions, questions 4 
and 5, in the Evans and Rauch survey.  This are respectively coded SQ4 and SQ5.26 
Question 4 is, “Approximately what proportion of higher officials in these agencies 
enter the civil service via a formal examination system?”. Question 5 is: “Of those 
that do not enter via examination, what proportion have university or post-graduate 
degrees?” These questions deal exclusively with higher officials; that is, those that 
hold roughly the top 500 positions in the core economic agencies.  
Career path: This indicator captures the degree to which there are clear and 
predictable career paths within the state bureaucracy for civil servants. This is what 
Court et al. calls “career opportunities” which is a composite of five questions.  The 
first assesses the number of higher officials that are political appointees (question 
number 6 and coded SQ6) – the exact question is “Roughly how many of the top 
levels in these agencies are political appointees (e.g. appointed by the President or 
Chief Executive)?”; and the second evaluates the proportion of these appointees that 
have worked in the civil service before (question number 7 and coded SQ7)  - the 
exact question is “Of political appointees to those positions, what proportion are likely 
to already be members of the higher civil service?” The third question asks how many 
of the top officials have made their career in one agency (question number 8 and 
coded SQ8) – the exact question is “Of those promoted to the top 2 or 3 levels in these 
agencies (whether or not they are political appointees), what proportion come from 
within the agency itself or (its associated ministry(ies) if the agency is not itself a 
ministry)?”; and the fourth seeks to know how many years a higher-level official 
typically spends in an agency (question number 9 and coded number SQ9) – the exact 
question is “Are the incumbents of these top positions likely to be moved to positions 
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of lesser importance when political leadership changes?” The fifth question 
investigates the career expectations of a new employee (question number 11 and 
coded SQ11) – the exact question is “What prospects for promotion can someone who 
enters one of these agencies through a higher civil service examination early in his/her 
career reasonably expects? Assuming that there are at least a half dozen steps or levels 
between and entry-level position and the head of the agency, how would you 
characterise he possibilities for moving up in the agency?”  
Like those questions used to constitute the merit indicator, these questions 
apply only to higher officials (roughly the top 500 persons in the country) and 
especially those employed in all of the core economic agencies. Evans and Rauch 
normalised each of the indicators that made up a variable on the scale of 0 – 1, with 1 
indicating the best option. 
Super Ministry: This constitutes the third indicator in my autonomy variable. 
This indicator captures the importance of a Planning Ministry/Agency. This indicator 
is derived from Question 1 of the survey questionnaire, which required respondents to 
indicate the most important agencies in the central bureaucracy in shaping overall 
economic policy.  The exact question is “List the four most important agencies in the 
central state bureaucracy order of their power to shape overall economic policy. (e.g. 
Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Industry and/or Trade and/or Commerce, Planning 
Board, agency or Ministry?)”. Those that listed super ministry has been coded Q105 
and it was ranked first by at least half of the respondents for each country. This 
implies that the Planning Ministry, Secretariat, Commission or Board was rated first 
by at least half of the respondents as the most important agencies in shaping overall 
economic policy.   
As we have already seen, the centrality of a super ministry is well covered in 
the institutional economic literature. It is usually the core economic agency. A super 
ministry where meritocracy and a defined career path prevail enhances the capacity of 
the Synergistic Autonomous States (SAS) to develop its goals, foster a developmental 
agenda and ensure its successful implementation. Such a ministry enables the state to 
have a holistic view of its programmes and to adopt a coordinated approach so that the 
activities complement one another, and also to ensure that the state does not 
overstretch its capacity.   
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Having constituted this aspect of my independent variable, the next task was to 
select the countries for which I have data on the dependent variable. Using this 
method of elimination, I selected sixteen countries to construct the Weberian scale 
(which combines merit and career scores). This means that of the 40 countries for 
which I have data on my dependent variable, the Evans and Rauch dataset only covers 
sixteen of those countries two aspects of the autonomy variable (which are 
meritocratic recruitment and career path), and consequently sixteen for autonomy; 
namely, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Egypt, Guatemala, India, 
Kenya, Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, Nigeria, Pakistan, Singapore and Thailand. 
Although this decrease in the number of cases is unfortunate, the population still has 
enough variation in both the dependent and independent variables to warrant this 
study – in fact they constitute a reasonably representative sample on both variables. 
Based on this dataset, we find a significant positive correlation between merit 
and career path (see Figure 5.1). The Pearson correlation is 0.78, with an estimated p-
value of 0.000.  
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Figure 5. 1: Scatter Plot of Career and Merit
 
We can combine these two aspects (career and merit) into a scale that 
measures the degree of Weberianness.  This Weberianness scale is depicted in Table 
5.1, and is constructed by averaging the career and merit scores for each country. 
Thus, Thailand—the country in our sample that scored the highest on the 
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Weberianness scale—had a career score of 0.78, a merit score of 0.83, and a 
Weberianness score of 0.81, or (0.78 + 0.83)/2).  This means that the autonomy 
variable has three dimensions (meritocracy, career paths and super ministry), each of 
which are accorded equal weight.  
 
Table 5.1: Weberianness Scale27 
Country Career Merit Weberianness  
Thailand 0.78 0.83 0.81 
India    0.56 1.00 0.78 
Singapore 0.67 0.85 0.76 
Korea    0.68 0.72 0.70 
Malaysia 0.57 0.72 0.65 
Pakistan 0.55 0.67 0.61 
Mexico   0.52 0.46 0.49 
Costa Rica 0.36 0.56 0.46 
Egypt    0.42 0.44 0.43 
Brazil   0.28 0.58 0.43 
Nigeria  0.31 0.50 0.40 
Chile    0.26 0.54 0.40 
Kenya    0.37 0.39 0.38 
Guatemala 0.29 0.33 0.31 
Ecuador  0.22 0.39 0.31 
Colombia 0.13 0.33 0.23 
 
As shown in Table 5.1, the sixteen countries score from 0.23 and 0.8128 in the 
Weberianness scale, with Colombia with the lowest score and Thailand with the 
highest score. No countries therefore scored a zero and none scored a 1, the latter 
would have represented complete Weberianness. Most of the countries (ten) scored 
less than 0.50 in the autonomy scale while only six countries scored 0.50 and above.  
The problem with bivariate correlation coefficients of this sort, however, is 
that they provide only an indirect and incomplete indication of the actual pattern of 
overlap among these indicators of state autonomy. In order to make a more definite 
assessment, it is necessary to consider these indicators of autonomy in combination, 
and, by so doing, create the autonomy scale.  
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The next step, therefore, is to score states in terms of their having a central 
planning agency/super ministry. Here again, I have to rely on the Evans and Rauch’s 
dataset.  Like the data for Weberianness, the data for super ministries cover sixteen 
countries. They have been scored from 1-4 (which is a smaller variation compared to 
the variations in both the career and merit indicators). A score of 4 means that a super 
ministry is the most important agency in the central state bureaucracy for shaping 
overall economic policy. A score less than 4 means that the planning ministry was not 
the most important state bureaucracy in shaping economic policy.  The ranking of 
countries has been normalised to range between 0 and 1, to conform to the scoring in 
the Weberian scale, and are listed in Table 5.2.  This is in order to ensure that the 
three indicators of autonomy have equal weight.  
 
Table 5.2: Super Ministry Scale 
Country Super Ministry  
Korea 1.00 
India    0.75 
Costa Rica 0.75 
Mexico   0.75 
Egypt    0.75 
Pakistan 0.75 
Singapore 0.75 
Brazil   0.50 
Chile  0.50 
Colombia 0.50 
Ecuador 0.50 
Guatemala  0.50 
Malaysia 0.50 
Nigeria 0.50 
Thailand 0.50 
Kenya 0.25 
 
After the construction of both the Weberian (which is a combination of 
meritocratic recruitment and career path for core economic technocrats) and the super 
ministry scales, I proceeded to construct the autonomy scale for sixteen developing 
countries. 
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In constituting the autonomy scale, each of the indicators (career, merit and 
super ministry) is weighted equally with a score between 0 and 1. Autonomy is 
therefore defined in terms of the following formula: 
 
Meritocracy + Career + Super Ministry 
3 
Table 5.3: Autonomy Scale29 
Country Career Merit Super Ministry State Autonomy 
Korea    0.68 0.72 1.00 0.80 
India    0.56 1.00 0.75 0.77 
Singapore 0.67 0.85 0.75 0.76 
Thailand 0.78 0.83 0.50 0.70 
Pakistan 0.55 0.67 0.75 0.66 
Malaysia 0.57 0.72 0.50 0.60 
Mexico   0.52 0.46 0.75 0.58 
Costa Rica 0.36 0.56 0.75 0.56 
Egypt    0.42 0.44 0.75 0.54 
Brazil   0.28 0.58 0.50 0.45 
Nigeria  0.31 0.50 0.50 0.44 
Chile    0.26 0.54 0.50 0.43 
Guatemala 0.29 0.33 0.50 0.37 
Ecuador  0.22 0.39 0.50 0.37 
Kenya    0.37 0.39 0.25 0.34 
Colombia 0.13 0.33 0.50 0.32 
  
As can be seen from the Table 5.3, there is a considerable variations in the 
autonomy variable, ranging from 0.32 to 0.80.  
 
5.3: Conclusion 
 
In this chapter I have constructed a scale to capture the study’s first 
independent variable: autonomy. It was constructed from existing data derived from 
experts’ surveys. From this data, I was able to generate an autonomy scale for sixteen  
developing countries. This is a reasonably representative sample as it covers a diverse 
range of characteristics in both the independent and dependent variables. The data 
cover the period 1970 – 1990. Problems associated with the temporal contours have 
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been highlighted, but it is important to recognise that -- despite its shortcomings -- it 
is the only dataset in the world. In addition, the data for the autonomy indicators are 
not in constant terms, but are time-invariant. As such, we can assume that changes 
over time in the indicators could have been incorporated. But even this point is 
superfluous as the study noted that bureaucratic structures for the period covered by 
the data were remarkably stable. Lastly, given that the temporal span of the dependent 
variable in this study is for a more recent period, 1991 – 2001, and the temporal span 
of this independent variable is for an earlier period (1970-1990), it is therefore 
plausible to establish causality – in addition to showing correlation. Causality and the 
nature of the relations will be the subject of chapter seven. But, first, I proceed to 
chapter six, which deals with the operationalisation of the second independent 
variable: synergy.  
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Chapter Six 
The Synergy Variable 
 
6. 0: Introduction  
 
This chapter operationalises the second independent variable in the study: 
synergy. In chapter three, I defined synergy as the sharing of power and collaboration 
between the state, capital and civil society within an institutional framework, which 
enhances the capacity of the state to foster equitable growth. At the same time, it 
places limits on the ability of the state and social actors to act arbitrarily, and thus 
promotes accountability of state officials to broader societal interests. But for the 
purposes of operationalisation, I will focus on state-society30 relations at the national 
level as an explanatory variable for variations in national economic performance. 
Accordingly, I will focus on three key indicators of synergy, namely: policy networks, 
encompassing societal actors, and their influence on final economic policy. 
Encompassing societal groups interact with the state via Deliberation Councils, also 
known as consultative mechanisms (CMs). This type of interaction enables a SAS to 
successfully transform its economy and adapt to a rapidly changing global 
environment. In privileging encompassing associations, I have drawn on the 
corporatist literature, which argues that encompassing organisations tend to be more 
oriented (than fragmented associations) towards economy-wide performance (see 
Kenworthy and Kittel, 2003).  
The argument is that consultations between the state and organised interest 
groups enhance the flow of information, generate trust between participating partners, 
and give credibility to socio-economic policies and their outcomes. As pointed out in 
the corporatist literature, consultative structures and processes between government 
and interest groups - the source of SAS capacity - lead to economic efficiency. This 
enhances the capacity of the state to navigate the creative and destructive impulses 
flowing from both the intensity and extensity of economic globalisation. 
Unfortunately, in spite of the growing consensus in both academic and policy 
circles about the importance of societal actors’ participation in public policy in 
general (and socio-economic policy in particular), there are no data with which to 
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measure synergy. In fact, scholars and policy-makers alike have not paid much 
attention to developing operational indicators to measure state-society interactions in 
general, and state-society synergy in particular. This is partly because much of the 
emphasis on state–society relations is more about government policies, its behaviour 
and the reaction of business and civil society rather than on the institutional 
infrastructures of interactions (see Bowie, 1994 as an example of this approach). In 
other words, most existing studies, including those that attempt to operationalise 
corporatism, do not actually deal with interest groups’ participation to jointly shape 
and implement policies with economic bureaucracy. And some social scientists and 
development agencies wrongly use political rights (including freedom of association 
and the right to vote) as proxies for associational participation. In other words, they 
confine participation to its liberal conception.  
As I have pointed out in chapter three, people’s participation in decision-
making processes, including the implementation of programmes, is increasingly being 
recognised in both academic and policy circles. Consequently, the operationalisation 
of state-society synergy should empirically focus on organisational structures and 
processes of interactions. This is how Kenworthy and Kittel (2003: 13) summed up 
the paucity of data on participatory mechanisms: “…quantitative approaches using 
indicators of associational influence in order to make cross-country comparisons have 
been limited… or non existent” (emphasis mine). They argued that the various 
indirect indicators being used do not necessarily operationalise mechanisms and 
processes of interactions between economic technocrats and society, as well as the 
consequent impact/influence of interest associations on social and economic policy. 
Studies of corporatism, that have attempted to operationalise state-society relations, 
all fall short because of their preoccupation with wage-setting. 
The point needs to be stressed at this juncture that if state-society interactions 
matter, so does the need for more reliable and valid data on synergy to allow for 
cross-country comparability. The only available data that I am aware of is Hyden et 
al.’s (2003) data that cover sixteen developing countries.  But because of the 
intellectual premise of their work, which conceives of institutions in terms of rules, 
very little attention is paid to the organisational infrastructure of state-society relations 
or what Guy Peters refers to as “the structuring of relationships between the state and 
society” (Peters, 1999: 20). In addition, Hyden et al. limit consultation to government-
business interaction. Although this dataset could function as a useful starting point for 
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this study, it only covers three of my existing country cases and a different time 
period.   
To overcome the problem of a lack of synergy data, I have had to construct my 
own dataset. My aim has been to construct a dataset that will allow us to rate countries 
in terms of their degree of state-society synergy in a way that facilitates cross-country 
comparisons. The direct relationship between state-society synergy and economic 
performance will be one of the subjects discussed in chapter 8 and parts of chapter 9.   
It needs to be stressed at this juncture that I am interested in state-society 
relations that deal with broad economic policy, a point that will be elaborated upon 
subsequently. 
 
6. 1: Survey Methodology 
 
To generate systematic data on state-society synergy in developing countries, I 
conducted a country-experts’ survey, using a web-based survey questionnaire, 
administered in September 2004.  The survey contained a number of questions 
relating to structures and processes of participation, the interest groups represented 
(the actors) and the influence of such consultations on final economic policy at the 
national level. A copy of the questionnaire31 and the raw data, respectively, can be 
found in Appendix 3 and Table 6.2.  While an expert survey may not be able to 
capture all the nuances and salient aspects of synergy, it has allowed me to address 
some of its most important aspects. Indeed, the purpose of this survey was not to 
assess all the characteristics of state-society relations (synergy) that could lead to 
better economic performance. Rather, the aim was to provide some clear and 
identifiable indicators that could be used as an open and public starting point in 
scholarly works for evaluating the impact of differences or variations in state-society 
relations on economic performance.  In the absence of comparable, cross-national data 
on synergistic relationships, we can never be certain of its effect on diverse economic 
outcomes.  Hence I confine myself to three important aspects, namely the types of 
Deliberation Councils, hereafter referred to as Consultative Mechanisms (CMs) – 
statutory, informal, and ad-hoc; the actors involved; and the influence of participation 
on final economic policy. 
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Country experts, residing in and outside the countries, completed the 
questionnaires.   Undoubtedly, experts’ surveys are not without problems. Because 
they are based on perceptions, such surveys can be very subjective.  In addition, even 
experts in the same field can use concepts differently in various contexts. To 
overcome this problem it is useful for a researcher to include a box/space for 
respondents to provide comments as addendum, in addition to choosing from standard 
options/answers. This might throw some light on their responses, and where necessary 
for a researcher to revert back to respondents for clarifications.  This was precisely the 
method I adopted in the survey.  
Their shortcomings aside, expert surveys are common in the social sciences, as 
social scientists rely on experts to provide information that can be assembled as 
quantitative indicators to ensure comparisons across countries and over time. One 
advantage of using country experts survey in this study is that they are not only 
knowledgeable about the political economy of their respective countries but also on 
state-society relations – most have worked in this area for years if not decades and 
have established international reputations in the field. The major criterion for the 
selection of experts was therefore their scholarly works (books, chapters in books, 
journal articles and doctoral dissertations) in the country for which they are 
respondents. I was already familiar with the works of some of these scholars. For 
some others, I did internet searches for experts that have published on the role of the 
state in development in each of the sample country. These were how the experts were 
chosen. Once, I knew the names of the experts, I carried out further internet searches 
for their contact details, including e-mail addresses. Given their expertise on the 
subject matter, we can expect that the experts’ responses, with few exceptions, will 
mirror the real situation.  
As pointed out above, experts’ surveys are greatly utilised in the social 
sciences.  For example, the Rauch and Evans (1997) dataset from which I constructed 
the autonomy variable was based on an experts’ survey. Similarly, major research and 
policy think-tanks often rely on experts’ surveys. Worthy of note in this regard is 
Transparency International (TI) which annually publishes cross-country data on 
corruption from a number of surveys that are mostly based on experts’ perceptions. 
Besides its academic merit, experts’ surveys are time saving and cost effective, which 
is one of the reasons I deployed it in this study. With limited resources but with new 
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information technology, I was able to conduct the survey in a relatively short period 
of time and with very limited cost (namely the cost of follow-up telephone calls). Its 
merits aside, reliance on new information technology highlighted the problem of the 
digital divide that separates developed and developing countries, and the exclusionary 
and inclusionary logics of globalisation. Compared to universities in the developed 
world (with modern technology and functional websites), (some) universities in the 
developing world have no functional websites. As a result, it was easier to locate 
country experts in developed countries. This skews the number of respondents in the 
population toward those residing in the developed countries, - almost half (twenty 
four) are located in five developed countries compared to twenty-six respondents who 
are spread across fifteen developing countries (see Table 6.1).  
 
Table 6.1: Locations and Number of Respondents 
Country Number of Respondents 
Australia 3 
Brazil 1 
Chile 1 
Costa Rica 2 
Denmark 1 
Egypt 3 
Hong Kong 1 
India 1 
Korea 2 
Malaysia 3 
Mexico 1 
Nigeria 1 
Pakistan 2 
Senegal 1 
Singapore 5 
South Africa 2 
Switzerland 1 
Thailand 1 
United Kingdom 3 
USA 16 
Total 50 
 
Given that experts are always busy and at times inundated with surveys, some 
that is are unwilling to respond to survey questionnaires. Out of the twenty seven out 
of the seventy seven experts contacted, representing 35% did not respond to the 
questionnaire. While I experienced this problem in the course of administering the 
questionnaire, nudging and persistence enabled me to obtain responses to generate 
synergy data for twelve out of the sixteen countries within the period of one month. In 
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two of the countries sampled, Ecuador and Guatemala, I did not receive any response. 
But the good response rate overall is partly attributed to what some of the respondents 
call the “public good” of the project, a research area that is long overdue. While 
administering the survey and collecting responses were daunting tasks, it was, at the 
same time, intellectually rewarding, with surprisingly good cooperation from experts 
all over the world. Still, four prospective respondents questioned the utility of 
quantifying state-society relations, and refused to respond to the survey. This is not 
uncommon with country specialists in the social sciences. Without questioning the 
utility of qualitative methods, the problem with such a stance is that in the absence of 
quantifiable data, it is difficult to make cross-country comparisons. Some others also 
questioned the temporal framework of the survey, which they suggested did not 
correspond exactly to their respective countries (I will return to this subject shortly).  
In general, however, country experts responded to the survey fairly quickly. 
Thus for example, compared to the Weberian survey (Evans and Rauch, 1997), which 
took about three years to collect 126 responses, I received about fifty responses within 
the space of a month. Of these, three were discarded because of apparent 
contradictions (and when respondents did not respond to subsequent queries for 
clarifications). The only response from Colombia was discarded because there was 
not enough information to be certain about how to code the state.  Also, the two 
responses for Costa Rica were discarded because the experts provided contradictory 
responses, making it difficult to find a national average (which was how each 
country’s data was constituted).32  
In some instances, respondents provided contradictory responses and at times 
even multiple options, which, when taken together (factored in), would make coding 
of the data problematic. With respect to the former problem, I requested such 
respondents, either by e-mail or by phone, to clarify the apparent contradictions. With 
respect to the latter, I requested (via e-mail or phone) such respondents to choose any 
of the standard options they considered as the “notional” average for that country and 
for the given period. Consequently, the score for each country draws on both the 
country rating and contextual comments by the experts (See Table 6.2 for the raw data 
                                                         
32
 Only one of the respondents responded to the query for clarifications while the other did not. But the 
clarifications did not resolve the conflicting responses. If anything, it reinforced the perception that a 
national average could not emerge. Not much should, therefore, be read into the Costa Rican case; had 
the second respondent responded to follow-up queries, it would have been possible to code that 
country.  
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and changes that were affected following the comments and subsequent 
communication with respondents). Once constituted, data for each country data were 
sent to most of the country experts to corroborate the scoring. This increased the level 
of validity and reliability of the dataset. 
 
Table 6.2: Raw Data of Synergy Indicators, 1970 - 1990 
 Types Representations Influence 
Country N/ Change 
W/ 
Change 
N/ 
Change 
W/ 
Change 
N/ 
Change 
W/ 
Change 
Brazil 1 1 2 2 1 1 
Chile 0 1 0 1 0 1 
Egypt 0 0 0 0 0 0 
India 0 1 0 1 1 1 
Kenya 0 0 0 0 1 0 
Korea 2 2 1 1 3 3 
Malaysia 1 1 2 2 1 1 
Mexico 1 1 2 1 1 1 
Nigeria 2 1 2 1 1 1 
Pakistan 2 2 1 1 1 1 
Singapore 2 2 2 2 4 4 
Thailand 2 2 1 1 2 1 
 
N/Change = No changes made to the raw data 
W/Changes = Changes made following comments by respondents 
 
The figures in Table 6.2 should be interpreted as follows: (a) for types of 
Consultative Mechanisms (CMs), 0 = no CMs, 1 = Ad hoc CMs, 2 = Informal but 
Institutionalised CMs, and 3 = Statutory CMs or Deliberation Councils; (b) for 
Representations, 0 = No CM, 1 = state and business, 2 = state, business and trade 
unions, and 3 = state, business, trade unions and civil society; and (c) for influence of 
CMs, 0 = no influence, 1 = minimal influence, 2 = moderate influence, 3 = moderate 
influence and 4 = very influential. 
A total of 44 responses (see Table 6.3) were used to constitute the data that 
will be subsequently presented in the later part of this chapter. Nevertheless (and 
importantly), the population covers the four categories of countries which I have spelt 
out in chapter 4, namely, countries with E-Growth (Egypt, India, Korea and 
Singapore, and Thailand), countries with high inequality and high growth (Malaysia 
and Chile), countries with equity and low growth (Pakistan), and lastly countries with 
low growth and with high inequality (Brazil, Kenya, Mexico and Nigeria). Therefore, 
in the final analysis, the sample of countries offers a good range of variation to 
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empirically examine how variations in the degree of synergy could lead to different 
types of national economic performance.  
 
 
Table 6.3: Number of Experts for Data Construction33 
Country No. of Experts 
Brazil 4 
Chile 3 
Egypt 3 
India 3 
Kenya 3 
Korea 4 
Malaysia 4 
Mexico 3 
Nigeria 5 
Pakistan 3 
Singapore 3 
Thailand 6 
Total 44 
 
A critical consideration for selecting countries was that they were those for 
which I have autonomy data. These, in turn, were selected because they are those 
countries for which I have E-Growth data. As Evans and Rauch pointed out, these 
countries have one common characteristic: they are all developing countries “still 
confronting the issue of industrial transformation during the period under 
consideration” (Evans and Rauch, 1997: 7).  
In the same vein, the period selected for the survey was based on the need to 
have the same time period for both the autonomy and synergy data (1970 – 1990). To 
choose a different timeframe for the latter would limit their joint utility as explanatory 
variables for variations in national economic performance. Indeed, it would defeat the 
purpose of demonstrating the link between Auto-Synergy and economic performance. 
However, cognizance was taken of the fact that 1970 – 1990 (twenty years) was a 
relatively long period, within which there could have been changes in state-society 
relations, as well as changes in economic policy, within and across countries. It could 
also be argued that a major weakness of using this large temporal span is that it may 
not lead to a highly reliable means for measuring causality. Nevertheless, given that 
the temporal contours of the survey was inherited from the autonomy data, as well as 
                                                         
33
 Different numbers of respondents that are used to constitute the national average per country. This 
practice is widely prevalent in the social sciences. See, for example, the work of Court et al. (1999) 
carried out for the United Nations University.  
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the absence of data for a shorter time period, data for a longer span has been utilised 
to approximate the degrees of synergy in the population. 
 
It should also be noted that it is primarily because of recognition of the 
problems associated with the long temporal span that a second time period, 1991-
2003, was included in the survey. Although data for the second time period have not 
been included in the analysis of this chapter, they have been included as an Appendix 
4 in hope that other comparatives might find them useful. The second temporal frame 
would enable us to detect if there have been some institutional changes in developing 
countries.  
Furthermore it needs to be observed that no two countries sequenced their 
economic policies and state-society relations in exactly the same year(s). Hence a long 
time period is desirable, as this allows for a “notional” average to emerge for the 
purposes of cross-country comparison, while factoring changes between countries into 
account. Furthermore, as some scholars such as Kenworthy and Kittel have observed, 
“…policy formation is not a process that has a definite beginning and end but one that 
occurs over an indeterminate length of time, hence it is difficult to develop a clear 
sequencing” (Kenworthy and Kittel: 2003: 17). A long time duration is, therefore, 
desirable in a study like this one. Having said this, it should also be noted that the time 
period of the data is long enough for the degrees of synergy in the respective countries 
to have had an impact on economic performance within the period and even beyond. 
Hence, causality could still be shown, as the national economic performance data has 
a temporal contour of 1991 - 2001. 
At this juncture, it is important that I spell out the factors that framed the 
temporal parameters of the survey – and there are a number of factors informing this 
choice. Besides the need to have the same temporal frame as that for the autonomy 
data, there are other important considerations, all of which are part of the attempt in 
this study to understand the different developmental trajectories of developing 
countries. The first factor in this regards, as Kohli (2004: 5) succinctly puts it, is that it 
is “only in the 1970s did the dramatic variations in performance across developing 
countries…start to become apparent. Only from then on did these variations become a 
central concern for development scholars”.  Second, to a degree, the 1970s marked the 
beginning of the contemporary form of globalisation.  As illustrations, the following 
three dramatic events suffice for now: 
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(a) The collapse of the Bretton Woods’ exchange regime.  In 1971, the US 
unilaterally abandoned the convertibility of the dollar and ushered in an era 
characterised by flexible and floating exchange rates. Consequently, one of the 
dramatic changes in the global political economy occurred; that is, the 
financialisation and the rapid rate with which finances move across the globe, 
become a dominant feature of a new era. This is generally referred to as 
globalisation (Glyn et al., 1990). 
 
(b) The end of the Fordist mode of production. The emergence of new 
information technology in the early 1970s changed remarkably the global 
production landscape (Lipietz, 1987; Jessop, 1992).  
 
(c) Neo-liberalism or market fundamentalism becomes hegemonic in both 
intellectual and policy discourses. This resulted in pressure being exerted on 
developing countries to conform to perceived global economic imperatives. 
The late 1980s could be said to be the apogee of the Washington Consensus, 
although its decline did not happen until about a decade later. 
 
In light of the above, a study that seeks to explain variations in development 
trajectories across developing countries in the context of globalisation, should take the 
early 1970s as a necessary point of departure. By 1990, the intensity and extensity of 
globalisation have become more pronounced. In addition, variations in development 
performance have also become more glaring. As such, a temporal parameter of twenty 
years, 1970 – 1990, is useful in that this is a long enough period for us to understand 
the institutional infrastructure of developing countries in navigating the sea of 
globalisation – and understanding the divergent developmental outcomes.  
The survey focussed on CMs, both structures and processes, where the agenda 
of engagement is not confined to labour market issues but instead covers broad social 
and economic policies (including industrial policies, trade policy, and macroeconomic 
policy).  
Like Compston’s (1997) study on corporatism, this study excludes wage-
setting structures. Rather, it focuses on policies relating to employment, prices, 
growth and trade. Put differently, the policy areas of interest include: fiscal policy, 
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monetary policy, investment, overall industrial planning, trade policy, job creation 
and training, and employment law. The reasons for these choices are three-fold. First, 
as Compston (1997: 736) rightly observed, income policy represents “government 
participation in union policy-making rather than union participation in government 
economic policy- making”. Second, civil society organisations, as used in this study, 
do not normally participate in income policy. Third, and most importantly, most of the 
aforementioned policy areas, which I refer to as the macro-conditioning of 
development policy in developing countries, capture the depths of state-society 
synergy. They define the environment for micro economic and sectoral policies. 
The approach in this study therefore differs from that of the International 
Labour Organisation (ILO), which focuses primarily on labour market institutions, 
and at the national level to tripartite labour market institutions – that is corporatism. 
The problem with the ILO approach is that it fails to take cognizance of the fact that 
labour market policies are shaped and conditioned by macroeconomic and industrial 
policies. As Weiss (1998) reminds us, corporatist institutional arrangements play a 
limited role in industrial transformation. In addition, the ILO approach fails to take 
account of the organisation of the state itself.  It is for these reasons that we need to go 
beyond intermediation bodies that are confined to labour market issues. Although 
CMs and the policy issues they deal with may vary with time, they are within the 
general policy areas identified above. 
 
6.2: Constructing the Synergy Indicators 
 
I proceeded to construct three indicators for the synergy variable. As I have 
stated above, these indicators may not represent all attributes of state-society synergy. 
Nevertheless, they constitute important components for an (initial) academic inquiry, 
especially one that aims to test empirically the link between degrees of synergy and 
variations in country economic performance. The two indicators (nature and 
representations) will be rated in terms of types, while the third (influence) is rated in 
terms of degrees.  The total synergy scores will take the form of “degrees”.  
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6. 2. 1: Nature of Consultative Mechanisms 
 
This indicator captures the types or nature of Consultative Mechanisms (CMs). 
It is derived from question number 3 that required respondents to indicate the type of 
CMs in the countries sampled. The exact question is “Which of the following best 
describe the nature of the consultative mechanism?” 
The literature of state-society interactions has described various methods of 
interactions, which can be broadly defined as consultative mechanisms (Biddle and 
Jesse, 1999). These can be disaggregated as: (a) statutory CMs; (b) informal but 
institutionalised CMs (although not backed by law, they are institutionalised because 
consultations between the economic bureaucracy and societal actors are made on a 
regular basis34 – indeed a norm); and (c) ad-hoc CMs. It is important to distinguish 
between these three forms of associational participation in economic policy-making. 
In statutory deliberation councils, the state establishes formal institutions of dialogue 
between the state and associational interest groups. In such contexts, there are regular 
and compulsory interactions between state and societal socio-economic actors. 
Through such interactions, the latter is able to systematically make inputs on national 
economic policy. Thus the main distinguishing features of these two types of 
institutionalised CMs, is that the former is backed by law and the latter is not; hence 
they can be described as informal intermediation bodies. Lastly, ad-hoc and irregular 
CMs are (as the name implies) -- irregular. In most cases consultations are at the 
discretion of the state.  
Deliberation councils and other forms of institutionalised CMs could cover 
macro, sectoral, and/or industrial issues. For the purposes of this study, I am 
concerned with institutionalised deliberation councils or CMs – namely statutory and 
informal mechanisms, as well as ad hoc CMs at the national level. To go beyond this 
would be a monumental task for a study of this nature. These institutional structures 
are the bases for consultations between the state, business, trade unions and civil 
society groups. In fact, deliberation councils are institutional structures of 
participation/involvement of citizens, represented by their interest/associational 
groups, in the decision-making processes (especially in a world when citizens feel that 
they are losing control over decisions that affect them). They provide space for 
organised interest groups to engage in face-to-face interactions with the state. By so 
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doing, citizens are able to jointly determine policy with the state. In some instances, 
these interactions take the form of formal negotiations between the state and its socio-
economic partners. In others, the participating actors enter into formal and binding 
agreements. While in other instances, the agreements may not be binding (they might 
just be recommendations) but parties to agreements are required to coordinate and 
mobilize their members to achieve specific goals, which will not only benefit 
members of participating stakeholders but the nation as a whole. Being able to 
persuade members to abide by agreements gives societal actors greater influence over 
economic policy. This is what Schmitter and Streeck refer to as the “logic of influence 
associations’ exercise over public authorities” (Schmitter and Streeck 1999: 19). In 
some contexts, they are structures and processes for sharing information between the 
participating national stakeholders. 
I should stress that the choice of national-level CMs is not made because of a 
lack of recognition of the centrality and importance of other levels of governance 
(which I have highlighted in chapter 3), but primarily to ease operationalisation. It is 
also because national macro-policies, which can be termed as the macro-conditioning 
of policies of provincial and local levels, set the parameters for policies and 
programmes at lower levels of governance. In fact, national economic policies frame 
and indeed define the context and parameters for policies at both local and provincial 
levels of government, especially in developing countries, which are under both 
internal and external pressure to align their economic policy to the dominant logic of 
market fundamentalism in the last two and half decades, in an effort to become 
globally competitive. It is therefore appropriate for a study of this nature to focus on 
national CMs.  
Given the three categorisations above, I will then be able to rate countries in 
terms of their type of CMs. In particular, we can rate countries separately on a scale of 
0 to 3, with 0 being given to countries that have no deliberative structures; 1 for 
countries that have irregular but ad hoc CMs; 2 for countries that have informal but 
institutionalised CMs; and 3 for countries that have statutory CMs.  The statutory 
CMs are accorded a higher score value because they involve regular and formal 
contacts between economic actors with core government economic agencies. This 
means that there are formal contacts by non-state stakeholders to the state. In contrast, 
                                                                                                                                                                  
34
 In most cases these informal consultative mechanisms do not have a permanent secretariat! 
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I have scored ad hoc policy networks/processes lower because societal actors, while 
they may be consulted as a matter of procedure, have no regular or formal contact 
with the state. Thus, the higher a country’s score on this indicator, the stronger its CM 
contacts.  The influence of societal actors over policy depends on the discretions and 
invitations by the government to comment on government proposals. This might also 
take the form of the government inviting stakeholders to workshops on conferences as 
a mechanism for dialogue. Indeed, in this context, governments perceive economic 
policy formulation as its exclusive prerogative. The aforementioned categories of 
CMs are represented in Table 6.4.  Specifically, the question to respondents was 
“Which of the following best describe the nature of the consultative mechanism?” 
 
Table 6.4: Typologies of Consultative Mechanisms 
Score Type Description 
3 Statutory Deliberation 
Councils 
 
Through legislation a formal consultative structure is 
established that requires government to consult with 
stakeholders around major economic policies. 
 
2 Informal but 
Institutionalised 
Consultative Mechanisms 
 
Although there is no law that requires government to 
consult with stakeholders, there are regular and formal 
consultations between government and its economic 
partners. 
1 Ad-hoc Consultative 
Mechanisms 
There is no law that requires government to consult 
with its economic partners but there are irregular 
interval consultations at government’s discretion with 
economic stakeholders. 
 
0 No Consultative 
Mechanism 
There is no law that requires government to consult 
with important stakeholders and, consequently, no 
formal consultations by government with stakeholders. 
 
 
In this way, we can develop an index with four categories.   The ranking on 
the types of CMs in the sample is presented in Table 6.5 below 
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Table 6.5: Nature/Types of Consultative Mechanisms, 1970 – 199035 
Country Score Score Normalised to 
between 0 – 1 
Types of CMs 
Korea 2 0.67 Informal but institutionalised 
Pakistan 2 0.67 Informal but institutionalised 
Singapore 2 0.67 Informal but institutionalised 
Thailand 2 0.67 Informal but institutionalised 
Brazil 1 0.33 Ad-hoc 
Chile 1 0.33 Ad-hoc 
India 1 0.33 Ad-hoc 
Malaysia 1 0.33 Ad-hoc 
Mexico 1 0.33 Ad-hoc 
Nigeria 1 0.33 Ad-hoc 
Egypt 0 0.00 None 
Kenya 0 0.00 None 
 
 
Table 6.5 shows that of the twelve countries sampled in the period under 
consideration, 1970-1990, none had statutory CMs, four had informal but 
institutionalised CMs (namely, Pakistan, Singapore, South Korea and Thailand), six 
had ad hoc CMs (Brazil, Chile, India, Malaysia, Mexico and Nigeria), while two had 
no CMs (Egypt and Kenya).  
 
6. 2. 2: The Breadth of State-Society Synergy - The Actors 
 
The second index of the synergy variable considers the breadth of state-society 
synergy. It is constructed from question number 3 that required respondents to 
indicate the type of representations in the predominant CMs. The exact question asked 
was “How would you characterise the composition of the forum of dialogue and 
consultation?” Four alternative options were provided from which respondents were 
to choose one that mirrors the situation in their respective countries of expertise. 
Countries were rated on the basis of the inclusivity of the national predominant CMs. 
In other words, like all the synergy’s indicators, the rating of this indicator is on types 
of representations in the national CMs.  
In constructing this index, we can envision four scenarios. First, the state 
ensures the participation of three other stakeholders, namely, peak business 
associations, peak trade unions federations and civil society groups, in economic 
policy-making. The second category includes the state, organised business and civil 
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 The countries are ranked in descending order according to the value of their types of CM score. All 
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society relationship. The third scenario concerns the state-business participation in 
economic policy. In the last category, the state single-handedly formulates policy 
without formal consultations with any of the aforementioned social partners. The 
simple proposition is that the type of coalitions that the state forges in economy-policy 
making is likely to shape the nature of the economic outcome. For example, if the 
state forges coalitions only with elite groups, the orientation of the policy and its 
benefits is likely to privilege the interests of elites (more than if the state-society 
relations consist of both elite and subordinate groups in society). It is precisely for this 
reason that the breadth of state-society relations is a crucial indicator of synergy. 
Therefore the inclusivity of CMs representation should be a good predictor of the 
likely economic outcome in a country. 
 
Table 6.6: Typologies of Actors/Partners in Economic Policy-Making 
Score Actors 
3 State, business, trade unions and civil society 
2 State, business and trade unions 
1 State and business 
0 State (No Consultative Mechanism) 
 
One reason for this focus is that these institutions and processes are open and 
transparent, which allows for empirical testing. Countries are rated on the basis of the 
inclusivity in the CMs, as evidenced in Table 6.6.  States with more inclusive CMs 
will score higher than states with less inclusive CMs.  Cases where government, 
business, trade unions and civil society are represented have the highest score of 3; 
those with government, business and trade unions scores 2; countries with only 
government and business scores 1; and when governments do not have formal 
consultation with any social partner, the country receives the lowest score of 0. 
However, none of the categories above preclude informal consultations with 
various individual actors. This is because, in the real world, informal contacts take 
place daily between government and the other actors, either as organised interests or 
as individuals. But these are not made public, which make them extremely difficult 
for empirical testing.  
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                  
subsequent tables in this chapter follow this pattern of ranking. 
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Table 6.7: Representations in CMs  
Country Score Score Normalised to 
between 0 and 1 
Representations 
Brazil 2 0.67 More Inclusive 
Malaysia 2 0.67 More Inclusive 
Mexico 2 0.67 More Inclusive 
Singapore 2 0.67 More Inclusive 
Chile 1 0.33 State and business 
India 1 0.33 State and business 
Korea 1 0.33 State and business 
Nigeria 1 0.33 State and business 
Pakistan 1 0.33 State and business 
Thailand 1 0.33 State and business 
Egypt 0 0.00 None 
Kenya 0 0.00 None 
 
Table 6.7 shows that between 1970 and 1990, none of the twelve countries 
sampled in the study had CMs with representations from civic organisations and 
NGOs. Four countries (namely, Brazil, Malaysia and Mexico, Singapore) had more 
inclusive CMs comprising representatives of government, business and trade unions. 
Another five countries (Chile, India, Korea, Nigeria, Pakistan and Thailand) had CMs 
comprising only of government and business, while two countries (Egypt and Kenya) 
had no CMs.  
 
6. 2. 3: Influence of Societal Actors’ Participation on Economic Policy 
 
This third indicator captures the degree of influence that consultations had on 
the final economic policy adopted. This was constituted from question number 4. The 
exact question was “Which of the following best fits the outcome of such 
consultations?” This is the most subjective of all the questions, as it is often difficult 
to measure this type of influence –and how this is measured may vary from context to 
context. Where there are formal agreements, which are directly translated to policy 
and in some instances into law, the degree of influence is easily measurable. But this 
is not always the case. In some instances, agreements do not immediately translate 
into policy. Indeed in the short run, the economic bureaucracy might still follow its 
chosen course of policy direction but years down the line, revise itself by 
implementing the previous agreements. The influence of the agreements given that 
some time has lapsed might not be obvious to outsiders. Again, how do you measure 
the influence of the information social partners shared with the state? This is not easy! 
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Given these problems, measuring the degree of CMs influence on economic policy is 
somewhat difficult. The most reasonable way to address this problem may be to rely 
on experts’ perceptions. Again, subjective judgement in rating cases is prevalent in 
the social sciences. 
The degree of influence on consultations is an important component of 
synergy because societal actors’ participation should be intended to improve 
economic policy. In this regard, the outcome of consultations is to enhance the 
economic policy with the aim of ensuring better economic performance. The outcome 
of consultations ultimately aimed at influencing economic policy (as against 
providing societal actors platforms to merely air their views).  There are other reasons 
why the influence of CMs is important. First, if the outcomes of consultations 
substantively influenced the economic policy that is ultimately adopted by the state, it 
is an indication that the government takes consultation seriously. Secondly, it could 
also mean that there is a “joint project” of national transformation between the state 
and its socio-economic partners. As Evans (2004) describes it, joint projects imply 
that some group within the state (and for our purposes those in the economic 
bureaucracy) and some organised groups in society, jointly accomplish a mutually 
desirable goal. Against this background, the degree of the influence of consultations 
could be used as a proxy for the existence of a joint project between the state and its 
chosen socio-economic partners. It can therefore be conceived as an independent 
variable (shared project or government commitment to consultation around national 
economic transformation). 
We can anticipate five scenarios of the degree of influence of state-society 
synergy on final economic policy adopted. As we see in Table 6.8, these can be 
ranked as follows: 0 = no influence; 1 = minimal influence; 2 = moderate influence; 3 
= influential; and 4 = very influential.  In short: a state that enjoys CMs with influence 
will score higher than a state where CMs do not influence economic policy. This is 
represented in column 4. 
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Table 6.8: Degree of Influence of CMs on Adoption of Economic Policy 
Country Score Score Normalised between 0 and 1 Influence 
Singapore 4 1.00 Very influential 
Korea 3 0.75 Influential 
Thailand 2 0.50 Moderate Influence 
Brazil 1 0.25 Moderate Influence 
Chile 1 0.25 Moderate Influence 
India 1 0.25 Minimal Influence 
Malaysia 1 0.25 Minimal Influence 
Mexico 1 0.25 Minimal Influence 
Nigeria 1 0.25 Minimal Influence 
Pakistan 1 0.25 Minimal Influence 
Egypt 0 0.00 No Influence 
Kenya 0 0.00 No Influence 
 
 
Table 6.8 depicts the influence of consultations on final policy adopted by the 
state. It shows that Singapore’s CMs are very influential in the determination of final 
economic policy while in Korea it is influential. In Thailand, the predominant CMs 
had moderate influence in the determination of economic policy. Interestingly, for this 
period, 1970-1990, for most (six) of the countries (Brazil, Chile, India, Malaysia, 
Mexico, Nigeria and Pakistan), the outcomes of consultations had minimal influence 
on the economic policy adopted, while in two countries (Egypt and Kenya), there was 
no consultation (and therefore no influence).  
 
6. 3: Weighting of the Indicators and Constituting the Synergy Variable 
 
Having presented the three indicators, I will proceed to demonstrate whether 
or not there is empirical justification for weighting the different indicators. We might 
recall that institutionalised CMs are likely to have greater influence in the 
determination of final economic policy than other types of representations.  For this 
reason, the institutionalisation score will reflect this.  At the same time, more 
inclusive CMs play an important role in the nature of economic outcomes. Given our 
theoretical expectations, we can expect that institutionalised CMs that are inclusive of 
both elite and subordinate classes are more likely to achieve E-Growth (than those 
mainly composed of elite groups (e.g., business).  In constructing the synergy scale, I 
will utilise the figures that have been normalised from 0 – 1. In this way, the synergy 
score can accord to that of the autonomy score presented in chapter 5. 
All columns in bold in Table 6.9 are double weighted. Columns two and three 
represent the types of CMs that are single and double weighted respectively. The 
fourth column represents the constituent groups that are represented in the CMs, while 
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the fifth column represents the degrees of influence of the CMs on economic policy.  
Column six depicts single-weighted synergy scores, while the seventh column reflects 
a doubled-weighted synergy score.  By comparing columns six and seven we can 
more clearly see the effect of weighting the types of CM score.  The last column 
represents the various categories of synergy. 
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Table 6.9: The Synergy Scale for 12 Developing Countries 
Country Types 
 (SW) 
Types  
(DW) 
Representation
s 
Influence/ 
Shared 
Projects 
Synergy 
Score (SW) 
Synergy 
Score 
(DW) 
Synergy 
Score36 
Groupings 
Singapore 0.67 1.33 0.67 1.00 2.33 3.00 0.75 High Degrees 
Korea 0.67 1.33 0.33 0.75 1.75 2.42 0.60 High Degrees 
Thailand 0.67 1.33 0.33 0.50 1.50 2.17 0.54 High Degrees 
 
Brazil 0.33 0.67 0.67 0.25 1.25 1.58 0.40 Low Degrees 
Malaysia 0.33 0.67 0.67 0.25 1.25 1.58 0.40 Low Degrees 
Pakistan 0.67 1.33 0.33 0.25 1.25 1.58 0.40 Low Degrees 
Mexico 0.33 0.67 0.67 0.25 1.25 1.58 0.40 Low Degrees 
Chile 0.33 0.67 0.33 0.25 0.92 1.25 0.31 Low Degrees 
India 0.33 0.67 0.33 0.25 0.92 1.25 0.31 Low Degrees 
Nigeria 0.33 0.67 0.33 0.25 0.92 1.25 0.31 Low Degrees 
Egypt 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 Low Degrees 
Kenya 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 Low Degrees 
SW= Single Weighted and DW = Double Weighted.  
                                                          
36
 These scores are based on the conversion of the scores to from 0 – 1. 
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I will proceed to construct the synergy variable, which is presented in the last 
two columns of Table 6.9. But for the purposes of this study, I will use the scale in the 
last column. This variable is a combination of the three indicators discussed above, 
with the nature of CMs given double the weight of composition and influence 
indicators. The synergy scores therefore ranges from 0 to 4. In constructing the 
synergy variable, the index on the typologies of representation (nature of CMs) has 
been given a double weight of 0 to 6 compared to both the actors (the actors that are 
included in the CMs) and the influence of CMs on economic policy. This weighting is 
based on the assumption that institutionalised structures and processes (statutory and 
informal CMs) are likely to have greater influence in government’s determination of 
economic policy. This proposition is evidenced in Appendix 4.37   
The synergy scale is presented in the last column.  Countries are being rated 
on the degree, rather than types, of synergy. In the 1970 – 1990 period, on the scale of 
0 – 1, only three countries (Singapore, South Korea and Thailand) could be said to be 
highly synergistic, scoring 0.75, 0.60 and 0.54 respectively. The other countries in the 
population hover below 0.40, which is an indication of abysmal synergistic records 
(low degree of synergy) in developing countries. Of these, two countries (Egypt and 
Kenya) have the worst synergy grading. It needs to be stressed at this juncture that 
none of the twelve countries have CMs that include representatives of civic 
organisations and NGOs - an indication of their marginalization in economic policy 
making.   
But for purposes of consistency, the median of the synergy score of the eleven 
countries covered in the study will be used. The median is 0.40. Scores between 0 and 
0.40 are held to represent low degrees of synergy while scores between 0.41 and 1.00 
represent high degrees of synergy. 
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 It is evidently clear from Appendix 4 that certain combinations of the nature of CMs and 
representations are influential or very influential in the determination of final economic policy. It 
shows that when institutionalised CMs have more inclusive representations, the outcomes of 
consultations range from influential to very influential in government’s determination of final 
economic policy. This is precisely the case in both periods for Singapore and for Korea and Mexico in 
the 1991 – 2003 period. One exception is Brazil, where in the same period the outcomes of 
consultations had moderate influence. Interestingly, whenever there is disequilibrium in any of these 
two indicators, the outcomes of consultations are unpredictable. It could either have minimal or 
moderate influence. Another exception is South Korea for the 1970 – 1991 period, when the 
representations at the institutional CMs were made up of government and business yet the outcome of 
consultations ultimately played an influential role in the economic policies that were eventually 
adopted.   
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6. 4: Conclusion 
 
In this chapter, I have constructed the second independent variable, synergy, 
for the study. Because of the absence of data for this variable, I conducted country 
experts’ survey for sixteen developing countries. This survey yielded responses for 
the construction of data for twelve countries. From the experts’ evaluations, the 
synergy data was created. Like the indicators for the autonomy variable, the synergy 
indicators may not be able to cover all of synergy’s characteristics, but they provide a 
strong basis for researchers to begin to quantify state-society synergy.  Similarly, the 
synergy variable, like the autonomy variable, is treated in terms of differences of 
degree rather than type, which will form the point of departure in the subsequent 
chapters.  
The temporal span and the population of these data were chosen to coincide 
with the countries and time period of the autonomy data. While recognising the 
problems associated with data covering a long period of time, the data do provide 
national averages that can still enable social scientists to establish the nature of the 
relationship between it and variations in national economic performance. 
Furthermore, the data are constructed in such a way that they can incorporate change 
over time. This is based on the recognition that state-society relations, economic 
policies and the effects of CMs on economic policies change over time, from country 
to country. Given this approach, the construction of the synergy variable lends itself to 
replication across countries for the same period, as well as for any other period(s) 
desirable by other scholars.  
As noted previously, there are strong empirical justifications for the choice of 
countries. They are all developing countries confronted with the need for industrial 
development and becoming globally competitive while at the same time improving 
the standards of living for their populations. Indeed, achieving E-Growth is the most 
fundamental challenge faced by these countries. Although the sample is small, the 
synergy data covers the range of countries included in the dependent variable. This 
will make it possible to evaluate the link between various degrees of synergy and 
economic performance (that is, assess the effects of synergy on economic 
performance). Establishing this link, as well as assessing the relationship between our 
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independent variables (autonomy and synergy) and dependent variable, E-Growth, is 
the subject of the next chapter.   
  This chapter provides an important background to set out the sources of the 
capacity of the SAS. It is assumed that countries with scores that approximate the 
synergy scale are likely to have greater capacities to foster growth with equity than 
those that are not. 
Having now constructed the independent and dependent variables for this 
study, the next chapter, 7, begins the empirical analysis. It aims to show the 
relationship between one of the independent variables, autonomy, with the dependent 
variables.  It will be shown that autonomy accounts for much of the variations in 
growth and inequality. But contrary to our theoretical expectation, some countries 
with low degrees of autonomy achieved high growth while some others with high 
degree of autonomy achieved low growth. These are the subjects of the next chapter.  
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Chapter Seven 
 
State Autonomy and Equitable Growth 
 
7. 0:  Introduction 
 
In chapters, four, five and six, I constructed measures for both the dependent 
and independent variables. Specifically, in chapter four, a measure for the dependent 
variable, equitable growth (E-Growth), was constructed.  There you will recall that the 
E-Growth variable had two component parts: economic growth and equitable 
distribution.  Chapter five covered the first indicator of the independent variable 
(autonomy) while chapter six focused on its second indicator (synergy). The primary 
objective of this chapter is to examine how variations in the degrees of synergistic 
autonomy (Auto-Synergy) lead to diverse national economic performances. 
The findings in this chapter will cover twelve developing countries because 
they are those for which I have data (for both the independent and dependent 
variables). It needs to be stressed at this juncture that because the two independent 
variables are based on data for the 1970 – 1990 period, and those for the dependent 
variable are for a more recent period, 1991 – 2001, we can make some plausible, if 
tenuous, arguments about causality. This is because the development of state 
institutions and state-society relations – the explanatory variables – preceded the 
economic performance (E-Growth) temporally in the sample. Put differently, the 
institutional infrastructure – autonomy and synergy – are conceived as a precondition 
for E-Growth.   
This chapter is divided into two main sections. The first section addresses the 
association between the two independent variables, autonomy and synergy. The 
second section covers state autonomy’s relationship with growth, inequality, and E-
Growth. The analysis of the independent variables that follows will be based on the 
median values.38 As pointed out in chapter four, I have used the mean score for both 
economic growth and the income Gini to aggregate the E-Growth score. In the 
subsequent analysis (including chapters 8 and 9), I will attempt to account for the 
outlier status of countries as well as discuss some of the interesting cases. This is with 
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 This is based on the advice of Peter Evans that using the median will make the interpretation clearer 
and less complex.  
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a view to explore the different types of relationships we find between the independent 
and dependent variables.  
 
7.1: The Two Independent Variables: Synergy and Autonomy  
 
Table 7.1: Autonomy and Synergy Scales 
Country Autonomy Synergy Auto-Synergy 
Singapore 0.76 0.75 0.76 
Korea 0.80 0.60 0.70 
Thailand 0.70 0.54 0.62 
Pakistan 0.66 0.40 0.53 
Mexico 0.58 0.40 0.49 
Brazil 0.45 0.40 0.42 
Malaysia 0.60 0.40 0.50 
India 0.77 0.31 0.54 
Chile 0.43 0.31 0.37 
Nigeria 0.44 0.31 0.38 
Egypt 0.54 0.00 0.27 
Kenya 0.34 0.00 0.17 
Median 0.59 0.40 0.49 
 
Table 7.1 depicts the two independent variables in the study for the 1970 – 
1990 period. Contrary to a priori expectations39, there is a strong and significant 
correlation between synergy and autonomy. The Pearson correlation coefficient which 
measures the strength of the linear relationship between the two variables is estimated 
at 0.69 (or 69 percent). The figure is highly significant with a P-value of 0.002. 
Interestingly, however, there are some important developments that need to be 
highlighted. While in the population, India is the second highest autonomous state, in 
the synergy scale it is one of the least synergistic country, placing 5th along with Chile 
and Nigeria.  In the same vein, Egypt is ranked 8th in the autonomy scale but is 
completely unsynergistic, ranking at the bottom with Kenya. The table also reveals 
that the highly autonomous states (with the exception of India and Pakistan), on 
average, rank at the top of the synergy scale. Similarly, countries with the lowest 
ranking in the autonomy scale are also at the bottom of the synergy scale.  The third 
                                                         
39
 Scholars like Midgal (1988) suggest that a strong state, that is autonomous state, has to impose its 
will over society. There is therefore an assumption that such a state did not require to forge strong ties 
with societal actors. In this perspective, synergy may undermine state’s autonomy. In contrast, the 
results of this study tell us that states that have autonomous institutions tend to forge strong ties with 
organised interests. It thus provides empirical validity to Peter Evans (1995) contention that 
autonomous state agencies need strong ties with society, and not insulation or isolation.  
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column presents a new variable, Auto-Synergy, which combine the autonomy and 
synergy scores.  
In most cases I will refer to the high and low degrees of these variables, 
descriptions which are derived from their relationship to the median of the twelve 
countries covered in this study. The median score for autonomy is 0.59, that of 
synergy is 0.40 and for their combined scores (Auto-Synergy): 0.49. Scores from the 
median and below, will be referred to as low degrees while high degrees are scores 
above the median. As a result, low degrees of autonomy range from 0 - 0.59 while 
high degrees of autonomy range from 0.60 – 1. In the same vein, low degrees of 
synergy are any score from 0 - 0.40 and high degrees of synergy are from 0.41 – 1.  
Similarly, scores from 0 – 0.49 and from 0.50 – 1 respectively on the Auto-synergy 
scale represent low and high degrees. Cognizance should be taken of these in the 
analysis that follows in this chapter and the subsequent two chapters, 8 and 9.  
It is also important to note that the E-Growth variable is a dichotomous and 
categorical variable and hence a logit regression will be used in modelling the 
relations between the independent variables and E-Growth (I will return to this 
shortly).  
 
Table 7.2: The Independent and Dependent Variables 
Country Autonomy Synergy 
Auto-
Synergy 
% Change 
in GDP Inequality 
E-Growth 
Categories 
Singapore 0.76 0.75 0.76 7.0 0.43 4 
Korea 0.80 0.60 0.70 6.0 0.32 4 
India 0.77 0.31 0.54 5.5 0.38 4 
Egypt 0.54 0.00 0.27 4.2 0.34 4 
Thailand 0.70 0.54 0.62 4.4 0.43 4 
Pakistan 0.66 0.40 0.53 3.8 0.33 3 
Malaysia 0.60 0.40 0.50 6.6 0.49 2 
Chile 0.43 0.31 0.37 6.2 0.58 2 
Mexico 0.58 0.40 0.49 3.2 0.52 1 
Brazil 0.45 0.40 0.42 2.6 0.61 1 
Nigeria 0.44 0.31 0.38 2.7 0.51 1 
Kenya 0.34 0.00 0.17 1.6 0.45 1 
 
Table 7.2 presents the independent and dependent variables. This section 
provides an important background to the discussion of the findings in subsequent 
sections in this chapter, as well as in chapters 8 and 9.  
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7.2: Autonomy, Growth, Equity and E-Growth 
 
In this section, I will present the research findings on the impact of state 
autonomy on economic growth and equity. The analysis will focus on the bivariate 
relationships so that we can better examine the relationship between the independent 
and dependent variables.  In addition, by means of linear regression, I am able to 
model the value of the dependent variable based on its linear relationship with the 
independent variable. I have also chosen to focus on the bivariate relationship40 in 
order to exploit the interpretive utility of the scatter plots and outliers in the sample. In 
fact, one of the benefits for including plots is that it might provide an indication of any 
serious departures from the assumed linearity of the relationship between the 
independent and the dependent variables. In short, the bivariate relationship deals 
specifically with the construction of a model in which the expected value of the 
dependent variable is related linearly to the value of the independent variable. 
Specifically in this chapter, I will focus on the linear relationship between autonomy 
and growth, autonomy and inequality and autonomy and E-Growth. This focus should 
be juxtaposed against the theoretical background of this study: that a high degree of 
state autonomy is closely associated with high economic growth rates and 
egalitarianism, and consequently variations in the former across countries account for 
varying economic performance. 
Because E-Growth is a categorical variable, the logit model will be used. Logit 
models extend the principles of generalised linear models to better treat the cases of 
dichotomous and polychotomous dependent variables. They focus on the association 
of group data, looking at all levels of possible interaction effects. In particular, logit 
models extend the log-linear model to allow a mixture of categorical and continuous 
independent variables with respect to a categorical dependent variable (Garson, 1998; 
2006). In the case of this study, using a logit model will allow us to test the linear 
relationship between our independent variables, namely, autonomy, synergy and auto-
synergy with one of the dependent variables, E-Growth, which is a categorical 
variable.  
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 A multivariate analysis would have been undertaken after the bivariate analysis, save for collinearity 
problems.  
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We are, therefore, interested in seeing how a country’s E-Growth status (1-4) 
is related to its autonomy, synergy and auto-synergy scores, respectively. Since our 
response variable, E-Growth, is a polychotomous categorical variable (consisting of 
more than 2 distinct categories) the use of ordinary least squares regression or logistic 
regression is inappropriate. We therefore use multinomial logistic regression (an 
extension of binary logistic regression) in order to perform our analyses. 
Let ipi = probability of a random country falling into E-Growth category i, 
i=1,...,4. Since no other E-Growth categories exist, 1 2 3 4 1pi pi pi pi+ + + = . The 
multinomial logistic regression model simultaneously compares all 4*(3-1) pairs of 
categories although given a certain choice of 4-1=3 of these; the rest are redundant. 
The logit41 equations that pair each response category with the reference 
category are set up below. Thus, since there are 4 E-Growth categories, the model will 
consist of 3 logit equations. In the analyses, E-Growth category 4 is chosen to be the 
reference category as it is the most frequently observed category in the data. This is 
the conventional way of choosing the reference category. Thus, the logit equations for 
the model are: 
1
1 1
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2 2
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3
3 3
4
log ,
log ,
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egories. From these equations, expressions  
could be derived for the .spi
 The first equation gives the log odds that a country is classified as the first E-
Growth category, given that the country is known to be either of the first or fourth E-
Growth categories. The second equation gives the log odds that a country is classified 
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as the second E-Growth category, given that the country is known to be either of the 
second or fourth categories and the last equation is defined similarly.42 
 
7. 2. 1: Autonomy and Growth 
 
This section is divided into two parts. In the first part, the results of the model 
and analyses will be presented. The second part will deal with a narrative analysis of 
the results.  
 
7. 2. 1. 1: Modelling Growth on Autonomy 
 
There is a significant and strong correlation between state autonomy and 
economic growth as the Pearson correlation coefficient between the two indicators, 
autonomy and growth, is estimated at 0.641. It is significant at 0.05 level with a p-
value of .025. A graphic illustration of this relationship is provided in Figure 7.1 
which shows the relationship between the degrees on the autonomy scale and 
percentage change in GDP (i.e., economic growth).  
Furthermore, the relationship is vividly captured by a simple linear regression. 
Based on our theoretical specifications, the following regression equation can be 
derived: 
 
% change in economic growth = 
 α + ßAutonomy
 
+ εt 
 
From the estimated regression, the following equation is obtained: 
 
% change in economic growth = -0.103   + 7.434 (Autonomy) 
  (-061)     (2.641) 
        R2  = 0.411 
The estimated t-ratios are in parentheses. The coefficient is significant at the 
0.05 level. The R2 value is 0.411, which is a good fit.43 This means that our equation 
explains 41% of the variations in the sample data.  Put differently, it means that 41% 
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 This applies to all sections of the study where the logit model has been used.  
43
 The R2 measures the proportion of variation in the dependent variable that is explained by the 
regression.  
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of the variations in % change in economic growth is explained by variations in 
autonomy.  
From the above equation, it would be tempting to suggest that a unit (0.1) 
increase in state’s autonomy ranking would lead to a 7.434 percent change (increase) 
in economic growth. This would, of course, be unrealistic given that there are other 
variables which certainly impact on economic growth that have not been included in 
the equation. If such variables were included, the coefficient of the autonomy variable 
would certainly be different. Consequently, in this and subsequent equations 
(including those in chapters 8 and 9), the exact impact of the independent variables on 
the dependent variables will not be measured or determined.   
This result compares favourably with that of Evans and Rauch (1997), who 
show strong and positive correlation between Weberianness (which constitutes two 
indicators of autonomy) and economic growth. They report a Pearson correlation 
coefficient between Weberianness and GDP per capita of .674 and a P-value of .001, 
which is significant at 0.05 level. It is interesting to note that although my temporal 
span for the dependent variable (1991 – 2001) is different from and shorter than that 
of Evans and Rauch (1970 – 1990), as well as the fact that my sample is smaller than 
theirs, we report similar findings. 
 
7. 2. 1. 2: Descriptive and Narrative Analyses 
 
At this juncture, it is pertinent to account for the placements of countries in the 
graph, especially the outliers. This is especially important and appropriate given the 
relatively small sample being used.  I will subsequently proceed to discuss some of 
the interesting cases. This will help to confirm or disconfirm the existence of causal 
links that the model above posited. 
The countries in Figure 7.1 are relatively representatives of countries of the 
following four groups, namely, those with (a) high degrees of autonomy with high 
economic growth – Malaysia, Singapore. Korea, India and Thailand, (b) high degree 
of autonomy with low economic growth – Pakistan, (c) low degrees of autonomy with 
high growth – Chile and Egypt, and (d) low degrees of state autonomy with low 
growth – Kenya, Brazil, Nigeria and Mexico.  
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The analysis will focus on highly autonomous countries, namely India, Korea, 
Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand in order to show the relationship between this 
institutional attribute and high economic growth. This will be contrasted with 
countries with low degrees of synergy with low growth rates, especially Nigeria and 
Kenya. The analysis will proceed to look at one interesting cases, Chile, with low 
degree of autonomy and yet recorded one of the highest rates of economic growth in 
the sample. In turn, this will be contrasted with Pakistan which despite its autonomous 
state institutions recorded a low economic growth rate.  
Obviously, the most striking feature of the above graph (and in line with the 
theoretical assumption of his study) is that all the countries at the top right hand 
corner are highly autonomous and are marked by high economic growth rates. In 
contrast, all the countries at the lower left corner (Kenya, Nigeria and Brazil) have 
low degrees of state autonomy and experienced low economic growth rate.  In short, 
there is an obvious trend to the data (again in accordance with the theoretical 
assumption of the study, with few exceptions), that high degrees of autonomy are 
associated with high economic growth and low degrees of autonomy are associated 
with low economic growth.  
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One general consensus in the case study materials, mostly from the 
institutional perspective, about the countries at the top right hand corner of Figure 7.1 
(Malaysia, India, Korea, Singapore and Thailand) is that these countries have highly 
autonomous institutions (Haggard and Moon, 1990; Leipziger and Thomas, 1993; 
Evans, 1995; Hwang 1996; and Worthington, 2003).  There is also a degree of 
agreement that these countries, especially Korea and Singapore, have witnessed a 
phenomenal economic growth - the result of transformation of the structural basis of 
their economies; shifting from primary products to high value-added products 
through, among others, adoption of new technology and industrial upgrading. Indeed, 
these were some of the mechanics for their integration as competitive economies into 
the global economy. All of these occurred in one generation.  
Malaysia and Korea are two classical examples of countries with remarkable 
industrial transformations, and, consequently, high economic growth. In the 1950s 
and 1960s, these countries were basically primary sector-based economies, and had 
the status of being low-income countries like Nigeria and Kenya. But in the space of 
thirty years, the economies of Malaysia and Korea have been transformed into high 
middle-income countries, while Nigeria and Kenya continue to be primary-sector 
based, low-income countries, with sluggish economic growth rates of 1.6 and 2.7 
percent respectively in the 1991 – 2001 period.   The differing growth records of both 
sets of countries are clearly evidenced in Figure 7.1, with Nigeria and Kenya at the 
lower left corner, a sign of their poor economic growth rate. This is in contrast to 
Malaysia and Korea located at the top right corner, which shows their higher 
economic growth rate record of 6.6 and 6.0 percent respectively for the same period.  
The different placements also indicate the variations in the degree of state 
autonomy between the two sets of countries with Nigeria and Kenya being depicted as 
having low degrees of state autonomy in contrast to Malaysia, India, Korea, Singapore 
and Thailand that more closely approximate the autonomy scale. These varying 
organisational structures partly explain variations in economic performance, that is, 
economic growth, that are observed in the graph.  As noted earlier, there is 
considerable unanimity in the case studies literature about the institutional attributes 
of these countries. Take India, Korea, Singapore and Thailand as examples. These 
countries had some common institutional traits – although with some minor 
variations. These include meritocratic recruitment and predictable career paths for 
higher economic bureaucrats, where competence is the main criterion for promotion.  
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All of the foregoing values/factors have contributed to the enhancement of the 
capacity of the state. Writing on the Thai44 state bureaucracy, for example, 
Christensen (1992) notes that educational achievement was pervasive. Hence by 1987, 
“61 percent of rank of C9 through C11 officials had a Masters’ degree or higher. The 
vast majority of those degrees were earned abroad. And over one-fourth of serving 
permanent secretaries held PhDs in their fields of service” (p. 5).  The story, in terms 
of meritocracy, was not much different in India, Korea (where the best graduates of 
Seoul National University were recruited by core economic ministries) and Singapore 
– all of which contributed to enhance their competence and legitimacy. The senior 
economic bureaucracy, in these countries, is an elite group (in Singapore at any point 
in time, they were roughly 300 officers and were very cohesive given their similar 
educational background) that worked closely with the political elite. In some cases, 
such as in Singapore and Korea, they were policy-makers as well as policy-
implementers (Worthington, 2003).  
In addition, these countries were characterised by the centralisation of 
economic decision-making in core economic agencies, such as the Economic Planning 
Board (EPB) in Korea, the Economic Development Board (EDB) in Singapore and 
the National Economic and Social Development Board in Thailand (NESDB), which 
formulated and co-ordinated economic policies. However, there were slight variations 
among these countries, which a narrative analysis can help us to understand. In terms 
of functions, the EPB provides an interesting example. It had a broad mandate over 
planning, budgetary and economic management. This enabled it to ensure that 
government's policies, programmes and spending were synchronized, thereby 
avoiding an overheating of the economy. Policy co-ordination in Thailand and 
Malaysia was much more fragmented than, say, the most autonomous country in the 
sample, South Korea, where the economic teams “were co-ordinated and led by 
clearly identified “economic czars” – the Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of the 
Economic Planning Board (Leipziger and Thomas, 1993). In Malaysia, the political 
elite played a much greater role in economic policy-making than their counterparts in 
Singapore. And in Thailand, both the Ministry of Finance and the Central Bank 
played a more prominent role in policy formulation, especially around 
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 One interesting observation is that the Thai state seems to have been remarkably transformed. 
Writing on the recruitment of senior servants in the 1950s, Shor (1960) noted that politicians routinely 
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macroeconomic management than say in Korea and Singapore. Unsurprisingly, in this 
sample, Korea and Singapore have higher degrees of policy co-ordination than 
Malaysia and Thailand. Overall, the organisational structures of the highly 
autonomous states were some of the important foundations for what Chang (2003) 
calls their entrepreneurial role.  These propelled their high economic growth rates. It 
is therefore crucially important that we should not underestimate the importance of 
these agencies in anticipating industrial change and coordinating investment decisions 
that have made them excel in the global markets. These core ministries were also 
instrumental to these countries becoming predominantly high-tech, industrially based. 
Their high degrees of autonomy enabled them to behave as coherent collective actors 
to identify and implement their developmental goals without being overwhelmed by 
interest groups. Hence, they were able to ensure their economic competitiveness 
resulting in high economic growth, in stark contrast to most of the countries with low 
degrees of state autonomy (I will return to some of these cases shortly). In general, 
bureaucrats in these countries were able to stick to policy goals and by so doing give 
legitimacy to the state and its development objectives.  In particular, there was 
increased investment, which contributed to high growth rate, because of policy 
stability and predictability that were engendered by the autonomous state institutions.   
One important part of the political economy history of countries like Korea, 
Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand is that because of their high degrees of state 
autonomy, the economic bureaucratic elite shared common values and a commitment 
to a corporate goal. Autonomy enhanced the capacity of the states in these countries to 
be able to articulate national transformative agendas and to mobilize society around 
their transformative goal. This goal was a collective national project of industrial 
transformation that was a key factor to their global competitiveness and growth. 
Indeed, economic success was conceived as a necessary prerequisite for the 
legitimacy of the bureaucratic elite and the survival of the political elite. A single-
minded commitment to, and pursuit of, this developmental goal enhanced the 
confidence of the state in the eyes of the business elite. Through the coordination of 
economic planning embodied in their super ministries, the Korean, Malaysian, 
Singapore and Thai states were able to channel resources from declining sectors to 
sunrise industries.  Governments in these countries embarked on systemic planning (at 
                                                                                                                                                                  
violated the meritocratic requirement. But as I have noted in this study, in the 1970 – 1990 period, 
Thailand was the second most meritocratic country (next to Singapore) in the sample.  
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times by trial and error) of prodding entrepreneurs to invest in new sectors, signalling 
new markets and in some cases—to use Peter Evans (1995) words—midwifed new 
industries. As a result, the economic bureaucratic elite in these highly autonomous 
countries, especially the East Asian countries in the sample, encouraged both local 
and international capital to invest in high-value-added economic activities that 
propelled them to high-growth economies. With capable internal institutions and 
coordination of economic policy, the states in Korea, Singapore and Thailand were 
not only able to articulate their goals but also “fostered growth by encouraging the 
business community, … to make long-term investment and upgrade organisation and 
management” (Campos and Root, 1996: 29).  
At the same time, these highly autonomous states induced the non-elites “to 
make short-term sacrifices in exchange for larger benefits in the long-term” (Campos 
and Root, 1996: 29). The support of the non-elite for the growth process was secured 
through implementation of “[h]ighly visible wealth-sharing mechanisms – such as 
land reform, free primary education and free basic health care” (Ibid, p.29). In turn, 
this discouraged the non-elite from embarking on disruptive actions that could have 
undermined investors’ confidence in the economy, unlike the situation in most 
transition economies in the developing world. Furthermore, wealth-sharing is a 
virtuous circle – it increases the income and wealth among citizens, which in turn 
leads to higher rates of savings and an increase in domestic capital formation. The 
high savings’ rates in these countries (with Korea as an example) would have been 
near impossible without autonomous state institutions, which enabled the government 
to mount “campaigns for belt-tightening and demonised…luxury consumption and 
conspicuous consumption” (You, 1999: 53).  
Another remarkable feature of these countries, one that flows from their high 
degrees of autonomy, is that they had the capacity to at once adjust their policies and 
intervene in their economies in response to changing global and domestic 
circumstances. Their capacity to respond to rapidly changing economic conditions 
was partly due to the highly autonomous and insulated economic bureaucracies.  The 
story is not much different in India, where most qualitative analyses, such as Evans 
(1995), have tended to underestimate its economic success.  
Another way to explain the relationship between high degrees of autonomy 
with the resultant high rate of economic growth in Korea, Malaysia, Singapore and 
Thailand is to look at the profit-investment nexus. Although there are exceptions, it is 
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generally recognised that high profits (accumulation of capital) generate vigorous 
investment activities (You, 1999). Highly autonomous state institutions enhance the 
capacity of these countries to formulate and implement policies that were aimed at 
improving the profitability of investments. These included policies to reduce 
investment costs by offering lower interest rates, low import duties for investment 
goods, provisions for industrial infrastructures, etc. In addition, governments in highly 
autonomous countries successfully formulated and implemented policies to reduce the 
risks of investment, particularly in targeted sectors that were crucial for the states’ 
project of rapid economic transformation. These included greater coordination of 
policies and regulation of investments. You (1999: 54) eloquently captured this as 
follows: 
 
East Asian governments reduced risks by coordinating private sector investment 
according to their carefully planned development strategy. This coordination went 
beyond simply indicating which areas to invest in to regulating the overall amount of 
investment to private excessive investment and organizing recession cartels. All these 
reduce risks considerably… 
 
The analysis above points to the fact that most of the countries that score well 
on the autonomy scale contributed to the capacity of bureaucrats to formulate and 
implement policies that led to the diversification of their economies. It is therefore not 
surprising that they became highly competitive in the global economy and ultimately 
achieved the high growth rate reported in this study.  
The story is much different in countries with less autonomous state 
institutions. For example, Kenya and Nigeria have not been able to diversify their 
economies; they remain mainly primary sector-based, and hence they are unable to 
compete in the global economy. For example, Nigeria, in particular, remained heavily 
reliant on natural resource production.  Compared to Malaysia, where in 1980 and 
1998 agriculture accounted for twenty-two percent and twelve percent of GDP 
respectively, Nigerian agriculture accounted for twenty-one percent and thirty-two 
percent of GDP in 1980 and 1998 respectively. Also, while between 1980 and 1998 
industry’s contribution to GDP in Malaysia increased from thirty-eight percent to 
forty-eight percent, in Nigeria the share of industry’s contribution to the GDP has 
declined from forty-six percent in 1980 to forty-one percent in 1998.  And most of the 
industrial sector’s contribution to GDP has been in the oil sector. The contrast 
between Nigeria (with its low degree of autonomy) and Malaysia (with its high degree 
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of autonomy) is even more apparent when we look at the share of manufacturing and 
service sector’s contributions to GDP. In Malaysia, by 1980, manufacturing 
contributed twenty percent of GDP, increasing to thirty-four percent in 1998. In both 
periods, the service sector contributed forty percent to GDP. In contrast, the 
manufacturing sector in Nigeria contributed just eight percent of GDP in 1980 and 
declined to five percent in 1998. Similarly, the share of the service sector’s 
contribution to GDP in Nigeria declined from thirty-four percent in 1980 to twenty-
seven percent in 1998 (World Bank, 2000).  It is clear that variations in state 
capacities produced variations in economic performance. 
Now it might be useful to proceed with a closer examination of the Kenyan 
case as an example of the developmental failure that is associated with low degrees of 
state autonomy. Among scholars of its political economy, there seems to be no 
consensus about the developmental records of Kenya, or even the role of economic 
bureaucrats in the country. One school of thought on Kenyan political economy points 
to various macro-indicators, the political orientation and Kenya’s overall development 
strategy to suggest that Kenyan economic performance has been impressive. This 
success is attributed to the higher level of state capacity.45 It is in the light of this that 
scholars such as Oyugi (1994) may have prematurely celebrated the performance of 
the bureaucracy in the management of the economy. However, other scholars have 
questioned the glowing assessment of the Kenyan economic bureaucracy and the 
performance of the economy. They subsequently provided an alternative assessment 
of the Kenyan state. Among these scholars is David Himbara, one of the leading 
commentators of Kenyan political economy. In his view, any “conception of the 
Kenyan state as efficient is misguided” (Himbara, 1994: 69).  His critical appraisal of 
the Kenyan economic performance has been confirmed in this study. The difference 
that separates these two schools underscores the importance of having open and 
public comparative indicators for assessing levels of state autonomy. 
If economic growth performance is used as the main dependent variable to 
measure economic performance, Kenya has a poor record and the developmental 
impact of the economic bureaucracy has been abysmal. A closer examination of the 
state’s institutional attributes, especially its degree of state autonomy, will provide us 
with a better understanding of how this economic outcome came about. There is a 
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 See David Himbara (1994) for a succinct summary of the views of this school.  
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consensus in the case studies literature that, unlike India and Malaysia, Kenya did not 
inherit an autonomous state from the British colonialists, yet higher-level economic 
bureaucrats were the main actors in economic policy-making. Furthermore, the major 
reforms of the state in the immediate post-colonial era were primarily aimed to 
achieve Africanisation of the bureaucracy. 
Unfortunately for Kenya, Africanisation became synonymous with ethnic 
dominance.46  This was partly because recruitment and promotion were based on 
tribal affiliations. As a result, between 1963 and 1975, the Kikuyu ethnic group of the 
incumbent president, Jomo Kenyatta dominated the public service (Hyden, 1979). The 
same ethnic considerations dominated recruitment and promotion in the civil service 
under the government of President Daniel Arap Moi, that is, until the early part of the 
21st century. Obviously, these created an uncertain career future for senior bureaucrats 
and instability in the economic policy horizon that was not conducive to long-term 
investment and economic growth.   
As noted earlier, senior economic bureaucrats were the main actors in 
economic policy making, beginning with the 1965 Sessional Paper, described as 
“Kenya’s development bible” (Oyugi, 1994) since it framed the macro context for all 
subsequent Development Plans. It has also been shown that the senior economic 
bureaucrats acted to further narrow tribal interests rather than collective national 
goals. This was worsened by the implementation of the recommendations of the 
Ndegwa Commission’s in 1971: that civil servants be allowed to simultaneously own 
and run private businesses along with their public duties, provided that these interests 
are publicly declared. This had major adverse implications for the cohesiveness and 
competences of the Kenyan economic bureaucracy.  
Rather than make decisions that will enhance the development of the 
economy, senior bureaucrats, as the major actors (along with their expatriate advisers) 
in economic policy-making, acted to advance their personal interests.  As an 
illustration, according to Hyden (1979), it has not been easy to maintain a distinct line 
between private and public interests. Senior economic bureaucrats took advantage of 
their positions to grant licences and allocate other benefits to themselves.  In effect, 
policies were not based on rational economic sense. This system compounded rent-
seeking activities as well as the diversion of public resources to private ends with the 
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 This is unlike in Malaysians were affirmation action focused on the Malays rather than a narrow 
ethnic interests within the Bumis.  
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attendant negative effects on economic growth.  Indeed, the state became the source 
of primitive accumulation. The subsequent Waruhiu  Commission’s report of 1980 
noted that the implementation of the Ndegwa Commission report, resulted in “gross 
neglect of public duty and the misuse of official positions and official information in 
furtherance of civil servants’ interests” (Republic of Kenya, 1980: 37 – 39). Not 
surprisingly, corruption has become the norm rather than the exception.  In 
consequence, Kenya has consistently been rated by Transparency International (TI) as 
one of the most corrupt countries in the world. High level of corruption in Kenya (like 
in Nigeria) subverted policy goals and eroded the legitimacy of the state. Because of 
the appointment of under qualified people into the Kenyan bureaucracy, it was unable 
to provide basic social services and physical infrastructure such at water, education, 
housing, electricity and transport to majority of the Kenyan population. The low 
investment in human capital in Kenya over time has contributed to their low economic 
growth rate.  Furthermore, there have been incessant conflicts among its top 
bureaucrats, resulting in mistrust. Because of these, the Kenyan state has been unable 
to act as a coherent collective entity to foster economic development. Instead, both the 
bureaucratic and political elites promoted sectional interests at the expense of national 
development.  In addition, public officials extracted rents (in form of charges) from 
business and citizens for undertaking services. These adversely impacted on Kenyan 
economic growth rate in two ways. First, it increased the costs of business and 
therefore discouraged investment. Second, it diminished the rate of savings and 
consequent investment, which in turn led to low growth.  
Another by-product of the non-autonomous state institutional landscape in 
Kenya was the lack of commitment by senior economic bureaucrats to economic 
policies. As noted in the 1970 – 1974 Development Plan, the lack of commitment by 
senior economic bureaucrats to national economic policies resulted in delays, as well 
as poor or lacking records of implementation. The poor implementation of policy 
“contributed to the present (that is, 1982), financial crisis and at the same time has 
reduced government impact on development” (Republic of Kenya, cited in Oyugi, 
1994: 94). Like most African and Latin American countries, the financial crisis forced 
the Kenyan government into the debt trap, a phenomenon that encouraged the World 
Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to intervene in, and eventually take 
over, the economic management of the country. With this came an assault on the state, 
that further eroded its autonomy.   
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Lastly, like most post-independent African governments, the Kenyan 
government established its Ministry of Planning and National Development. But for 
reasons beyond the scope of this study, the ministry was not adequately staffed; nor 
could it effectively play its role. As a result, economic policy-making was 
considerably compartmentalised or departmentalised, which, as Oyugi has aptly 
observed, bred a lack of cooperation and coordination of economic policy. This 
gradually led to a disintegration of the state apparatus, coupled with bureaucratic 
delays. As an example, by the mid 1980s, it took the Ministry of Commerce and 
Industry about three years to process licences to start an enterprise. Himbara (1994: 
72), one of the most critical observers of Kenyan development, summed up the 
adverse effect thus:  
 
The Ministry of Commerce and Industry was no longer an effective arm of the state 
for implementing industrial and commercial plans. It is, therefore, not surprising that 
Kenya ceased to be an attractive destination for foreign investments, notwithstanding 
the fact that it was supposed to be the basis of the country’s development strategy. On 
the contrary, in response to the decline of the various administrative and 
infrastructural facilities in Kenya, substantial divestment occurred in the 1980s, 
especially by large U.S manufacturing companies ….   
 
It is therefore clear that the lack of state autonomy constrained the capacity of 
the Kenyan state to engineer high rates of economic growth.  
In Figure 7.1, the Chilean47 case seems to push the outer boundaries of the 
posited relationship between autonomy and economic growth: it has a relatively low 
degree of autonomy but achieved economic growth rate of 6.6 percent during the 
period under consideration.  In the sample, it ranked second in the economic growth 
variable and it has the second lowest degree of autonomy (.43 in the autonomy scale). 
What is, however, evident is that there was a very low degree (near absence) of career 
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 Both Mexico and Brazil share some state organisational similarities and dissimilarities with their 
Chilean counterpart.  Indications of this is the fact that in both countries there was a high circulation of 
top civil servants, and career advancement was not based on merit but on informal networks 
(Schneider, 1993). These have had adverse implications for the state as well as national transformation: 
when career advancement is based on political patronage, loyalty is to the political patron. This 
destroyed the esprit de corps – the camaraderie spirit among the Brazilian and Mexican economic 
bureaucratic elite. It was noted in the theoretical chapter 3, that a feeling of esprit de corps is central to 
the cohesiveness of the state and its insulation from interest groups, and that these are crucial 
ingredients for a successful economic transformation. That these crucial institutional elements were 
missing in both countries contributed to their poor growth performance. But unlike Chile, where 
political appointees were confined to few senior economic technocrats, in Brazil and Mexico (and you 
might add Nigeria and Kenya), political appointees were in their thousands and cut across all layers of 
the bureaucracy. 
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paths for economic bureaucrats. Nevertheless, this co-existed with a moderate degree 
of policy co-ordination, with the Ministry of Finance and Central Bank, being the lead 
economic agencies. In addition, it also had a moderate degree of meritocracy. These 
findings are consistent with the conclusion reached by one of the leading scholars on 
Chilean political economy, Eduardo Silva, that top economic policy-makers were 
political appointees, members of the governing coalition” (Silva, 1996: 315). These 
appointees are those generally referred to in the literature on Chilean political 
economy as the Chicago boys48 and they dominated the bureaucracy in the early years 
of the Pinochet regime.  Unable to take a long-term view of the economy, in part 
because they were beholden to special interests, their economic reforms led to the 
economic collapse in 1982 – 83. 
However, with the fall from grace of the Chicago boys, economic bureaucrats 
came to be “drawn exclusively from the ranks of experienced, technocratic, flexible 
civil service officers” (Silva, 1997: 166). As will be shown in the next chapter, it was 
this group of senior economic bureaucrats that worked in concert with encompassing 
business organisations to develop an orthodox neo-liberal economic blueprint that led 
to the revival of the Chilean economy (a point that will be elaborated upon in chapter 
8).  
At another level, the Pakistani case may be illustrative, as it falls somewhat 
below the trend line and it has a low growth rate in spite of being highly autonomous. 
This suggests that non-institutional factors may have accounted for Pakistan’s 
relatively low economic growth rate. In fact, most case studies on Pakistani political 
economy suggest that non-institutional factors may have accounted for its low growth 
rate. 
Since its independence, Pakistan has been burdened by socio-political crises 
and uncertainty with negative consequences for economic growth. In the period of the 
independent variables of this study, 1970 – 1990, Pakistan witnessed the secession of 
East Pakistan to become Bangladesh in 1971, a civil war between 1973 and 1977, it 
was embroiled in the Afghan crisis following the invasion of Afghanistan by the 
Soviet Union, incessant changes of government, and so on. In addition, the 
nationalisation policy pursued under Prime Minister Zulfikar Bhutto was determined 
more by political than economic logic. It subsequently became a means of 
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 This name is derived from the fact that these bureaucrats all attended the University of Chicago. 
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accumulation by Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) supporters and members. A Pakistan 
political analyst, Lawrence Ziring, notes of the impact of the nationalisation 
programme of Prime Minister Bhutto thus, “Pakistan continues to go deeper into 
financial debts and its economy has been severely wrenched by the nationalisation of 
private enterprises in the industrial, commercial, and financial sectors. Capital has fled 
the country, as have many important entrepreneurs, engineers, scientists, and other 
technically qualified people” (Ziring, 1977: 585). Subsequently, agro-industries were 
also nationalised. The nationalisation programme had a lasting impact on Pakistan’s 
economic development as it was not undone even by Bhutto’s successor, President 
Zia. Needless to say that during the regime of President Zia ul-Haq (1977 – 1988), 
Pakistan witnessed remarkable economic growth. This was, however, due more to the 
United States’ military and economic aid, which amounted to $7.4 billion between 
1982 and 1990 (see Hilali, 2002). With the subsequent withdrawal of Soviet troops 
from Afghanistan, Pakistan lost its importance in the Cold War matrix of the 
superpowers. As a result, foreign aid from the US and other western donors to 
Pakistan declined significantly. This trend continued in the 1990s following the first 
Gulf War. Consequently, the country’s growth rate experienced a decline. What these 
circumstances point to is the fact that in spite of its autonomous state institutions, non-
institutional factors seem to have influenced Pakistan’s growth rate. Similarly, the 
general political climate, especially under Prime Minister Z. Bhutto, led to “the 
diminution of the bureaucracy’s role as formulator of policy” (Noman, 1988: 61). 
Among other things, Bhutto abolished the elite Civil Service of Pakistan (CSP) that 
had the attributes of Weberianness, meritocratic recruitment and life tenure. In 
addition, though Pakistan had a Planning Commission, chaired by the Prime Minister, 
and responsible for long and medium-term planning, Bhutto suspended medium term-
planning and centralised power around himself. As one commentator, Ziring (1977: 
591 – 592) puts it,  
 
Bhutto is intimately involved in all departments of government and at many levels of 
decision-making…Any decision judged to be of significance to the Prime 
Minister…is referred to him for final approval. So centralised is this decision-making 
role that government administrators are generally reluctant to take initiative on any 
matter where the Prime Minister might be remotely concerned.  
  
However, this trend was substantially revised after 1977 under President Zia. 
In effect, bureaucrats began to reassert greater influence over policy-making and the 
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country reverted to planning. Consequently, the fifth five-year plan under the 
guidance of the planning commission was launched in 1978.  One explicit objective of 
the plan was to restore business confidence which was at its lowest ebb during the 
reign of Prime Minister Bhutto. But a major factor set Pakistan aside from the highly 
autonomous states in our sample. Unlike countries such as Korea and Singapore, the 
Pakistani economic bureaucrats were “ill-equipped to define long-term economic and 
social objectives or to generate resources for achieving them” (Burki, 1994:325).  In 
addition, President Zia did not completely overturn the nationalisation of his 
predecessor, Prime Minister Bhutto. For examples, banks were not denationalised; 
rather they remained under the effective control of the state. As a consequence and 
due to political uncertainty, the private sector’s response to President’s Zia’s 
economic reforms, including efforts to court them, was somewhat lukewarm.   
With the exception of Pakistan, our sample of highly autonomous states stand 
in stark contrast to the sort of short-term individual maximization that has been the 
hallmark of governments in post-independent Nigeria and Kenya. With recruitment 
based on political patronage, coupled with uncertain career paths, senior economic 
bureaucrats in these countries were unable to take a long-term view of social and 
economic development. Consequently, they were unable to articulate a clear vision of 
national transformation (unlike their counterparts in the highly autonomous states). 
Therefore, rather than fostering a growth path driven by productive economic 
endeavours and radical structural transformation of their economies, bureaucrats in 
these countries (hand in glove with the political class), engaged in conspicuous 
consumption. The state’s institutional incapacity made it nearly impossible to regulate 
such behaviour. This is the basis for their dependence on primary sector, as well as the 
resultant economic involution. 
It is obvious from the foregoing discussion that variations in state capacities 
can account for variations in national economic performance.  Most countries with 
higher degrees of state autonomy achieved high rates of economic growth (with the 
exception of Pakistan).  In contrast, most countries with limited state capacity — 
exemplified by low degrees of autonomy — have witnessed low rates of economic 
growth in the 1991 – 2001 period. The two exceptions here are Chile and Egypt which 
have low degrees of autonomy but achieved high rates of economic growth. What 
these findings show is that institutional variables may not be the sole factor 
responsible for a country’s good economic performance. What is clear, however, is 
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that high economic growth rates can be achieved with or without high degrees of state 
autonomy (contrary to our a priori expectation), although the former is the most likely 
outcome. This constitutes the first main finding of this study. 
 
7. 2: Autonomy and Inequality 
 
This section is divided into two parts. Like the first section of this chapter: the 
first part focuses on the results of the model and analyses, while the second deals with 
the descriptive and narrative analyses.   
 
7. 2. 2: Modelling Inequality on Autonomy 
 
In contrast to what we have seen in Figure 7.1, autonomy is strongly but 
negatively correlated with equity. The Pearson correlation coefficient between the two 
variables is estimated at –0.626. It is significant at the 0.05 level, with an estimated p-
value of 0.029.  This inverse relationship between autonomy and inequality shows 
that, as the degree of state autonomy increases, income inequality is likely to 
decrease. Implicitly, low degrees of autonomy are associated with high inequality, and 
vice versa. That is, an increase in the degree of autonomy leads to a decrease in 
inequality. Simply put, in conformity with the theoretical premise of this study, a high 
degree of state autonomy is strongly associated with low inequality. 
A graphic illustration of this relationship is provided in Figure 7.2 which 
shows the relationship between the degrees of state autonomy and income inequality. 
Also the relationship is vividly captured by a simple linear regression. Based on our 
theoretical specification, the following regression equation is derived: 
 
Inequality = α – ßAutonomy
 
+ εt 
  
  From the estimated regression, the following equation is obtained: 
 
Inequality = -0.682    - .395 (Autonomy) 
  (7.222)      (2.540) 
        R2 = 0.392  
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The estimated t-ratios are in parenthesis. The coefficient is significant at the 
0.05 level. The R2 value is 0.392, which is a good fit. This means that our equation is 
explaining 39% of the variations in the sample data, meaning that 39% of the 
variations in inequality is explained by variations in autonomy.  The explanatory 
variable, that is autonomy, is significant in explaining inequality. The significance is 
indicated by the t-ratios shown beneath the coefficient estimation.  
 
7. 2. 2.2:  Descriptive and Narrative Analysis 
 
Figure 7.2 is fairly representative of four subgroups of countries, namely, (a) 
those with high degrees of autonomy and low inequality (Korea, Pakistan, India, 
Singapore and Thailand - congregated right in the lower part of the graph), (b) those 
with low degrees of autonomy and low inequality (Egypt – located at the centre of the 
lower part), (c) those with high degree of autonomy and inequality (Malaysia – located 
at the centre) and (d) those with low degrees of autonomy and high inequality (Brazil, 
Chile, Mexico, Nigeria and Kenya – located at the middle left hand upward). These are 
among the issues to be addressed in this section. 
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It can be observed from the graph that most of the countries with high degrees 
of autonomy (e.g., Pakistan, Singapore, Thailand and Korea) and those with low 
degrees of autonomy (e.g., Brazil, Nigeria and Kenya) tend to conform to our 
theoretical expectations. I will now proceed to examine some of these cases in details. 
Without detailed elaboration, it is important to briefly explicate how, in 
conformity with our theoretical assumption, the highly autonomous countries were 
relatively equitable; while those with low degrees of autonomy were relatively 
inequitable. In other words, we need to examine how the various degrees of state 
autonomy may have contributed to variations in the inequality indexes. We might do 
this by looking more closely at those states where the relationship is most evident. 
The lucid exposition by Campos and Root (1996) is an important starting point 
to understand how high degrees of state autonomy may have contributed to low 
inequality in Korea, Singapore and Thailand. The political elites in these countries 
recognised equitable distribution of income and wealth as an integral part of their 
economic success and hence the establishment of autonomous economic bureaucracy 
that efficiently utilised national resources for the collective improvement of the living 
conditions of all their citizenry. Central to this were highly visible wealth-sharing 
mechanisms – such as land reform, free primary education, and free basic health care 
- as major thrusts of their transformative agenda. These sorts of policies transformed 
the ownership patterns and enhanced the asset capabilities of the poor in these 
countries. 
In part, high degrees of autonomy allowed these states the freedom to initiate 
and implement highly egalitarian policies that radically altered the relations of 
production and the consequent egalitarianism in these societies. Thus, the autonomy 
status of Korea, Singapore and Thailand enhanced the capacities of the states to 
promote economic empowerment through access to productive income-generating 
activities and other welfare measures that were at the heart of their equity objectives. 
Integral to this were deliberate policies to develop the productive assets of the 
citizens, namely intelligence, strength, skills, knowledge and creativity. It is in this 
context of equalisation of income and wealth that we need to understand the high 
savings rates in these countries (see World Bank online database, 2005). In 
conformity with the theoretical underpinning of this study, high rates of savings in 
these highly autonomous states are closely associated with high rate of investments, 
which in turn contributed to their rates of high growth.  
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But this is not the end of the story. It is generally recognised in the 
development literature that lower inequality allows more people to invest in human 
capital, and in turn produces higher output, leading to economic growth (Perotti, 
1993). Our highly autonomous states were no exception to this rule. In these 
countries, the development of citizens’ capabilities enabled them to compete for 
positions in society and in the market place. In turn, a more egalitarian income 
distribution was one important factor for increased investment in human capital and 
skilled workers in the highly autonomous states in the sample. This virtuous circle 
continued as it positively impacted economic growth. As an illustration, the demand 
for labour in these countries was so high in the 1990s that some of these countries 
enjoyed a zero unemployment rate. 
Singapore provides a good example of the causal relationship between 
autonomous state institutions and low income inequality. The Singaporean state was 
able to initiate and implement public policies that resulted in low income inequality. 
For example, the state provided housing subsidies to its citizens. The result is that 
over 90% of Singaporeans live in owner-occupied public housing that are built and 
maintained by a public utility, the Housing and Development Board (HDB). The 
housing ownership subsidy is such that those with high incomes receive less subsidies 
compared to those with a lower income. Those in the upper income spectrum live in 
private housing that are more expensive than those provided by the state. Poor people 
that did not qualify for the house-ownership subsidy live in generously subsidised 
apartments provided by the HDB.  In addition, the Singaporean state has been able to 
implement progressive income tax. As a result, a large proportion of low income 
households and wage earners are exempted from paying income tax. These income 
equalising measures were coupled with high investment in human capital such as 
education and health (Yue and Yu, 2003). At the beginning of their industrialisation, 
the Korean and Singaporean states promoted labour intensive manufactures for 
export. Labour intensive industries created demands for unskilled and semi-skilled 
workers. As a result, by the mid-1980s, there was a shortage of these categories of 
workers. This in turn pushed up their wages, and thereby narrowing the income gap 
between skilled and unskilled labour.  Due in part to the labour intensive nature of 
Korea and Singapore’s industrialisation as well as the increased investment in human 
capital, there was an increase in the female participation rate in the labour market. 
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These factors contributed to a decline in the fertility rate and the consequent under 
supply of labour, which further contributed to a decline in poverty and an increase in 
wages of unskilled and semi-skilled workers. And in the mid-1980s, when their 
economies became more capital intensive, there was re-skilling of workers. Labour, 
including female workers were also beneficiaries of this process, which resulted in 
narrowing the income gap between educational groups (Choi, 2003).  
 The key point to note is this: not only were the aforementioned states 
committed to these developmental goals, they established the requisite state 
institutions that could deliver them. That is precisely what set them apart from 
countries with low degrees of state autonomy, which were rife with corruption. State 
officials diverted public resources into private ends instead of investment in human 
capital. A case in point is Nigeria where between 1960 and 2005, twenty trillion 
dollars ($20 trillion) were stolen from the public purse by public officials, according 
to Dapo Olorunyomi, chief of staff to the chairman of the Economic and Financial 
Crimes Commission (EFCC) (BusinessDAY, September 18, 2006). Had the money 
been channelled into productive investment and human capital, it would have led to 
high economic growth rates and low inequality. These in turn, would have contributed 
to reducing the rate of poverty in Nigeria.  In general, corruption has favoured the rich 
at the expense of the poor by facilitating unequal appropriation of resources. As a 
result, while the income and wealth of the elite has increased over time, those of the 
poor have declined. As a consequence, Nigeria is a highly inegalitarian society.   
To illustrate the logic of the posited relationship we might look at two 
exemplary cases that share similar levels of autonomy: Pakistan and Malaysia.  
Despite this similarity, the Pakistani’s case performs below the trend (i.e., is more 
egalitarian) and the Malaysian case performs above the trend line (is more unequal).  
What factors can account for this difference in outcomes? 
  Contrary to the finding of this study, that suggest that egalitarianism in 
Pakistan is due in part to the autonomous state’s institutions, most case studies on 
Pakistan suggest that its high egalitarianism happened more by accident than by the 
deliberate design by the state. In fact, a consensus is emerging in the contemporary 
literature on Pakistan’s political economy that its high level of egalitarianism was not 
due to the government’s policies and programmes but to the impact of remittances 
from the Middle East (Syed, 1977; Cohen and Weinbaum, 1982; Noman, 1988; Burki, 
1994; and Monshipouiri and Samuel, 1995). As Burki (1994) has observed, 
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“Although there was an improvement in income distribution during some political 
periods in Pakistan’s history, this cannot be attributed to policies designed to achieve 
these results”.  This is hardly surprising given the fact that during most of its post-
independence period until the 1990s, with the exception of the Bhutto era, the state 
was not concerned with the question of equitable distribution of income and wealth. 
In fact, during Pakistan’s immediate post-independence era, “the model of economic 
development adopted …consciously promoted inequalities as a necessary condition 
for successful economic growth” (Noman, 1988: 40). This was the logic of economic 
policy under both Presidents Khan and Zia. And even when the state had the explicit 
objective to promote equitable distribution of income and wealth, such initiatives 
failed due to some of the factors that will be discussed below.  
In spite of the Pakistan state’s ideological commitment to, and implementation 
of, land reforms in 1959, 1972 and 1976 the level of inequalities worsened rather than 
improved. The abysmal failure of Pakistan’s land reform is aptly captured by Burke 
(1994): “The three reforms together benefited a tiny proportion of rural households: 
272,000 out of some ten millions. In all, four and half million acres of cultivated land 
– less than ten percent of the total – were redistributed” (Burki, 1994: 308). In 
particular, only about one percent of the landless tenants and small land owners 
benefited from the 1972 land reforms. In general, Pakistan’s land reforms were 
minimal compared to the land reform in Egypt that benefited millions of tenants and 
small landowners.  A number of factors accounted for this failure, including land 
ownership, which was capped in terms of the individual rather than the family. 
According to Noman (1988), this phenomenon made it possible for large landowners 
to retain most of their holdings through divisions within the family. Also, land reform 
was used to punish recalcitrant landlords and reward members and supporters of the 
Pakistan People’s Party (PPP). The implication of this was that political consideration 
rather than economic logic informed land redistribution, and hence its failure to 
achieve its objective of income redistribution.  In addition, because Prime Minister 
Bhutto was beholden to the military, landholdings by military officers were exempted 
from the reform process. These reforms were coupled with resistance from the 
property class.  
It can be discerned from this analysis that the Pakistani political leadership 
lacked the political will to pursue the land reform efforts, which Noman (1988) 
argued was the most important factor for the failure of the land reform. This needs to 
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be viewed against the background that Sindhi landlords were prominent members of 
the PPP and they used their position to shape the nature and pace of economic 
reforms. This is how Noman explained the influence of the landlords: “Landlords 
comprised a substantial component of the founding members of the PPP. They 
tolerated and even encouraged a radical programme as a basis of mass mobilisation. 
In power, they were not entirely indifferent to reform, but were careful in controlling 
its pace and minimizing its magnitude” (Noman, 1998: 75). Thus, in contrast to 
Egypt, in Pakistan there was land reform in name but not in substance. All of these 
changes should be seen against the backdrop of a diminution in the role of economic 
bureaucrats following the restructuring of the state by Bhutto. The latter entailed the 
abolition of the bureaucratic elite - the CSP; withdrawal of life tenure, and suspension 
of planning. As a consequence, the main beneficiaries of the land reforms were large 
farmers, senior military officers and civil servants, and not the vast majority of the 
Pakistani people. 
The mid-1970s marked an important turning point in Pakistan’s inequality 
status.  This change seemed to have happened more by accident than by the design of 
the state.  In the early 1980s, remittance began to stream in from the estimated three 
millions Pakistani migrants living in the Gulf States. This dramatically lowered the 
level of inequality in the country. One commentator, Shahid Javed Burki (1994) 
estimates that between 1974 and 1988, these migrants remitted $25 billion to Pakistan 
through official banking channels and another $10 billion through non-banking 
channels. By 1984, remittance constituted forty percent of total foreign exchange 
earnings, financed eighty-six percent of trade deficit, and represented eight percent of 
the Gross National Product (GNP) (Noman, 1988). These are indicative of the volume 
of remittances which the migrants sent to the families they left behind in Pakistan. 
Remittances had both egalitarian and poverty reduction effects. According to Burki 
(1994: 277):  
 
From the mid-seventies onward…Pakistan’s poor began to benefit from flow of 
remittances sent by the workers who had gone to the Middle East. The impact of this 
flow on the incidence of poverty was dramatic. Today, some fifteen years after the 
migrants began to go to the Middle East in large number, Pakistan shows few signs of 
extensive absolute poverty that characterises other countries of South Asia. 
Malnutrition is less visible than in India and Bangladesh. The cities of Pakistan do not 
have people living on the streets in the number seen in Bombay, Calcutta, and Delhi. 
Both unemployment and underemployment are less evident in the urban areas. The 
quality of life in the countryside is better than in most other countries of South Asia. 
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In the same vein, Omar Noman (1988: 158 – 159) commented on the impacts 
of the remittance thus: 
 
The most favourable consequences of migration have been the decisive impact on the 
living conditions of the poor. Approximately ten million people, 11% of the 
population, have benefited directly from the exodus to the Middle East. The vast 
majority of the beneficiaries come from low income households. On average, their 
salaries increased eightfold. The increased family incomes from remittances have had 
a pronounced egalitarian impact, in both the urban and rural areas. There is, perhaps, 
no historical parallel of remittances having resulted in such rapid and wide 
distribution of benefits among the poorer sections of society…the country has been 
able to achieve a better distribution of income, through manpower export, without 
having to undergo the politically sensitive process of asset redistribution.     
 
The massive migration of Pakistanis to the Middle East has other egalitarian 
effects. In the short-run, it led to worker shortages in the home economy, including in 
the construction sector. Large number of migrants, both unskilled and semi-skilled, 
had gone to work in the construction sector in the Gulf States. Thus, at home, there 
was a shortage of workers of these categories. Most of the remittances went into real 
estate, as the poor families built houses. This in turn led to a construction boom and in 
the context of labour shortage, real wage increases. In fact, a general rise of real 
wages of workers, except in the public sector, was reported between 1971 and 1984 
(Noman, 1988).   
Therefore even when the level of remittances declined in the 1990s, when the 
economies of the Gulf countries began to experience crisis, the remittances from 
previous decades had laid a strong foundation for the rise of egalitarianism that we see 
in the period, 1991 – 2001. As noted in chapter 4, inequality does not change much in 
the short-run, due to its high inelasticity.   
The above analysis, useful as it is, may have underestimated the impact of 
state autonomy on the overall level of low inequality in Pakistan.  
The Malaysian experience tends to lean in the other direction: although its 
level of autonomy is similar to that of Pakistan, its level of inequality is much higher.  
As we shall see, there are historical features that can help to explain Malaysia’s 
differences with Egypt, since the post-independent Malaysia state was the only non-
socialist state in the developing world that explicitly committed itself to promoting 
equitable development.  In fact its development policy has been predicated on growth 
with equity.  
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The New Economic Policy (NEP) was launched in 1971 as a twenty-year plan 
(1971- 1990) and has been described by scholars as a Malay-first policy (Horii, 1990), 
ethnicity-oriented policy (Torii, 1997), and an affirmative action programme 
(Shamsul, 1997).  It has two main objectives. The first goal was the reduction and 
eventual eradication of poverty through increasing employment opportunities and 
income for all Malaysians, irrespective of race. The second objective was the 
restructuring of society to correct economic imbalances in a way that would eliminate 
the identification of race with economic function (Malaysia, 1971).  The basic idea 
behind these objectives was to uplift the social and economic position of the Bumis49 
and especially the Malays whose economic positions were historically inferior to the 
Chinese. Put differently, the NEP aimed to create a Malay entrepreneurial class and to 
reduce poverty for all Malaysians. 
To realise the NEP’s objectives, the state set clear targets.  With respect to the 
first objective, poverty alleviation, it was envisaged that poverty would be reduced 
from 50 percent in 1970 to 20 percent in the 1990.  In respect of the second objective, 
a restructuring of the society, it was stated that “employment in the various sectors of 
the economy and employment by occupational levels will reflect the racial 
composition of the country” (Malaysia, 1971: 9). This was to be accompanied by an 
aggressive training and education strategy intended to create the much-needed Malay 
professional class.  The most salient aspect of the restructuring of society was the 
restructuring of wealth ownership.  It was envisaged that by 1990, Malays and their 
interests (that is government trust agencies and state enterprises) equity ownership 
would increase from 2.4 percent50 in 1970 to 30 percent in 1990 (Malaysia, 1971). The 
attainment of these objectives was predicated on direct government intervention51 in 
the economy to give preferential treatments to Bumis as a way of levelling the socio-
economic playing field. 
 
                                                         
49
 The Bumiputera or Bumis refers to all indigenous people including the Malays who constituted the 
majority race group. 
 
50
 Malay individuals or trust funds equity ownership amounted to 1.6 percent while government 
agencies had another 0.8 percent in 1970. 
 
51
 Most of the existing studies on the Malaysian political economy agree that state intervention was the 
most crucial feature of the NEP (see Jesudason, 1989 and Crouch, 1996). 
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There is a general consensus in the literature on the Malaysian political 
economy that the implementation of the NEP led to sustained economic growth, a 
reduction of poverty and a relatively egalitarian distribution of income (Jomo, 2003; 
Krongkaew, 2003; Roslan, 2001; World Bank, 1993).  According to Krongkaew, 
“The Gini ratios rose from 0.513 in 1970 to a peak level of 0.529 in 1976, then began 
to fall reaching the lowest level of 0.446 at the end of 1990. But from, 1990, it started 
to rise again” (Krongkaew, 2003: 9). There is no doubt that the NEP period also 
witnessed increasing incomes; this helped to reduce poverty and raise the quality of 
life of Malaysian (Roslan, 2001). Though with some exaggeration, Zin (n.d) 
concludes that “This U-turn in income inequality, as a result of economic 
liberalisation, almost wiped out all the gains that were made under the NEP, that is 
from 1970 – 1990” (Zin, n.d: 5, emphasis mine). Comparatively, however, even 
during the NEP period, Malaysia’s income inequality declined by eight percent 
between 1970 and 1990 (Henderson, 2003). This was a much smaller decline than in a 
country such as Korea, where the decline in inequality was in double digits.   
Malaysia is singled out by the World Bank in its East Asian Miracle volume 
as the country with relatively higher income inequality among the eight high-
performing Asian economies (HPAEs) by noting that:  
 
[t]he positive association between growth and low inequality in the HPAEs, and the 
contrast with other economies, is illustrated….Forty economies are ranked by the 
ratio of income share of the richest fifth of the population to the income share of the 
poorest fifth and per capita real GDP growth during 1965 -89….There are seven high 
growth, low inequality economies. All of them are in East Asia, only Malaysia, which 
has an index of inequality above 15, is excluded (World Bank, 1993: 29 – 30).   
 
Several scholars have offered different explanations for Malaysia’s high level 
of inequality. Some scholars suggest that Malaysian state institutions were relatively 
inferior to those of Korea and Singapore; hence its redistribution policies and 
interventions were tamer compared to a country like South Korea. According to 
Henderson (2003: 10):  
 
[t]he Malaysian experience of economic governance over the past thirty years 
underlines the fact that while, in principle, there seems to be a correspondence 
between economically pro-active states and growth with relative equity, there are 
significant differences  between such states in terms of the coherence, 
authoritativeness and competence of their planning agencies…which have 
implications for inequality and poverty. Thus in Malaysia it seems clear that the well-
documented corruption within the political elite coupled with the gradual decline in 
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the equality of the civil society has resulted in a less impressive record of reducing 
inequality than would otherwise have the case. For instance, while the state holding 
companies…could have been significant tools for redistribution of wealth, in practice 
the bulk of their material benefits have flowed to particular individuals and groups 
close to the Prime Minister, Mahathir Mohamad, and the leadership of the ruling 
party, UMNO.  
 
Closely related to the inferior capacity of the Malaysian state, compared to 
Korea and Singapore, was the inability of the state to spend its development budget, 
including those earmarked for poverty reduction. Henderson (2003) estimates that 
each year, from the 1970s and the 1990s, between 19 and 32 percent of development 
budget went unspent, with adverse implications for the state goal of promoting 
egalitarianism.  
Roslan (2001) offers an alternative interpretation for the high level of 
Malaysia’s inequality, suggesting that the NEP focused on reducing inter-ethnic 
inequalities and not individual or household inequality. Hence, while inter-ethnic 
inequality was reduced in general, intra-ethnic inequality, especially among the 
Bumis, was increasing, hence the high inequality status of Malaysia. Unfortunately, 
the NEP and subsequent development plans have not been able to respond to intra-
Malay inequality. Therefore, it can be argued that the Malaysian state was unable to 
address inequality in the society as a whole. As Jomo (2003: 19) argues, “Ethnic 
criteria in redistribution efforts in Malaysia…have probably also limited the 
potentially broader progressive impact of redistribution efforts”.  Therefore, a lesson 
for other emerging economies is that affirmative action policies and programmes may 
mitigate their equity potentials.  
Jomo (2003) and Zin (n.d) further suggest that Malaysia’s relatively high level 
of inequality might be explained by the liberalisation of the economy at the end of the 
NEP period, that is after 1990. One of the impacts of liberalisation on income 
inequality is a fall in labour’s share of income and a rise in the capital share (Cornia et 
al., 2003). Jomo also suggest that economic liberalisation has engendered a more 
regressive tax regime and that the conservative fiscal regimes have generally 
exacerbated income inequalities. But why these problems are more acute in Malaysia 
than in say Thailand or Korea52 remains unexplained.  
                                                         
52
 Choi (2003 cited in Krongkaew 2003) reports that in Korea, “income inequality did not change 
substantially during the mid-1980s. From the late 1980s to the early 1990s, however, Korean income 
inequality had reduced and stayed at the low during the mid-1990s. After the crisis in the late 1997, 
income inequality suddenly increased and stayed at this level until recently. Although the Gini 
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In contrast to most of the highly autonomous states in our sample, countries 
like Kenya and Nigeria that suffer from low degrees of state autonomy (or an 
autonomy deficit), have been characterised by political patronage. Recruitments into 
the higher echelons of the economic bureaucracy were based on this consideration. 
This was coupled with uncertain career futures. Together, they engendered corrupt 
practices in the management of their economies. In fact, corruption has become the 
norm rather than the exception in both countries. In addition, the bureaucratic 
inefficiency that has been the hallmark of these countries contributed to the absence of 
basic services for the populace. Even the Kenyan government acknowledged that 
corrupt and illegal activities of senior state officials such as “unauthorized 
expenditures” in effect meant that government paid duty and sales tax on behalf of 
individuals (Republic of Kenya 1991, cited in Himbara, 1994: 73). 
The inefficiency associated with low degrees of autonomy in countries like 
Nigeria imposed a greater tax burden on the poor, particularly workers, who have to 
pay more taxes. This is because income taxes are more transparent, unlike the illegally 
acquired wealth by the rich – which are more difficult to assess and collect. Also, state 
inefficiency and corruption imposed an additional tax burden on the average citizen in 
these countries while at the same time enriching senior government officials and their 
cronies in the private sector. This invariably widened the wealth and income gap 
between the corrupt rich and the poor as the state acted as a canteen, distributing 
favours to its clients while neglecting the majority of the population.   
Consider the example of education. It is generally recognised that equal access 
to education is one means towards the actualization of social and economic equality. 
While  the Nigerian education system has been working in fits and starts since the 
1980s, senior government officials (both military and civilian)  and their cronies in the 
private sector have resorted to sending their children and wards overseas to receive 
the best education offered in the US and Europe. At the same time, the average 
Nigerian student attends poorly-funded national universities. Access to differing 
qualities of education have enhanced the chances of the children of the rich to better 
                                                                                                                                                                  
coefficients of Korea had increased as a result of the crisis, the overall level was only slightly worse 
than the situation in the early 1980s, which was still lower than the situation in the early 1960s when 
Korean economy started to develop” (Krongkaew 2003: 8). This supports the argument that intensified 
liberalisation in the 1990s contributed to worsening inequality in most countries including Korea. 
However, as shown by this study, Korea still remained a relatively egalitarian society, the adverse 
effects of liberalisation on income distribution notwithstanding.  
 
  156 
employment opportunities and other positions in society, compared to their home-
based colleagues. This has invariably widened the income and wealth gap in Nigeria. 
As Dreze and Sen (2001) have correctly argued, large disparities in access to 
education and educational achievements, as well as the distribution of formal 
employment, tend to perpetuate income and wealth inequalities – and the Nigerian 
case is no exception to this rule. 
Similarly, while corruption and inefficiency have virtually destroyed the 
Nigerian medical system (compared to the ‘golden’ decades of the 1960s through 
mid-1980s). The system today is characterised by high cost of drugs, inadequate 
medical facilities and the persistent brain drain of qualified medical personnel. As a 
result, senior government officials routinely travel overseas for sundry medical 
treatments. In highlighting the wealth-gap implications, Rose Umoren (2001) 
observed that “more of the poor turned to traditional medicare while the rich utilise 
expensive but well equipped private hospitals at home and abroad” (Umoren, 
2001:116).  
The low degree of state autonomy and the consequent gross mismanagement 
of the Nigerian economy and increased inequality were precisely the reasons used by 
the military to take over power in 1983. As the coup spokeperson, then Brigadier Sani 
Abacha, who later became the most brutal military dictator in the history of Nigeria, 
announced: 
 
Our economy has been hopelessly mismanaged. We have become a debtor and 
beggarly nation. There is inadequacy of food at reasonable prices for our people. .. 
Health services are in shamble as our hospitals are reduced to mere consulting clinics, 
without drugs, water and equipment. Our educational system is deteriorating at an 
alarming rate. Unemployment figures…have reached embarrassing and unacceptable 
proportions. In some states, workers are being owed salary arrears of eight to twelve 
months and, in others, there are threats of salary cuts. Yet our leaders revel in 
squandermania, corruption…continue to proliferate public appointments in complete 
disregard of our economic realities (Excepts from radio broadcast announcing the 
coup by Brigadier Sani Abacha, 31 December 1983). 
 
The intertwined relationship between low degrees of autonomy and inequality 
is encapsulated in the quote above. A low degree of autonomy leads to inefficiency, 
mismanagement and wastage of public resources, a decline in productive economic 
activities, unemployment, and a lack of access to basic services - as generally reported 
in the literature on the Nigerian political economy. All of these generated an increase 
in relative poverty in Nigeria. Therefore, rather than economically empowering the 
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people, low degrees of state autonomy in countries such as Nigeria provide 
institutional foundations for the state to subsidized bureaucratic, political and 
economic elites at the expense of the poor and thereby increased relative poverty. It is 
important to note that these institutional configurations in Nigeria and their socio-
economic outcomes are in contrast to the highly autonomous countries in the sample 
of this study.  
Compared to most of the countries with low degrees of autonomy, Egypt leans 
in the other direction, that is, though it has low degree of autonomy it is one of the 
most egalitarian countries in the sample. A brief narrative of Egyptian political 
economy will suffice to shed light on the institutional factors. Following the 1952 
revolution, decision-making was centralised, with the president and his cabinet being 
the main players.  Writing on decision-making structure relating to industry, Harik 
(1997: 27) notes, “The general development policy has always been made at the 
highest level of government in a highly centralised fashion. Reform efforts made in 
the seventies and later in the eighties…were more formal than real and decision-
making power remained authoritarian and centralised”. Centralisation of decision-
making at the political level, especially in the president and, to a lesser degree, the 
cabinet, was so strong that the bureaucracy was considerably marginalised in 
economic policy-making. In this regard, the Higher Policy Committee (HPC), made 
of key ministers, played a pivotal role in the determination of economic policy. To 
draw on Harik (1997: 29), once again, 
 
[t]he Higher Policy Committee sits as a commissar of last resort over most 
operations of the public sector, dictating what to charge for products and services, 
what to produce, how, and by what means. Expansion, imports, and loans all have to 
be approved by the HPC. Usually, it reserves for itself the critical issues, leaving 
ordinary matters to line ministries. Also, when there is a difference between 
ministers, the HPC acts as arbiter.  
 
We need to understand the institutional context of Egypt. The Egyptian case 
differs from the highly autonomous state of Korea and Singapore where the core 
economic bureaucracy played a much more prominent role in policy formulation. But 
Egyptian equity may be explained by something other than its institutional 
configurations. In particular, Egypt experienced a radical redistribution of wealth, 
mostly through land reform, in the wake of the 1952 revolution.  This initial 
redistribution accounts for Egypt’s subsequent low inequality.  
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Following the 1952 socialist revolution, the Egyptian state embarked on 
income and wealth-sharing mechanisms that included land reforms, which benefited 
primarily the rural peasants and thereby transformed the peasantry from tenant 
farmers to small property owners. Land reforms were accompanied by other wealth-
sharing policies such as universal and free education and health services, as well as 
food subsidies. These reforms constituted the foundation for Egyptian egalitarianism 
in spite of its low degree of autonomy. The Egyptian case conforms to the well known 
fact in political economy that “Agrarian reforms worthy of the name transform rural 
society through alterations in property structure and production relations, 
redistributing power and privilege in favour of the poor” (Little, 2003: 81). According 
to the World Bank “Theory and empirical evidence suggest that widespread 
ownership of land …improves equity…” (World Bank, 1993b: 160).  
To conclude, this section has demonstrated how variations in states’ capacities 
expressed in the variations in state autonomy accounted for differing economic 
performances: in general, those states with low degrees of autonomy suffer from high 
levels of inequality. While this pattern is consistent with our expectations, it is 
important to exercise some caution in generalising from these findings, since some of 
the highly autonomous states share in common an important characteristic - initial 
land reform (witness Egypt). This may have contributed to their high levels of 
equality.   
 
7. 2.3: Autonomy and E-Growth 
 
Like the previous sections, this section is divided into two parts. Part 1 focuses 
on the results of the model and bivariate analysis, while Part 2 deals with the 
descriptive and narrative analyses.   
 
7.2.3.1: Modelling E-Growth on Autonomy 
 
As expected, there is strong and significant correlation between autonomy and 
E-Growth. The Pearson correlation coefficient for the relationship between autonomy 
and E-Growth is 0.81, and it is highly significant at the 0.01 level with a P-value of 
0.03.  
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The variable autonomy is used as a continuous explanatory variable in 
modelling the probability of a country’s E-Growth category (a non-continuous 
variable). Thus, the logit equations for the model are: 
 
 
The results of the analyses presented in Tables 7.3 – 7.6. 
 
Table 7. 3: E-Growth Distribution of Countries Considered (Autonomy) 
E-Growth Status Number Percentage 
0.25 4 33.3% 
0.50 2 16.7% 
0.75 1 8.3% 
1.00 5 41.7% 
TOTAL 12 100% 
 
A total of twelve countries were considered. Table 7.3 shows the number of 
countries considered in each E-Growth category.  
 
Table 7.4:  Parameter Estimates (Autonomy) 
E-Growth B 
Standard 
Error P-Value 
Lower 95% 
Confidence 
Bound 
Upper  
95% 
Confidence 
Bound 
0.25 
 
Intercept 
Autonomy 
 17.186 
 -29.765 
  9.835 
 16.708 
0.081 
0.075 7.108E-28 19.728 
0.50 
 
Intercept 
Autonomy 
 12.832 
  -22.173 
 9.259 
15.215 
0.166 
0.145 2.624E-23 2096.355 
0.50 
 
Intercept 
Autonomy 
  3.255 
  -7.065 
8.448 
12.442 
0.700 
0.570 2.192E-14 33321011.81 
 
 
Table 7. 4 gives the results of the fitted logistic regression model. The table 
shows the fitted parameter estimates for each E-Growth category. E-Growth category 
4 is the reference category and therefore is not shown explicitly above. The p-values 
for E-Growth categories 0.5 and 0.75 are high (greater than 0.1) indicating that they 
are not well predicted by autonomy. This result is seen clearly in the classification 
table below – Table 7.5; the model correctly predicts 75% and 80% of E-Growth 
categories 0.25 and 1 respectively, and fails to make a single correct prediction in the 
1
1 1
4
2
2 2
4
3
3 3
4
log ,
log ,
log .
e
e
e
Autonomy
Autonomy
Autonomy
pi
α β
pi
pi
α β
pi
pi
α β
pi
 
= + 
 
 
= + 
 
 
= + 
 
  160 
other categories. The parameter estimates had relatively high standard errors, possibly 
as a result of the small sample size. Caution should therefore be taken in attempting to 
generalize based on these results. 
 
Table 7. 5: Classification, Model vs. Observed (Autonomy) 
 
0.25  
Predicted 
0.50 
Predicted 
0.75 
Predicted 
1.00 
Predicted 
Percentage 
Correct 
0.25       Observed             3 0 0 1 75.0% 
0.50       Observed 1 0 0 1 0% 
0.75       Observed 0 0 0 1 0% 
1.00       Observed 1 0 0 4 80.0% 
Overall Percentage 41.7% 0% 0% 58.3% 
 
 
 
 
Table 7.6:  Pseudo R2 (Autonomy) 
Cox and Snell 0.604 
Nagelkerke 0.660 
McFadden 0.375 
 
Table 7.6 shows the estimated R2. The pseudo R2 values give an idea of how 
much variation of our response variable is explained by the model being fitted – they 
are usually low for this type of regression but values ranging from 0.2 to 0.4 for 
McFadden’s R2 are usually acceptable. Thus, an acceptable amount of the response 
variable’s variation, 0.375, is explained by autonomy. 
In general, the significance of the autonomy variable as a predictor for the E-
Growth category is tested. The drop in -2*log-likelihood function when moving from 
a model with only an intercept to a model that includes an intercept and the autonomy 
variable is compared against a 21χ  distribution. The p-value for this comparison is 
0.011 which is significant at the 5% level. We can conclude therefore that autonomy 
is a significant explanatory variable. 
Our estimated logit equations for the fitted model are: 
1
4
2
4
3
4
log 17.186 29.765 Autonomy,
log 12.832 22.173 Autonomy,
log 3.255 7.065 Autonomy.
e
e
e
pi
pi
pi
pi
pi
pi
 
= − × 
 
 
= − × 
 
 
= − × 
 
 
 
  161 
It should be noted that the coefficient values and their corresponding standard 
errors are extremely large, which is probably the result of our very small sample size. 
Thus, we need to be wary of our interpretation of this model. As earlier, we will limit 
our interpretation to drawing out relationships in this model which can then be 
substantiated with case study evidence.  
Given that a country has an E-Growth category of 1 or 4, the odds of the 
country being of category 1 (that is low growth and high inequality) rather than 
category 4 (that is E-Growth) with value of autonomy (r+0.1) is 29.765*(0.1) 0.05e− =  
times the odds for countries with autonomy r. In other words, when we increase a 
country’s autonomy by 0.1, it becomes more likely (on the odds scale) that the 
country will be classified into E-Growth category 4 rather than category 1. 
However, perhaps we want to compare categories 1 and 2, 2 and 3, and 3 and 
4 with each other, respectively. The estimated logit equation for comparison of 
categories 1 and 2 is  
2
1
log (12.832 17.186) ( 22.173 ( 29.765)) Autonomy
4.354 7.592 Autonomy.
e
pi
pi
 
= − + − − − × 
 
= − + ×
 
Thus, assuming that a country has an E-Growth category of 1 or 2, the odds of 
the country being of category 2 rather than category 1 with value of Autonomy 
(r+0.1) is 7.592*(0.1) 2.14e =  times the odds for a country with Autonomy r. This means 
that when a country’s autonomy is increased by 0.1, it becomes approximately twice 
as likely (on the odds scale) that the country will be classified into E-Growth category 
2 (that is high growth and high inequality) rather than category 1 (that is, low growth 
and high inequality). 
Now, let’s compare categories 2 and 3. The estimated logit equation for this 
comparison is 
  
3
2
log (3.255 12.832) ( 7.065 ( 22.173)) Autonomy
9.577 15.108 Autonomy.
e
pi
pi
 
= − + − − − × 
 
= − + ×
 
 Now given that a country has an E-Growth category of 2 or 3, the odds of the 
country being of category 3 rather than category 2 with value of Autonomy (r+0.1) is 
15.108*(0.1) 4.53e =  times the odds for countries with Autonomy r. This means that when 
a country’s autonomy is increased by 0.1, it becomes approximately 4.5 times more 
  162 
likely (on the odds scale) that the country will be classified into E-Growth category 3 
(equity with low growth) rather than category 2 (Inequitable growth). 
Given that a country has E-Growth categories 3 (low inequality and low 
growth) or 4 (low inequality and high growth), the odds of the country being of 
category 4 (equitable growth) rather than category 3 (equity in the context of low 
growth) with value of Autonomy (r+0.1) is (0 ( 22.173))*(0.1) 9.18e − − =  times the odds for 
countries with Autonomy r using the same method as was used above.  
All the interpretations above indicate the strong influence that a country’s 
autonomy score can make on its E-Growth categorisation. The larger the autonomy 
value of a country, the more likely it is that they will achieve E-Growth category 4 
(where there is low inequality and high growth). This relationship can be clearly seen 
in the scatter plot of the estimated probabilities ( 1 2 3 4ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ, , ,pi pi pi pi ) against autonomy 
below. 
 
Figure 7. 3: Scatter Plot of Fitted Probabilities of E-Growth on Autonomy 
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The scatter plot above shows clearly that at low levels of autonomy, the 
respondent is least likely to fall into category 4, and most likely to fall into category 1. 
The converse is true at high levels of autonomy. A country is least likely to fall into 
category 1 and most likely to fall into category 4. Figure 7.3 shows a clear negative 
relationship between autonomy and the likelihood of being in category 1. Likewise 
there is a clear positive relationship between the probability of falling into category 4 
and autonomy.   
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For categories 2 and 3, the relationship between autonomy and the likelihood 
is not a direct linear relationship as it is for categories 1 and 4. Between 0.30 and 0.60 
degrees of autonomy, the likelihood of being a category 2 country increases as the 
likelihood of being a category 1 country decreases, possibly showing that the 
transition from category 1 to 2 as autonomy increases in these low ranges is the 
dominant driving factor. After 0.60 degrees of autonomy, the probability of being in 
category 2 starts to decrease with autonomy, possibly reflecting the influence of the 
transition from category 2 to categories 3 and 4 as the dominant driving factor at these 
higher degrees of autonomy. However, we should be cautious of this interpretation 
given that the model does not do so well in predicting categories 2 and 3. It is also 
clear from the above scatter plot that when a country’s autonomy is in the 
approximate range of [0.5; 0.6] the fitted probabilities of all E-Growth categories are 
very similar. However, extreme values of the variable autonomy clearly separate the 
E-Growth categories.  
Finally, the classification table in the output above indicates how well our 
model would predict the data we have already used in the analyses. It is preferable to 
use data that were not used in fitting the model. We, however, do not have this luxury 
with the current sample. The model accurately predicts 58.3% of our data, which is 
not too bad. It should be noted that the model is better at predicting for countries with 
E-Growth categories 1 and 4 than for categories 2 and 3 since there are proportionally 
many more observations in our data for categories 1 and 4 than for categories 2 and 3. 
It should also be mentioned that no goodness of fit testing has been performed 
for this model as the current sample size is too small for such tests.  
 
7.2.3.2: Descriptive and Narrative Analysis 
 
It should be remembered at this point that the E-Growth scale is composed 
from countries growth rates and the Gini index for the 1991 – 2001 period. Countries 
with E-Growth are those with an aggregate economic growth rate of more than 4.2 
percent, and a Gini index of lower than 0.44.  
It will be noticed from Table  7.7 below that the sample is representative of six 
sets of countries, namely, those with (a) high degrees of autonomy and E-Growth - 
Singapore, Korea, Thailand and India; (b) high degrees of autonomy with equity and 
low growth  - Pakistan; (c) high degree of autonomy with Inequitable growth – 
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Malaysia; (d) low degrees of autonomy and E-Growth - Egypt; (e) low degrees of 
autonomy with inequitable growth - Chile; and (f) low degrees of autonomy with low 
economic growth and high inequality (Mexico, Nigeria, Brazil and Kenya – located at 
the bottom part of the Table 7.7).  
 
Table 7.7: Autonomy and E-Growth 
Country Autonomy 
E-Growth 
Categories E-Growth Status 
Singapore 0.76 4 Growth with equity 
Korea 0.80 4 Growth with equity  
India 0.77 4 Growth with equity  
Egypt 0.54 4 Growth with equity  
Pakistan 0.66 3 Equity with low growth 
Malaysia 0.60 2 Inequitable growth 
Egypt 0.54 4 Growth with equity  
Chile 0.43 2  Inequitable growth 
Mexico 0.58 1 High inequality and low growth 
Brazil 0.45 1  High inequality and low growth 
Nigeria 0.44 1  High inequality and low growth 
Kenya 0.34 1  High inequality and low growth 
 
The organisational characteristics of those states with high growth rates have 
been discussed. As such they require no further elaboration here. Suffice it to say, 
however, that Singapore, Korea, India, Malaysia and Thailand all have state 
institutions marked by meritocracy, career pathing and strong co-ordination of 
economic management.  
Furthermore, it is evidenced from Table 7.7 that the highly autonomous states 
in the sample, namely Korea, India, Singapore and Thailand, enjoyed very high levels 
of economic performance – they all achieved both economic growth and equity (with 
Korea being the most egalitarian country with a Gini index of 0.32). 
In the previous sections, I have discussed the relationship between autonomy 
and economic growth and autonomy and inequality. Suffice it to point out here that 
the high degrees of autonomy in these countries gave states the freedom to pursue 
their developmental objectives of growth with equity. Not only did states facilitate an 
alliance between domestic and foreign firms, they were also instrumental to the 
penetration of new markets, adoption of new technologies, reduction of risks and cost 
of investments, and so on.  
Consider the Korean case as an example.  The Korean state prodded domestic 
industry towards greater efficiency and productivity, and induced industries to move 
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into higher value-added production. These choices can be explained in terms of the 
highly autonomous institutions of state that enabled it to formulate cohesive industrial 
policies, set unambiguous targets and extract performance targets from capital. These 
were instrumental to the country’s high growth rate. Henderson (2003) aptly captured 
the impact of state autonomy on equitable growth in countries such as Korea. He 
observed that the Korean state established institutions/structures that supported 
“industries capable, over time, of delivering higher value-added activities that 
underpin high wages (and that these can be sustained through subsequent movements 
into innovation-led growth and development)” (Henderson, 2003: 11).  
The high degrees of autonomy also allowed states like Korea to promote high 
egalitarian wealth sharing mechanisms such as investment in human capital as a basis 
for E-Growth. The equity-saving-investment-growth nexus in India, Korea, Singapore, 
and Thailand would have been near impossible without autonomous institutions of 
state. Therefore a remarkable feature of these highly autonomous countries is the 
transformation towards relatively high-paid employment. With better paying jobs 
came qualitative improvement of the material conditions of people in these countries. 
This resulted in poverty reduction in these societies.  
Unlike the countries discussed above, Brazil, Kenya and Nigeria all have low 
degrees of state autonomy. Consequently, their economic performance as shown in 
chapter four is poor – they all have low economic growth rates as well as the highest 
income inequalities in the sampled countries, with Brazil retaining its status as the 
most unequal country (in the world), with a Gini index of 0.61.   
Although our model is not very good at predicting for E-Growth category 1 
countries such as Brazil, our observation about Brazil is consistent with most of the 
case studies literature on its political economy. In summing up some of the most 
pertinent case study works, Evans (1995) describes the difficulties of the Brazilian 
state in trying to institute a meritocratic recruitment. Compared to some of the 
developmental states, like Korea and Singapore, political appointees by the president, 
in their thousands, populated the bureaucracy in Brazil. In such an institutional 
context, to a greater degree, there was an absence of career paths for civil servants. 
Evans poignantly captured this point as follows: “Instead of being tuned to long-term 
gains via promotions based on organisationally relevant performance, Brazilian 
bureaucrats face staccato careers, punctuated by the rhythms of changing political 
leadership and periodic spawning of new organisations” (1992: 167). Unable to 
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establish bureaucratic-wide meritocratic recruitment, the state created “pockets of 
efficiency” or what Cheng et al. (1999: 100) would call “developmental enclaves”, 
where meritocratic recruitment and predictable career paths prevailed, ensuring a 
degree of corporate coherency. These latter factors were supposed to have made the 
Brazilian state more autonomous and efficient than states like Nigeria, according to 
the case study literature. In this respect, my finding is at variance with Evans’ and 
similar narratives of the Brazilian state’s institutional structures and its economic 
performance. Just like Nigeria, the Brazilian state has a low degree of autonomy with 
a pathetic economic growth record, which is graphically captured in Figure 7.1. 
What is remarkable in the Brazilian case is that the autonomy deficit accounts 
for its inability to forge a cohesive developmental agenda and be able to discipline 
capital and labour to meet its set objectives. In fact, an incoherent economic 
bureaucracy incapacitated the Brazilian state’s ability to set clear standards and 
extract performance from the private sector. Its low economic growth rate was partly 
a result of its lack of cohesiveness, which, among other things, militated against 
coordinating industrial development as a central pillar for economic growth.   
Unlike Brazil, India and Malaysia, Nigeria inherited from British colonialism 
a poor quality bureaucracy that was anything but that which approximates the 
Weberian ideal type (Kohli, 2004). But like Brazil, Nigeria, appointments to the civil 
service in the 1970 - 1990 period were purely on the basis of “god-fatherism”, that is 
political patronage. Getting a job in the Nigerian civil service depended on whom you 
know in the higher echelon of the bureaucracy, the political class or senior military 
ranks. As in Brazil, there has been a high turnover of senior Nigerian civil servants, 
almost every four or five years. An illustration of this relates to permanent secretaries 
– the highest rank in the Nigerian civil service. Inherited from the British colonialist, 
and as the name implies, permanent secretaries were supposed to be permanent 
appointments with security of tenure. But with successive military regimes, beginning 
with the General Murtala Mohammed/Olusegun Obasanjo’s regime in the mid 1970s, 
the position of permanent secretary become politicized – a political appointment – 
where the secretary’s tenure was tied to the military regimes that appointed them 
(with this came the change of designation from permanent secretary to director-
general). In fact, the reform of the civil service that was introduced in the 1970s led to 
the destruction of the civil service tradition of security of tenure. This was achieved 
by the retirement or dismissal of many whom had not attained retirement age. When 
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you consider that between 1970 and 1990, there were about three successful military 
coups, it tells us that the rapid turnover rate of senior bureaucrats in Nigeria 
approximate that of Brazil.  
This situation is compounded by the corruption of the quota system – the so-
called federal character - which implies that appointments to the civil service should 
be based on quotas in order to ensure fair representation of all states at the national 
level.53 The result is that qualified and skilled people are bypassed in appointments in 
the name of “federal character”. This was one of the main grievances of Major Gideon 
Orkar’s led military coup in the 1980s, which felt that qualified citizens from the 
South were being bypassed in favour of less qualified citizens from the North. 
Whatever the merits or demerits of the coup, the corruption of the federal character 
principle, which was supposed to ensure balanced representation among the 
constituent parts of Nigeria, is a significant problem in the Nigerian political economy 
in the period under consideration. There was also a high degree of political 
interference in the work of civil servants. Thus, unlike Korea and Singapore, for 
example, where the economic bureaucracy played a central role in social and 
economic policies, in Nigeria major social and economic policies were “actually 
determined by politicians and under military regimes by military leaders, and they 
ensured that civil servants implemented such policies.  Even at the implementation 
stage, there were still interference from politicians and military rulers” (Adamolekun, 
1988: 85, emphasis mine).  Among other things, these institutional factors accounted 
for the low degree of state autonomy in Nigeria, as well as its sub-optimal economic 
growth performance.  In fact, because economic bureaucrats in Nigeria are well aware 
that their knowledge and talent are discounted, at least from the 1980s, in the 
determination of economic policy; they in turn did not generate the requisite 
information that could have put the country on a high growth path. In addition, senior 
economic bureaucrats in Nigeria have also been more prone to particularistic interests. 
They were conscious of the fact that their positions were not secure and that they 
could be fired if they took decisions which did not favour some politically connected 
individuals. Consequently they were hamstrung from making policy decisions that 
could lead to national economic development but which were not favourable to the 
short-run benefit of individuals in both the private and public sectors.  
                                                         
53
 Successive constitutions in Nigeria have made provisions for the Federal Character.  
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Egypt is the only country with low degree of autonomy that did not meet our 
theoretical expectations. It is can be observed from Table 7.7 that Egypt has a low 
degree of autonomy, yet it nevertheless scored well on the E-Growth variable.  As 
described in chapter four, the economic growth rate of Egypt for the period 1991 - 
2001 was 4.2 percent, and it had a Gini index of 0.34. Indeed, Egypt is the only 
country in the sample with a low degree of state autonomy that achieved E-Growth. 
As I have noted above, its growth rate status can be explained by factors other than 
institutional configurations. These included remittance of its workers from overseas 
(mostly oil rich Arab countries) and revenues from the Suez Canal. As described 
above, Egypt’s low level of inequality is a product of initial egalitarian wealth 
distribution, including agrarian reforms that fundamentally altered the property 
relations in favour of the poor.  
 
7. 3: Conclusion 
 
The analysis above lends itself to a number of conclusions. Autonomy is 
statistically significant in explaining economic growth, equity and equitable growth. 
In line with the theoretical premise of this study, a majority of countries in the sample 
with high degrees of autonomy experienced high economic growth rates in the period 
covered in this study.  Similarly, most of the highly autonomous countries are highly 
equitable societies (although, as suggested above, Pakistan’s equity status may be due 
to non-institutional factors).  
By the same token, this chapter constitutes an important link to the next - 
chapter 8 - which will focus on the relationship between our second independent 
variable, synergy and the same dependent variables (economic growth, inequality and 
E-Growth). The statistical analysis will be complemented by comparative narrative 
analysis to throw some light on the cases in the sample.  
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Chapter Eight 
 
State-Society Synergy and Equitable Growth  
 
8. 0: Introduction 
 
This chapter focuses on the relationship between synergy and economic 
growth, synergy and equity, and synergy and E-Growth. The aim is to discover the 
effects of synergy on these dependent variables.  
This focus is important because of the central proposition of this study that 
synergy is one of the major sources of the Synergistic Autonomous State’s (SAS) 
capacity and that variations in state capacity account for differences in economic 
performance. Closely related to this is the proposition that the participation of 
organised interests in economic policy-making, through institutionalised Consultative 
Mechanisms (CMs) would enable a country to achieve optimal economic 
performance, namely equity and high economic growth. This argument is premised on 
the realisation that CMs serve as structures for information sharing, feedback and joint 
planning among national stakeholders on macroeconomic, industrial, sectoral, trade 
policies, development, and even Research and Development (R&D). These structures 
would help to generate trust among participating partners and are likely to provide 
credibility to policies and their outcomes. These types of interactions tend to enable a 
SAS to successfully transform its economy and adapt to rapidly changing global 
environment. CMs are likely to provide citizens’ organisations with real choices over 
policy, and make their views carry weight in determining the eventual policy 
outcome.  This might remove uncertainty about government policy direction and, by 
so doing, increase the confidence of the investment community and other social 
actors. Also, CMs are more likely than not to enable domestic economic actors, 
especially government, business and organised labour, to share information that will 
enhance the capacity of the national economy to adapt to the rapid changes 
engendered by globalisation. In particular, through such a consensus-building 
approach to economic adjustment, national actors are likely to balance the need to be 
globally competitive with the need to ensure equitable development, which, among 
other things, entails the improvement of the living standards of citizens.  
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This chapter is divided into three sections. The first section covers the 
relationship between synergy and economic growth, while the second section deals 
with the relationship between synergy and inequality. The third section focuses on the 
relationship between synergy and shared growth. 
 
8. 1: Synergy and Economic Growth 
 
This section is divided into two parts. Part one presents the results of the 
model and analyses, while the second deals with the descriptive and narrative 
analyses.   
 
8.1.1:  Modelling Growth on Synergy 
 
In conformity with the literature on participatory democracy and the likely 
positive impact of organised interests’ participation in economic policy-making, there 
is a strong and positive correlation between synergy and economic growth. The 
Pearson correlation coefficient between the variables is 0.562, and it is significant at 
the 10 percent level, with a p-value of 0.057.  The relationship between synergy and 
economic growth is graphically depicted in Figure 8.1.  
The relationship is vividly captured by a simple linear regression. Based on 
our theoretical specification, the following regression equation is derived: 
 
% change in economic growth = α + ßSynergy + εt 
 
  From the estimated regression, the following equation is obtained: 
 
% change on economic growth = 2.292    + 4.590 (Synergy) 
  (3.095)      (2.151) 
        R2 =32  
The estimated t-ratios are in parentheses. The coefficient is significant at the 
10% level. The R2 value is 0.316, which is a good fit. This means that our equation 
explains almost 32% of the variation in the sample data.  
 
  171 
8. 1. 2: Descriptive and Narrative Analyses 
 
The countries in Figure 8.1 can be aggregated into three subgroups, namely 
those with (a) high degrees of synergy with high economic growth – Singapore, Korea 
and Thailand, (b) low degrees of synergy with high growth rate record – Malaysia, 
Chile, Egypt and India, and (c) low degrees of synergy and low economic growth – 
Mexico, Nigeria, Brazil, Pakistan and Kenya.  Again, there is no country that is highly 
synergistic with low economic growth.  These findings confirm once again that 
countries with strong synergistic state-society are able to foster high economic growth 
rates. 
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It is useful to discuss the close association between the synergy and growth in 
the most synergistic countries. To do this, the analysis in this section will focus on 
three highly synergistic countries, namely; Korea, Singapore and Thailand to show 
how high degrees of synergy contributed to high economic growth rates. These will 
be compared to three countries, namely, Kenya, Nigeria and Brazil, with low degrees 
of synergy and low economic growth rates. Lastly, the analysis will also focussed on 
Chile because though it shared similar institutional characteristics with Nigeria and 
Brazil, it still recorded a high economic growth rate.  
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Much has been written in the case studies’ literature about the high degrees, in 
varying proportions, of the connectedness between the state and encompassing 
societal interests in Korea, Singapore and Thailand. These countries had a reputation 
for the institutionalisation of dialogue between the state and societal actors with likely 
positive spin-offs on economic growth.  This reputation has been more rooted in 
Korea and Singapore than in Thailand, where institutionalised state-society relations 
began in 1981 with the establishment of the Joint Public-Private Consultative 
Committee (JPPCC). The fundamental question, therefore, is how did the high 
degrees of synergy in these countries contribute to high economic growth? I will show 
in the analysis that follows that high degrees of state-society synergies were 
instrumental to the high growth rate of countries such as Korea, Singapore and 
Thailand in a variety of ways. 
To begin with, because of these countries’ institutionalised relationships 
between the state and its socio-economic partners, especially with organised business, 
policies were made purely on economic grounds. High degrees of synergy contributed 
to transparency in economic policy-making in these countries. As a result, economic 
policies and their outcomes were more often than not subjected to greater public 
scrutiny and also resulted in greater accountability of the bureaucratic elite to both the 
political elite and the public. As Weiss rightly pointed out, this reduces “the risks of 
corruption or political favouritism” (Weiss, 1998: 59). They were also avenues for 
rent-sharing between competing interests in the private sector or between the private 
sector and trade unions. With respect to the former, the Korean Export Promotion 
Council is illustrative. Through monthly meetings, which were presided over by the 
president, export targets were set for various sectors. When problems that could 
militate against meeting those targets were identified, recommendations were made at 
the meetings and subsequently implemented. In addition, criteria for access to export 
subsidies and production licences were transparently defined, and in a coordinated 
manner. This minimised the risks of favouritism in a way that would have undermined 
the Korean objective of transforming the structural bases of its industries as the 
foundation for its high economic growth rate. With respect to the rents’ distribution 
between business and trade unions, Singapore’s National Wage Commission (NWC) 
is a prime example. It facilitated joint decision-making on economic policies and 
contributed to a situation where rents were allocated transparently and objectively 
between business (profits) and labour (wages). In short, wage increases were tied to 
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productivity. One of the effects of this was policy stability. In addition, the state-
society relations provided legitimacy to public policy. Both of these were necessary 
conditions for investment.    
It is clear from these examples that the state in Korea, Singapore and Thailand 
has managed to minimize what the public choice theorists have always feared: that 
state-society relations would result in elite capture.  As we have seen in the case of 
our most synergistic countries, they were able to overcome this threat, precisely 
because the institutionalisation of state-society relations ensured that the states in 
these countries vigorously pursued their developmental agenda without being derailed 
by particularistic interests. In fact, the establishment of the JPPCC in Thailand may 
have minimised the military-bureaucrats clientelism that has characterised its political 
economic history from the 1930s to the early 1980s.  Unlike countries with lower 
degrees of synergy, bureaucracy capture was not an endemic problem in Thailand 
(MacIntyre, 1994).  
To the extent that state-business relations in these countries were with 
national, economy-wide relations, organised business was able to mobilize support for 
the state-defined developmental objectives of industrial transformation, growth and 
equity. This has generally been acknowledged in numerous case studies. For example, 
Campos and Root (1996) have observed that “(t)he East Asian leaders and those of 
Thailand secured the support of economic elites without compromising sound 
economic policy through mechanisms designed to facilitate consultation, cooperation, 
and coordination” (Campos and Root, 1996: 77, emphasis mine).   
These countries minimised the risks of economic policies being changed 
arbitrarily and erratically to meet the whims and caprices of both the political and 
economic bureaucratic elites – it partly led to predictability of economic policies in 
the highly synergistic countries in this study.  These tended to enhance the credibility 
of the governments and economic policies, which in turn encouraged both local and 
foreign investors to make long-term fixed investment in these countries and were 
instrumental in bringing about their high economic growth rates. Furthermore, both 
the political and bureaucratic elites were cognizant of the fact that the rules of the 
game arrived at in the various CMs could not be arbitrarily changed without adverse 
economic consequences that would have in turn undermined their own legitimacy – 
this is more so as their legitimacy was predicated on E-Growth. From this analysis, it 
can be concluded that the economic success stories of Korea, Singapore and Thailand 
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cannot be written without giving the high degrees of synergy a prime place.  
Cognizant of this, two astute observers of Asian political economy, Campos and Root 
(1996: 78), note “In these countries,… deliberation councils, have been active and 
often critical in the formulation of policies, rules, and regulations that eventually 
govern a sector, industry, or in some cases the macroeconomy.”  
Another point worthy of note is that the regular consultations and joint 
decision-making in Korea, Singapore and Thailand resulted in joint investments by 
the state and the private sector on R&D; this was one of the contributory factors for 
low investment costs for the latter. In addition, information exchanges relating to 
market opportunities also reduced the cost and risks for exporters.  Not surprising, as 
previously noted, these countries have become powerful players and competitors in 
the global markets. 
Significantly, high degrees of synergy in Korea, Singapore and Thailand, also 
ensured the joint planning and coordination of investment decisions between the state 
and the private sector. Among other things, through extensive exchanges of 
information, the governments in these countries were able to adapt policies to meet 
rapidly changes circumstances in the global economy, as well as to selectively 
intervene to promote new sectors. Central to this was a changing production method 
due to the emergence and dominance of information technology. The high degree of 
interconnectedness between the state and organised business provided the economic 
bureaucracies in countries such as Korea “with a vital mechanism for acquiring 
adequate information and for coordination of agreement with the private sector over 
the content and implementation of policy” (Weiss, 1998: 55). The point made by 
Okimoto with respect to state-society synergy in Japan can be extended to the highly 
synergistic countries in this study: high degrees of state-society synergy characterised 
by regular interactions and exchanges of information between the state and organised 
business were instrumental to their successful adoption of new technologies and 
movement from sunset to sunrise industries as key drivers of their spectacular 
economic achievements. One of the consequences of their high degrees of synergy is 
that both the state and the private sector were able to determine where technology is 
headed and where the most promising commercial opportunities lie (Okimoto, cited 
by Weiss, 1998). In particular, the intensive and extensive interactions between the 
state and business in Korea, Singapore and Thailand facilitated joint investment in 
Research and Development (R&D), including the setting of state-linked Research 
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Institutes. By so doing, governments in these countries reduced the risks and costs of 
investments. Consequently, within two decades, these countries transformed their 
economies from producing the labour-intensive and lowest stream products of the new 
technology to capital intensive and medium to high stream products. 
The Thai case is illustrative of the phenomenal structural shifts in the 
economies of the most synergistic countries. As reported by Chalongphob (1997, cited 
Doner and Ramsay, 2003: 127 ), between 1985 and 1993, labour-intensive goods 
(e.g., garments, gems and shoes) dominated manufacturing exports. However, by 
1995, medium-high technology products (computer parts, electronics and electrical 
appliances) grew rapidly, so that the export value of these products was 40 percent 
higher than the labour intensive products. In addition, high degrees of synergy in 
Korea, Singapore and Thailand were pivotal to their ability to capture new markets. 
The Korean Export Promotion Council, made up of representatives of government 
and business, is a prime example of how high degrees of synergy contributed to the 
capacity of the highly synergistic states to capture new markets in the global economy 
and share risks and costs among firms, and between the public and private sectors.  
Consequently, they have become competitive in the new economy dominated by the 
new information technology.  
This analysis of the highly synergistic countries has shown that state-society 
synergy, rather than coercion or repression, is one important explanation for their 
remarkable economic growth rates. Through cooperation, openness and consensus-
based economic policy-making, Korea, Singapore and Thailand have transformed the 
structural bases of their economies, upgraded their production techniques, adopted 
new technologies, created a climate conducive for investment, captured new markets, 
became globally competitive and consequently generated rapid and high growth rates. 
Furthermore, high degrees of synergy were also a mechanism for ensuring 
accountability of the bureaucratic elites to the political elite and the social partners in 
the consultative process, as well as accountability of the social partners to the state.  In 
sum, while high degrees of synergy constrained the powers of the state from acting 
arbitrarily, it also enhanced state capacity through the pooling of all national resources 
to achieve its set goal.  This, in turn, helped to secure the regime’s survival as well as 
the career advancement of the economic bureaucrats.  Other scholars have reached a 
similar conclusion. As Campos and Root (1996: 175 – 176) surmised: 
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Regimes in East Asia’s high performers recognised the importance of courting the 
business community. By giving bargaining power to constituent groups in exchange 
for information needed to formulate and implement rational economic policies, East 
Asian rulers overcome private sector reservations about their intentions. 
Communication mechanisms such as deliberation councils help nurture investor 
confidence in the ability of the government to restrain itself from highly discretionary 
and arbitrary policy making… Firms became more willing to invest in productive 
activities. Growth ensued.  
 
The developmental experiences of countries, such as Kenya, with low degrees 
or even the absence of synergy, stand in sharp contrast to the highly synergistic 
countries. As I have noted in chapter seven, the main policy actors in Kenya were the 
ethnically-driven bureaucratic elites who used the state for personal aggrandizements. 
Socio-economic stakeholders, including the Kenyan Chamber of Commerce, were 
frozen out of the economic policy process. Trade unions, for their part, were repressed 
by the Arap Moi regime. To illustrate the marginalization of economic actors from the 
policy process and its negative effects on economic growth, the following example 
will suffice. 
Kenya was the most developed among the countries that made up the East 
Africa common market. The latter (whose other members were Tanzania and Uganda) 
not only created a larger market for Kenyan goods and services but also provided 
institutional and infrastructural bases that facilitated greater trade and investment in 
Kenya and among the member states. In fact, the potential benefits that could be 
derived from Kenya’s membership in the common market were the main factors that 
attracted some investors to the country.  It is in light of this that both domestic and 
foreign capitals encouraged the Kenyan government to strengthen the common 
market. But to the chagrin of the business community, including the Kenyan Chamber 
of Commerce, the state ignored this advice.  Instead, through a number of actions, 
including the breaking up of East African Airways, Nairobi was instrumental to the 
collapse of the East African Common Market in 1977. This had negative 
consequences for the Kenyan economy. At one level, the markets for Kenyan goods 
and services shrank. Kenyan industries were denied access to services and 
infrastructural facilities that membership of the common market engendered. The 
consequence was that “most Kenyan manufacturing firms began to operate at half or 
less capacity…  Kenya was rendered unattractive to large-scale foreign investments 
whose interest in the area was the larger and unrestricted East common market” 
(Himbara, 1994: 74). At another level, with “the demise of the East Africa-wide 
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supranational organisations, particularly those responsible for duty and tax 
collections, such as the East African Customs and Exercise and the East African 
Income Tax Collection” (Himbara, 1994:75), the capacity of the Kenyan state to 
collect taxes was diminished. In the context of already deteriorating state institutions 
that could hardly provide basic economic infrastructures by the 1980s, companies 
began to provide these services to ensure their continued operation. By implication, 
the diminished capacity of the Kenyan state imposed additional cost on firms. All of 
these issues, which emanated from the demise of the East African common market, 
forced some companies to disinvest from the Kenyan economy. It goes without saying 
that reduced industrial production and low investment ultimately lead to low growth, 
and the Kenyan case was no exception.  
Another point worth emphasizing with respect to the negative effects of lack 
of interconnectedness between the state and capital in Kenya was that both the state 
and the entrepreneurial class worked at cross-purposes. Unlike highly synergistic 
states such as Korea, that have successfully nurtured a domestic entrepreneurial class, 
the Kenyan state was unable to create and nurture an indigenous or national 
bourgeoisie in spite of apparent efforts in this direction. In fact, not only did its 
Africanisation of the private sector fail, the success of the Kenyan Indian business 
class owes much to their own business acumen rather than to state actions to promote 
and nurture them. The state’s actions towards Kenyan Indian businesses in particular 
and businesses in general have been described by Himbara (1994) as 
“counterproductive, hindering the deepening of their operations through unconducive 
policies, markets and national infrastructure” (p. 88).  This was partly because of the 
failure of the state’s Africanisation project,54 which reserved certain economic 
activities for black Africans. Kenyan Indians and foreign investors, including those 
who had already invested in such businesses, were forced to leave the country or 
move to other sectors. Consequently, some non-African black investors closed their 
operations and migrated from Kenya. Such disinvestment further contributed to 
Kenya’s low growth rate, as reported in this study.  
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 The Africanisation project was unlike the affirmative action policy in Malaysia, because unlike the 
latter the Kenyan state reserved certain sectors for Africans. In the case of Malaysia, the state did not 
preclude the Chinese from any economic sector. Rather, it reserved set quotas for the ethnic Malays in 
all economic sectors and activities.  
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It is clear from this analysis that the absence of synergy in Kenya was one of 
the reasons why the government was not responsive to the needs of the private sector, 
as well as being able to take actions that subsequently undermined the growth of the 
economy. 
At this juncture it is important to undertake a narrative analysis of the 
institutional dynamics to highlight the Brazilian status observed in the graph.  Like 
most of its Latin American neighbours, Brazil has a long history of state corporatism 
– regulation, compulsory membership and financing trade unions and business 
associations that were granted representational monopolies and institutionalised 
access to policy-making. These are important features for understanding the 
background to state-society synergy in the 1970 – 1990 period.  In other words, state-
sponsored business associations and trade unions have characterised Brazil for most 
of the period prior to the 1970s, resulting in the emergence of powerful trade unions 
and business associations at an early stage. But in subsequent years and decades, 
especially after the 1970s, Brazil has had the misfortune of not having strong 
encompassing business associations. This was coupled with the repression of trade 
unions. 
In one of the most eloquent testimonies on state-business relations in Latin 
America, Schneider (2004) elaborates on the factors that accounted for this weakness 
and the consequent low degree of state-society synergy in Brazil.  Government 
attitudes towards business associations included at one point, favouring sectoral 
business associations as partners in policy-making. These and other factors acted as 
disincentives for capital to form national economy-wide, encompassing associations. 
As an illustration, “even when business formed … economy-wide co-ordinating 
bodies, state actors never granted them privilege access or other benefits” (Schneider, 
2004: 96). The result was a lack of interest for captains of industry to invest time and 
resources in building economy-wide encompassing associations. 
Another point to untangle in this puzzle is that business associations were 
relatively fragmented and also tended to be unrepresentative, a view shared by 
government, business and other non-state actors. This created further excuses for the 
state to exclude organised business from consultative mechanisms. Added to this, 
Schneider quoted former President Fernando Cardoso, as describing the 
predominance of “bureaucratic rings”, that is, the personalization of policy networks 
in subsequent years – all of which contributed to the low degree of state-society 
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synergy in Brazil. As illustrations, two important examples will suffice for now. In the 
Conselho Monetario Nacional (CMN), the central forum for economic planning under 
the Delfim Netto’s government, organised business was not represented. In the same 
vein, during the reign of President Ernesto Geisel, the Conselho de Desenvolvimento 
Economico (CDE),55 - the main economic coordinating agency - did not have 
representatives of organised business among its members. In both councils, 
businesspeople that participated were appointed in their personal capacities rather 
than representatives of organised interests by the respective presidents.  This 
marginalisation of organised business and the predominance of ‘ad-hocism’ and 
personalisation of relations spread to other areas of the economic policy-making 
domain.56  By implication, the institutionalisation of state-society synergy of earlier 
periods came to be replaced by ad-hoc and personalised relations in the period 
covered by this study, which, as Schneider (1983) points out, “makes them 
undependable from the point of view of industrialists and arbitrary in terms of their 
outcomes” (cited in Evans, 1995: 63).  Weyland (1998: 85) succinctly summed up the 
situation thus: 
 
The organisational fragmentation of Brazilian business has dispersed the political 
access and limited influence on public policymaking of the private sector. Through 
narrow links to state agencies and officials, entrepreneurs have continued to obtain 
special favors, but they have failed to push for overarching goals. Unable to design a 
comprehensive project with broad appeal or make demands in a unified fashion, 
business associations have often acted at cross-purposes from each other. Rivalries 
among them and the absence of an encompassing peak organisation have dispersed 
business power. Certainly, basic capitalist interests have not been endangered, and 
important firms have succeeded in obtaining many particularistic favors. But the 
private sector has had limited influence on broad policy decisions, especially the 
reorientation of Brazil’s development…The main beneficiaries of the private sector’s 
limited clout have not been labor and other lower classes, which have suffered from 
similar organisational fragmentation, but state agencies and Brazil’s irresponsible 
“political class”, who have enjoyed great latitude in decision making and have 
frequently been able to use their unaccountable power for personal enrichment.  
 
The internal weaknesses of organised interests in Brazil, as well as the absence 
of a joint project of national transformation, made it difficult for the state to forge 
synergistic relations with other social actors. Such a policy climate and institutional 
configuration are generally known to be unconducive to long-term investment and 
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  The CMN and CDE had two and three non-government members respectively. 
  
56
 The denial of formal access to policy making to organised business, however, had one unintended 
consequence: it helped to swell the ranks of opposition to military rule.  
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global competitiveness, which is manifested in the country’s low rate of economic 
growth. It is therefore not by accident that Brazil had a poor economic growth rate of 
2.6 percent in the 1991 – 2001 period - the second lowest growth rate in the sample of 
this study.  
It is important at this juncture to throw some light on state-society synergy in 
Nigeria.  Much of the existing literature on the Nigerian political economy points to 
the fact that state-society relations for the period under review were predominantly 
between the state and business associations, as trade unions and broader civil society 
were frozen out of the economic policy-making domain. As Kraus (2002: 412) points 
out, since the 1970s,57 Nigeria has a history of regular consultations between 
government and business, especially the Nigerian Association of Chambers of 
Commerce, Industry, Manufacturing and Agriculture (NACCIMA) and the 
Manufacturing Association of Nigeria (MAN). There was also a shared ideology (a 
joint project) of indigenisation of the Nigerian economy to ensure greater participation 
of Nigerians in an economy that was dominated by foreign interests. But this should 
not be misconstrued to mean the institutionalisation of business associations’ 
participation in economic policy. Kraus attests to this phenomenon when he noted that 
following successive military coups in 1983 and 1985, “there were major disruptions 
in the continuity of meetings” (p. 416). In addition, to this, to quote Kraus once again, 
“the Nigerian state…often ignores business associations’ proposals” (p. 412).  
This attitude was coupled with the disdain that bureaucratic elites had for the 
country’s incipient businesspeople. When you compare the regularity of which 
organised business and government held meetings in Nigeria to countries like Korea 
and Thailand, one sees the degree to which state-society synergy was not 
institutionalised in Nigeria. In the latter, meetings with key ministers, both under 
civilian and military regimes, were quarterly (Kraus, 2002). This hardly compares 
favourably with the monthly meetings of the Joint Public-Private Consultative 
Committee (JPPCC) in Thailand (Laothamatas, 1988).  
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 In the 1950s and early 1960s (immediately after political independence from the British colonialists) 
“businessmen were widely regarded as corrupt and highly dependent upon state favours, which they 
continue to do even until today. They were not taken into confidence over policy issues” (Kraus, 2002: 
400, emphasis mine).  
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Erratic state-business relations and the minimal impact of business 
associations on public policy seems to be more evident in the manner in which the 
General Ibrahim Babangida regime adopted a structural adjustment programme 
(SAP). The regime undertook a national consultation of all stakeholders, business, 
trade unions, etc on whether or not Nigeria should adopt a SAP. The overwhelming 
response of all Nigerians, as contained in the final report of the consultation, was a 
total rejection of SAP. But to the chagrin of Nigerians, the regime went ahead to adopt 
a SAP in the mid-1980s, which it termed ‘home-grown’. Thus, as far as the military 
government was concerned, Nigerians could have their say but the regime would have 
its way. The imposition of SAP (which subsequently framed the context for micro and 
sectoral economic policies) is a vivid illustration of the low degree of influence of 
societal actors, including business associations, on Nigerian economic policy. In 
consequence, even when business had, on occasion, won some concessions around 
policy issues, by and large, their influence remained minimal, to the extent of being 
constrained to operate within the confines of the government’s macroeconomic 
framework. The significance of the foregoing is that by the 1980s, there was hardly 
any shared project between the Nigerian state and business, as evident in the 
conflicting positions by organised business around the value of the Nigerian currency, 
the naira, as well as foreign exchange control.58 Lacking synergistic state-society 
relations, the Nigerian state has been unable to foster and build consensus around a 
long-term accumulation model. The result is that between 1991 and 2001, its fledging 
industrial sector suffered virtual paralysis, and its agricultural sector remained 
untransformed, given the continued dominance of subsistence farming. The low 
degree of synergy is one of the contributing factors to the poor growth performance of 
the Nigerian economy. In fact the state has not only been unable to forge an 
institutionalised relationship with business, but it has also displayed a corresponding 
inability to transform the Nigerian economy. Unable to forge and build consensus 
around a developmental agenda, individuals in the private sector penetrated the state 
to extract rents (which were either stored in European banks or channelled into 
wasteful consumption), a development which, in the long run, has not been conducive 
to sustained economic growth.  
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 While MAN was opposed to the devaluation of the naira, a section of business favoured it. 
Government policy on this and other issues was erratic and led to changes of policy from one day to the 
other.   
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The development experiences of these counties, Brazil, Kenya and Nigeria, 
can be contrasted against that of Chile, which shared similar institutional traits (i.e., a 
low degree of synergy).  Despite this, Chile recorded one of the highest rates of 
economic growth in the period under consideration in this study. In Chile, organised 
business was excluded from the policy loop, thereby creating uncertainty in their 
minds. Consequently, Chile experienced low levels of investment and subsequently 
the collapse of the economy in 1982, a year in which the economy declined by ten 
percent. This, however, forced the state to adopt a neo-liberal economic policy in the 
same year, which began to bear positive fruits as from 1984 when the economy grew 
on average at about seven percent between 1984 and 2001 (World Bank, WDI Online, 
2005). Therefore as noted in chapter 7, Chile’s economic growth rate is mostly due to 
non-institutional factors.  
It can be concluded from the above analysis that synergy has a positive and 
significant effect on economic growth. In line with the theoretical assumption of this 
study, the highly synergistic countries achieved high rates of economic growth, while 
most countries with low degrees synergy are marked by low growth rates.  
 
8. 2:  Synergy and Inequality 
 
This section presents the results of the model and analyses.    
 
8. 2. 1: Modelling Inequality on Synergy 
 
There is a negative but weak correlation between the degree of synergy and 
equity, the relationship has an estimated Pearson correlation coefficient of –0.019 and 
it is insignificant with a p-value 0.953. 
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This negative but insignificant relationship between synergy and inequality is 
discernible in the trend line and dispersion of cases as shown in Figure 8.2.  
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Figure 8.2: Synergy and Inequality
R Sq Linear = 
3.579E-4
 
The negative relationship is vividly captured by a simple linear regression.  
Based on our theoretical specification, the following regression equation is derived: 
 
Inequality = a - ßSynergy 
 
+ εt 
 
From the estimated regression, the following equation is obtained: 
 
Inequality = 0.452    - 0.008 (Synergy) 
   (7.618)      (.060) 
        R=.000 
The estimated t-statistics are in parenthesis. The coefficient is insignificant. 
The R2 is .000, which is a very poor fit indeed. This means that none of the variations 
in inequality is explained by the model (regression). This poor finding may, however, 
be associated with the paucity of data or data errors. Besides, the main explanatory 
variable, synergy is insignificant as exhibited by a t-ratio of –0.060. I will therefore 
not proceed with further analysis. 
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It is, however, important to note that this finding may surprise activists and 
policy-makers who expect to find a strong and negative correlation between synergy 
and inequality. Contrary to much of the case study literature and the received wisdom 
in policy and civil society activists’ circles (especially since the 1980s) about the 
perceived strong and positive social and economic benefits of interest groups 
participation in economic policy-making (and public policy in general), this study 
suggests that the positive effects of high degrees of synergy on equity are quite weak 
– indeed insignificant. Recall that the main justification for participation has been 
based on equity grounds. One plausible reason for the contradictory results is that 
most of the existing studies have used inappropriate indicators, such as “voice, 
openness and transparency” (Stiglitz, 2002: 164) to measure participation. These 
indicators are premised on the liberal conception of democracy. On account of their 
narrow analytical boundaries, these analyses failed to focus on the organisational 
dimension of participation that is so crucial for consensus building about rational 
economic policies. In this study, we can tentatively conclude that organised interests’ 
participation in economic policy-making is not necessarily development-enhancing: it 
does not necessarily lead to egalitarianism nor does it appear to have co-existed with 
egalitarianism in the past. The results also seem to contradict much of what is known 
from the corporatism literature, even if they use various indirect indicators and have 
mainly been applied to developed countries (which are outside the frame of this 
study). 
However, it needs to be noted that one possible reason for the lack of 
association between synergy and equity is that CSOs, except labour, are excluded 
from economic policy-making in the countries sampled.  Had they been included, 
perhaps the results may have been different.  
With the above qualifications in mind, the graph shows the following groups 
of countries, namely: those that are (a) highly synergistic with egalitarianism – Korea, 
Singapore and Thailand, (b) lowly synergistic with equity – India and Pakistan, (c) 
completely without synergy with low inequality  - Egypt, (d) lowly synergistic with 
high inequality – Brazil, Chile, Nigeria, Mexico and Malaysia (they are all 
congregated above the trend line), and (e) completely without synergy with high 
inequality – Kenya.  However, little meaning should be read into the placement of 
countries, given the weak correlation between synergy and inequality. 
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8.3:  Synergy and E-Growth 
 
This section is divided into two parts. Part one presents the results of the 
model and analyses. However, unlike in the two preceding sections based on simple 
regression, the modelling in this part will be based on a logit model. The second part 
deals with the descriptive and narrative analyses.   
 
8.3.1 Modelling E-Growth on Synergy 
 
 
Although not significant, there is a weak correlation between synergy and E-
Growth. The Pearson correlation coefficient between these variables is 0.346, with a 
p-value of 0.271. This weak correlation between these variables is primarily because 
of the weak association between synergy and inequality (as described in the preceding 
section).  
 
 
The synergy variable is now used as a continuous explanatory variable in 
modelling the probability of a country’s E-Growth category. The logit equations for 
the model are: 
1
1 1
4
2
2 2
4
3
3 3
4
log Synergy,
log Synergy,
log Synergy.
e
e
e
pi
α β
pi
pi
α β
pi
pi
α β
pi
 
= + × 
 
 
= + × 
 
 
= + × 
 
 
The results of the analyses indicate clearly that synergy is not a significant 
predictor of E-Growth – the p-value to test significance is 0.674, which is very large. 
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Table 8.1: Parameter Estimates (Synergy) 
E-Growth B 
Standard 
Error P-Value 
Lower 95% 
Confidence 
Bound 
Upper  
95% 
Confidence 
Bound 
Intercept 1.347 1.573 0.392 
  
0.25 
 Synergy -4.338 3.871 1.256 6.626E-06 25.728 
Intercept 0.047 1.911 0.981 
  
0.50 
 Synergy -2.414 4.447 0.589 1.410E-05 567.798 
Intercept -1.109 2.610 0.180 
  
0.75 
Synergy -1.189 5.811 0.042 3.443E-06 26914.075 
 
As shown in Table 8.1, the p-values for E-Growth categories 0.25 and 0.50 are 
high (greater than 0.1) indicating that they are not well predicted by synergy. This 
result is also seen clearly in the classification table below – Table 8.2; the model 
correctly predicts 80% of E-Growth category 1.00 but does very poorly with all the 
others. The parameter estimates had relatively high standard errors, possibly as a 
result of the small sample size. Caution should therefore be taken in attempting to 
generalize from these results. 
 
 
Table 8.2:  Classification, Model vs. Observed (Synergy) 
 0.25  
Predicted 
0.50 
Predicted 
0.75 
Predicted 
1.00 
Predicted 
Percentage 
Correct 
0.25       Observed             1 0 0 3 25% 
0.50       Observed 0 0 0 2 0% 
0.75       Observed 0 0 0 1 0% 
1.00       Observed 1 0 0 4 80% 
Overall Percentage 16.7% 0% 0% 83.3%  
 
 
It is also evident from the pseudo R2 values in Table 8.3 that very little of the 
variation in E-Growth is explained by the inclusion of synergy as a predictor variable. 
As a result, I do not see any utility in proceeding further with interpretations of the 
model.  Still, some utility may be gained by looking at the particular nature of the 
relation in a handful of cases.  
 
Table 8.3: Pseudo R2 (Synergy) 
Cox and Snell 0.120 
Nagelkerke 0.131 
McFadden 0.052 
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8.3.2: Descriptive and Narrative Analysis 
 
The sample countries shown in Table 8.4 can be divided into four groups, 
namely those with (a) high degree of synergy with E-Growth, (b) low degree of 
synergy with equity with low growth, (c) low degree of synergy with inequitable 
growth, and (d) absence and low degree of synergy with no E-Growth. Flowing from 
these, a number of observations can be made. First, all of the highly synergistic 
countries have E-Growth. Second, two countries with low degrees of synergy (Chile 
and Malaysia) have inequitable growth. Third, countries with low degrees of 
synergistic state-society relations have mixed outcomes. A majority of those countries 
have low economic growth rates and are highly inequitable, that is, there is an absence 
of E-Growth. The exceptions are Egypt and India: both have low degrees of 
synergistic state-society relations, yet managed to become highly egalitarian societies.  
Fourth, one country (Pakistan) with a low degree of synergy is equitable but with low 
growth.  
 
Table 8.4: Synergy and E-Growth 
Country Synergy 
Degrees of 
Synergy E-Growth E-Growth Categories 
Singapore 0.75 High Degrees 1.00 Equitable growth 
Korea 0.60 High Degrees  1.00 Equitable growth  
Thailand 0.54 High Degrees  1.00 Equitable growth  
India 0.31 Low Degrees 1.00 Equitable growth  
Egypt 0.00 Low Degrees  1.00 Equitable growth  
Pakistan 0.40 Low Degrees  0.75 Equity with low  growth 
Malaysia 0.40 Low Degrees  0.50 Inequitable Growth 
Chile 0.31 Low Degrees  0.50  Inequitable Growth 
Mexico 0.40 Low Degrees  0.25 High inequality with low growth 
Brazil 0.40 Low Degrees  0.25 High inequality with low growth  
Nigeria 0.31 Low Degrees  0.25 High inequality with low growth 
Kenya 0.00 Low Degrees  0.25 High inequality with low growth  
 
At this stage a narrative analysis is in order to understand the cases in the 
sample, with a focus on some of the interesting cases. But because synergy is a poor 
predictor of E-Growth, the analysis will focus only on countries that are marked by 
equitable growth, namely: Singapore, Korea and Thailand - all countries that are 
highly synergistic - India and Egypt – both countries that have low degrees of 
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synergy. That these countries have similar developmental outcome, E-Growth, points 
to the fact that synergy is not a significant predictor of this dependent variable.  
The intensive interconnectedness between the state and business in Korea and 
Thailand, and state-business-trade unions in Singapore contributed to the capacity of 
these states to distribute rents between competing interest groups. As I have noted in 
chapter 7, the state was able to balance the need for industrial upgrading and growth 
with the need to keep people in jobs and to undertake other highly-visible wealth-
sharing mechanisms that contributed to achieving the equity goals of the state, as an 
integrated developmental agenda. This included providing equal access to a range of 
programmes, including education, medicare, employment, and so on to enhance the 
human capabilities of their citizens. Visible wealth-sharing mechanisms elicited the 
support of the poor for the reforms agenda of the politico-bureaucratic elites in the 
highly synergistic states. In addition, wealth-sharing is a virtuous circle – it increases 
the income and wealth of citizens, which in turn leads to higher savings and an 
increase in domestic capital formation.  
The Egyptian case stands in stark contrast, as it does to the theoretical premise 
of this study.  An understanding of this puzzle is provided by the literature of its 
political economy. From the 1952 socialist revolution until the late 1980s - because of 
the state’s socialist orientation - Egypt underwent state-led development. With this 
approach came distrust of the business sector, resulting not only in nationalisation of 
the main sectors of the economy but also the state’s disdain for entrepreneurs (and 
vice versa), and the consequent absence of synergistic state-society relations for the 
country’s few entrepreneurs. The Arab socialism revolution virtually destroyed 
wealthy businesspeople, to the benefit of peasants and industrial workers (Harik, 
1997: 14). In addition, the Egyptian state virtually wiped out the traditional agrarian 
elites and undertook radical egalitarian reforms in the form of land redistribution. This 
reform was combined with other income-equalizing reforms (including subsidies on 
basic social services and foodstuffs) as the foundation for egalitarianism in Egypt. 
Thus, a crucial explanatory variable of the low inequality in Egypt is the strong 
redistributive thrust of social and economic policy. This redistributive policy placed 
strong emphasis on fundamentally transforming the ownership patterns in society. In 
this respect, Egypt shares some commonalities with India, Malaysia and Korea. 
Having accounted for Egypt’s and India’s low inequality status, it is pertinent 
to examine the factors that have been responsible for Egypt’s impressive growth rate, 
  189 
as observed in this study. Any inquiry has to account for the sources of Egypt’s 
economic growth. With the introduction of the Infitah policy (the open door policy) in 
the mid-1970s, the government began to gradually liberalise the economy in order to 
integrate it into the global one. This signalled the end of import-substitution 
industrialisation that had been the hallmark of earlier Egyptian economic policy; and 
the beginning of a new phase of export-led growth, in which the state acted, according 
to Waterbury (1983: 8 cited in Abdelazim, 2002), “as catalyst to and partner in 
alliance with foreign private capital and technology, and on occasion, with the 
Egyptian private sector”.  
As part of the economic reforms, the government offered a range of incentives 
to foreign investors including tax holidays, export processing zones, lower tariffs on 
imported goods, etc. Contemporaneously, obstacles to the growth of domestic capital 
were removed. They were subsequently offered incentives that encouraged their 
expansion.  All in all, the real source of Egypt’s economic growth “was related to the 
external sector, which included oil revenue, Suez Canal, duties, tourism, and 
remittance of Egyptian workers abroad” (Mohieldin and Nasir 1996: 34 – 36 cited in 
Abdelazim, 2002: 38).  
One basic conclusion from the analysis of the Egyptian case study is that E-
Growth can be achieved in the absence of synergy through the destruction of 
traditional elite power, the massive redistribution of land, as well as welfare 
provisions to the lower classes. Growth can also be achieved in the context of natural 
resources such as oil, even in the absence of synergy.59 Thus contrary to the 
theoretical premise of this study, E-Growth can be achieved under conditions of low 
degrees of synergistic state-society relations. This is what is evidenced in the Egyptian 
and Indian cases.  Campos and Root (1996) and You (1999) have emphasized the 
centrality of the social structural context in accounting for the egalitarian nature of the 
East Asian NICs. In this regard, the initial agricultural landholdings were regarded as 
an obvious candidate. For our purposes, the radical land reforms in the 1950s explain 
Egypt’s current egalitarian status in the early twenty-first century. 
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 We cannot generalise too much on this point because oil- rich countries like Nigeria continue to be 
marked by low rates of economic growth. 
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Like Egypt, Indian public policy since independence was geared to promoting 
equity. This policy thrust owes, in part, to the commitment of the Congress Party (CP) 
to socialism as espoused by the two immediate post-independent leaders, Gandhi and 
Nehru. Central to this ideology was a commitment to the poor.60 According to one of 
the leading experts of Indian political economy and the winner of Nobel Prize for 
Economic in 1998, Amartya Sen, and his co-author, Jean Dreze:  
 
In so far as anything has been done to reduce economic inequalities in India, the 
chosen measures have often consisted of interfering with market transactions that are 
perceived to generate these inequalities, Examples of such measures include legal 
controls on sharecropping and moneylending, minimum-wage provisions, restrictions 
on the scale of private enterprise, rent-control laws, and prohibitions on land sales by 
tribal people (Dreze and Sen, 2001: 93). 
 
But the measure that had the most profound effect on income distribution was 
land reforms, which granted millions of people access to productive economic 
activities and sources of improved livelihood. For example, in two of its states, West 
Bengal and Kerala, land reforms “succeeded in guaranteeing minimum land 
entitlements to millions of people, and their benefits in terms of increased economic 
security, greater self-empowerment, and improved bargaining power are far from 
negligible” (Dreze and Sen, 2001: 95). 
The success of the land reforms programme in India has been underestimated 
by the dominant literature on its political economy. As shown in this study, India 
enjoys an impressive equitable status, precisely because the agrarian reforms have 
fundamentally transformed the ownership patterns in Indian society. By so doing, 
India has placed more wealth in the hands of the peasantry and thereby narrowed the 
income gap between the rich and the poor. In addition, the successful implementation 
of programmes to prevent famine “which has also involved a well-devised system of 
public intervention to protect the entitlements of the vulnerable groups, chiefly based 
on large-scale employment” (Dreze and Sen, 2001: 100), has contributed to the 
greater equity reported in this study. 
In summary, the low levels of inequality that we find in both Egypt and India 
can be explained by factors other than high degrees of state-society synergy. These 
countries have achieved high equity because of a political leadership that was 
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 Scholars such as Atul Kohli (2004) have argued that this commitment to socialism and the poor was 
more rhetorical than real. As a consequence, they have tended to underestimate India’s economic 
performance.  
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committed to transforming ownership patterns. In both countries land reforms and 
programmes to enhance human capabilities have been central elements in achieving 
egalitarianism. As I pointed out in chapter 7, non-institutional factors, remittances of 
migrants to the Gulf countries, amongst others, have also been contributory factors to 
Pakistan’s high egalitarianism.  
With respect to state-society synergy in India, the findings in this study are 
supported by several case studies (Evans, 1995; Herring, 1999; and Kohli, 2004). 
Most of these work point to the fragmented nature of societal actors; the hostility of 
the state towards capital and vice versa; particularistic relations between individuals in 
the non-state sectors and the bureaucratic elites; and the absence of shared projects 
between the state and interest groups. The hostile relationship between the Indian state 
elite and capital preceded the 1970s. As Vivek Chibber  (2003) has argued, “Indian 
capitalists in the years immediately after independence refused to countenance a state 
with wide–ranging regulatory and interventionist powers, and organised effectively 
against it” (p. 5).  In the context of a state that wanted to play a more prominent role 
in the economy and a business sector that believed in a minimalist role for the state, 
together, these factors made it difficult for the Indian state to establish a high degree 
of synergistic relations with societal actors.  Therefore, in the absence of shared 
projects, the type of relationship “that might have allowed state managers to provide 
information dissemination, consensus building, tutelage, and cajoling to potential 
entrepreneurs seems almost entirely absent from the Indian scene” (Evans, 1995: 69). 
As a consequence, according to Evans, “[u]nlike in the developmental states, the 
Indian state cannot count on the private sector either as a source of information about 
what kind of industrial policy will “fly” or as an effective instrument for the 
implementation of industrial policy” (p.69). Without a cohesive “policy network”, the 
Indian state was deprived of vital mechanisms for societal actors to provide 
meaningful inputs and share information that could enhance economic policy. The 
argument goes further that in the absence of a shared project, it was difficult for state 
officials to provide signals that business persons have to respond to, on whether or not 
they have to invest. Consequently, the state could not achieve optimal results in its 
developmental efforts.  
The above analysis, like much of the case study literature, tends to place India 
in a different development column, that is, that is has poor economic records. 
Therefore, this study offers a revisionist interpretation of India’s economic 
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performance. On our combined E-Growth variable, India’s performance is impressive. 
What is remarkably from the perspective of this dissertation is that the Indian state 
was able to achieve its E-Growth goals because of its highly autonomous nature, in 
spite of its low degree of synergy (pointing to the fact that synergy is not a significant 
predictor of E-Growth). As I have pointed out above, the state was committed to 
changing the ownership patterns. It consequently intervened in the economy to 
achieve its goals. 
 
8. 4: Conclusion 
 
In concluding this chapter, a number of observations are in order. First, state-
society synergy has a greater impact on economic growth than it does on inequality. 
In fact, synergy is a poor predictor of E-Growth, compared to the strong influence of 
autonomy on E-Growth.   
Second, and as evidenced from the narrative analysis, initial income 
redistributions, especially those that aim to fundamentally transform the ownership 
structures and patterns in a society (such as land reforms) play an important role in 
explaining a country’s equity status. This is precisely the case in Egypt and India. 
Therefore, contrary to a priori expectations, some sample countries with low degrees 
of synergy still managed to achieve E-Growth.  Non-institutional factors have 
accounted for the egalitarianism in countries like Egypt, India and Pakistan.   
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Chapter Nine 
 
Synergistic Autonomy and Equitable Growth 
 
9. 0: Introduction 
 
The preceding two chapters, 7 and 8, provide important background to this 
chapter. This chapter is the last empirical chapter and it focuses on the relationship 
between the combined independent variable, synergistic autonomy (Auto-Synergy), 
and the dependent variables. It relies primarily on bivariate analysis to identify 
outliers as well as establish the relationship between the independent and dependent 
variables. Indeed, this chapter should have ended with multivariate regressions, but 
we could not employ a multivariate analysis because of the small number of cases and 
because of a colinearity problem between the autonomy and synergy variables.  
As in the previous two chapters, the median will be used to demarcate between 
low and high degrees of Auto-Synergy. The median for the twelve developing 
countries is 0.49. Consequently, scores from 0 - 0.49 represent low degrees of Auto-
Synergy and scores from 0.50 – 1 represent high degrees of Auto-Synergy.  
 
9.1:  Synergistic Autonomy and Growth 
 
This section is divided into two parts. In the first part, the results of the model 
and analyses are presented. The second part deals with a narrative analysis of the 
results.  
 
9. 1. 1: Modelling Growth on Synergistic Autonomy 
 
To begin with, there is a strong and significant correlation between synergistic 
autonomy (Auto-Synergy) and economic growth with a Pearson correlation 
coefficient of 0.646. This is significant at the 0.05 level with a p-value of 0.023.  A 
graphic illustration of this relationship is provided in Figure 9.1 which shows the 
relationship between the scores on the autonomy scale and economic growth.  
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Also, the relationship is vividly captured by a simple linear regression. Based 
on our theoretical specification, the following regression equation is derived: 
 
% change in economic growth = α + ßAuto-
Synergy
 
+ εt 
 
  From the estimated regression, the following equation is obtained: 
 
% change in economic growth = 1.268   + 6.714 (Auto-Synergy) 
  (.999)      (2.674) 
        R2  = 0.417 
The estimated t-ratios are in parentheses. The results show that Auto-Synergy 
is significant in explaining change in economic growth, with a t-ratio of 2.674 and the 
coefficient is significant at the 0.05 level. The R2   value is 0.417, which is a good fit. 
This means that the model explains almost 42% of the variations in the sample data.  
Put differently, it means that almost 42% of the variations in economic growth is 
explained by variations in Auto-Synergy.  
 
9. 1. 2: Descriptive and Narrative Analysis 
       
It is important to aggregate the countries in Figure 9.1 into subgroups. 
Basically, the following four subgroups of countries emerged, namely those with (a) 
high degrees of Auto-Synergy with high economic growth – Korea, Thailand, 
Malaysia, India and Singapore, (b) high degree of Auto-Synergy with low growth – 
Pakistan, (c) low degrees of Auto-Synergy with high economic growth – Chile and 
Egypt, and (d) low degrees of Auto-Synergy with low economic growth – Mexico, 
Nigeria, Brazil and Kenya.  
 
 
 
 
 
  195 
0.10 0.20 0.30 0.40 0.50 0.60 0.70 0.80
Auto-Synergy
1.0
2.0
3.0
4.0
5.0
6.0
7.0
%
 
Ch
a
n
ge
 
in
 
G
DP
Singapore
Korea
India
Egypt Thailand
Pakistan
Malaysia
Chile
Mexico
Brazil
Nigeria
Kenya
Figure 9.1: Auto-Synergy and Growth
R Sq Linear = 
0.417
 
The analysis in this section will focus on highly synergistic autonomous 
countries, namely India, Korea, Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand in order to show 
the relationship between this institutional attribute and high economic growth. These 
will be contrasted with countries with low degrees of synergy with low growth rates, 
especially Nigeria and Kenya. The analysis will proceed to look at one interesting 
cases, Chile, with low degree of Auto-Synergy and yet recorded one of the highest 
rates of economic growth in the sample. In turn, this will be contrasted with Pakistan 
which though has autonomous state institutions recorded low economic growth rate.  
A striking feature of countries like South Korea and Singapore, and to a 
certain degree, Thailand, is their high degree of bureaucratic coherence and policy co-
ordination. The economic success of these countries is due, in part, to a number of 
institutional factors that have been alluded to in the case study literature. These 
include meritocratic recruitment and performance-based promotion and technocratic 
excellence in pilot agencies, namely the EPB in Korea and the EDB in Singapore. 
These institutions were central to the developmental success of these countries. 
Indeed, they provided the focal point – an overall vision of development – in these 
countries, co-ordinated  investment decisions, technological adaptation, entrance into 
new markets, tax relief for investors,  and so on (Evans, 1999).  A central factor here 
was the aggregation of highly competent and insulated economic bureaucrats in these 
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lead agencies that enhanced the transformative capacities of these states. As a result, 
they were able to socialize risks and costs of investments. By so doing, they created a 
conducive climate for both domestic and foreign investors. 
The relationship between the Singapore EDB and government offer a useful 
example of the importance and role of the super ministries in achieving economic 
success. In 1988, the EDB established an “International Direct Investments (IDI) 
programme to help local firms expand overseas and eventually become multinationals 
themselves” (Lim and Fong, 1991: 54). The Singaporean government did not stop 
there. It provided free consultancy services on overseas investments to local 
companies if there were positive spin-offs for the economy as a whole. Among these 
were “feasibility grants for the hiring of consultants needed to evaluate overseas 
investment opportunities” (p. 54). 
As a sign of the importance attached to the super ministries, the EPB in Korea 
was headed by the deputy Prime Minister and it vetted policies from line ministries.  
As a classical commentary on the Korean experience, notes: 
 
After taking power in a military coup in 1961, President Park Chung-Hee established 
the Economic Planning Board, headed by the deputy Prime Minister to co-ordinate 
the policies of the different economic ministries. From the early 1960s to the late 
1980s, the government designed and implemented five year development plans to 
maximise growth…Economic management was largely the responsibility of elite 
bureaucrats and technocratic ministers…Korean bureaucrats were generally capable, 
well educated and selected on merits… (Australian Government, Department of 
Foreign Affairs and Trade, 1999: 20).  
 
This suggests that the economic bureaucracy had considerable leeway in 
economic management. In both Malaysia and Thailand, we find similarly high 
degrees of Weberianness, although their pilot agencies (the EPU and NESDEB in 
Malaysia and Thailand, respectively) played a lesser role compared to similar 
institutions in Korea and Singapore. One plausible explanation for this (as noted in 
chapter 7) was that in the former set of countries the political elite were very much 
active in the policy domain. This does not mean that the role of the EPU and 
NESDEB should be underestimated. Indeed, the latter was very powerful in the 1980 
– 1988 period to the extent that it vetted investment and policy decisions of line 
ministries (Christensen, 1992). During this period, it was an important agency in 
developing the policy agenda and monitoring the implementation of economic 
policies. An added strength of these lead economic ministries was an array of research 
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institutions that was intimately linked to them as part of the policy-making process. 
These research institutions, such as the Korean Institute for Trade and Energy (KIST), 
enabled the state to gain up-to-date knowledge of “products demand, quality standards 
and foreign markets trends” (Weiss, 1998: 51). Generally, what is clear is that the 
Research Institutions attached/affiliated to the lead economic ministries enhanced the 
capacity of the state “to monitor the new technologies, products and production 
processes of international competitors, organises technology transfers, and coordinate 
new projects in alliance with local firms as well as foreign firms (Weiss, 1998:52, 
emphasis mine). This case study narrative is reflected in the empirical findings of this 
study, with South Korea being the most autonomous state, followed by India, 
Singapore, Thailand and Malaysia/Pakistan.61   As noted in chapter 7, autonomous 
state institutions in these countries minimises corruption, which would have been a 
drag on growth. The minimal level of corruption provided a conducive climate for 
investment and growth. Furthermore, the provisions of basic services such as 
education, healthcare and housing – all of which enhanced human capabilities in these 
countries - had growth imperatives. They were indirect subsidies for industries. In 
Singapore for example, the redistribution of resources through housing, education and 
health subsidies (forming a social security net) were forms of subsidies for industrial 
wages. In fact, these subsidies represented a considerable amount of working-class 
household costs. In general, these contributed to a reduction of investment costs that 
consequently resulted in high investment and economic growth.  
In Korea, Singapore and Thailand, these internal state organisational attributes 
were complemented by institutionalised deliberative councils or CMs, made up 
especially of representatives of government and organised business (although in 
Singapore and Malaysia it also included trade unions – as a junior partner). These 
became the basis of intense linkages between the state and societal actors. This much 
is supported by the case studies’ literature. The Joint Public Private Consultative 
Committee (JPPCC) in Thailand is an example of the predominant form of 
consultative mechanisms in these countries. The JPPCC was established in 1981 as an 
attempt to institutionalize dialogue between the top leadership of government and 
organised business (Laothamatas, 1988, 1992). As a sign of the importance that the 
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 In chapter 7, I alluded to some of the factors that accounted for Pakistan’s low economic growth rate, 
especially political instability and uncertainty. 
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government attached to institutionalisation of organised interests’ participation in 
economic policy-making, its representation at the JPPCC comprised of the Prime 
Minister and all ministers in charge of economic affairs. The same is true of the other 
highly synergistic countries in the sample, Korea and Singapore. 
These types of CMs, highly synergistic state-society relations, were influential 
in the determination of policy to transform the economy and integrate them into the 
global markets. For example, in a survey of 50 trade associations in Bangkok, 
Laothamatas reports that "over 90% of them rate government responsiveness to their 
problems either moderate or high, but most of these are in the moderate column" 
(Laothamatas, 1988: 461). He even attributed Thailand’s successful shift to export-
oriented industrialisation (EOI) in the 1980s to the participation of business 
associations in the national JPPCC. Also in Korea, there was similar pattern of intense 
connection between the state and organised business. As an example, all exporters 
were required to be members of the Korean Traders’ Association, which assisted the 
government to set goals and targets for various items and to promote the marketing of 
Korean products abroad. In the same vein, organised business in Singapore was 
represented in the Trade Development Board, which was responsible for the 
formation and implementation of export policies. This was an essential element in 
Singapore’s ability to penetrate new markets, a crucial factor for Singapore’s 
economic competitiveness. These examples are illustrations of the intensity of state-
business relations in our highly synergistic countries and their positive effects on 
economic growth. The institutional interconnectedness of governments and businesses 
also had another major advantage: it helped to reduce rent-seeking behaviour by the 
private sector and enhanced the accountability of the economic bureaucrats to citizens 
in the highly autonomous countries. Furthermore, they contributed to ensuring that 
public resources were geared and utilised towards ensuring optimal and productive 
economic outcomes. It can therefore be argued that the economic success stories of 
these countries can hardly be told without these institutional characteristics occupying 
a prime place in such narrative.   
A salient point that also has to be noted is that, in most of the countries with 
high degrees of synergistic state-society relations, government played a crucial role in 
strengthening business associations, where they already existed and were weak. 
Where such institutions did not exist, government helped to organised business.  This 
is a pattern observed in Korea, Singapore and Thailand. This contrasted sharply with 
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the Brazilian example (discussed in chapter 8) where the state did not provide 
incentives for the emergence of economy-wide encompassing business associations.  
Another interesting case is Malaysia, which can be understood by taking a 
closer look at its organisational structures, both the institutions of the state and state-
society relations.  It has a high degree of Auto-Synergy and phenomenal economic 
growth. A closer look at the two independent variables that constitute the Auto-
Synergy scale reveals why this is so: it combined high degree of autonomy (0.60) with 
a relatively low degree of synergy (0.40), making it to be classified as high synergistic 
autonomous country (0.50 score). This can explain why it does not score as high on 
the Auto-Synergy score as we might expect.  Still, as graphically captured in Figure 
9.1, Malaysia was still able to achieve one of the highest rates of economic growth in 
the sample.  
The Malaysian level of state autonomy and degree of synergy is best 
understood by taking a look at its political economic history. Like India and to a 
certain degree Pakistan, Malaysia inherited a high quality bureaucratic apparatus from 
the British that enabled the state to intervene in the economy. Recruitment and 
promotion in the bureaucracy were examination-based (although within the confines 
of the New Economic Policy’s objectives of giving preferential treatment to the 
Bumis) and hence met the Weberian model of bureaucracy. In other words, attributes 
of Weberian bureaucracy were refined to suit the Malaysian situation. However, this 
preferencing of a specific ethnic class appears to challenge our conception of 
Weberianness, and requires further elaboration.   
Compared to its neighbours, Korea and Singapore, the Malaysian state was 
much more fragmented with multiple planning agencies.  The most important of these 
agencies was the Economic Planning Unit (EPU), an arm of the Prime Minister’s 
office.  As Jesudason (1989) observed, the EPU62 acted as the custodian of NEP goals 
and played a leading role in the selection of projects. At the initial stages of the NEP, 
the early 1970s, the political elite set the broad policy direction and left the 
technocrats to deal with detailed planning and implementation.  But with the increased 
concentration of power in the hands of top political executives, coupled with the 
emergence of powerful political leaders like Mahathir Mohamad as Prime Minister in 
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 It is interesting to note that most of the literature on the Malaysian political economy is silent on the 
role of the EPU.  Even Jesudason did not discuss its role in detail. This is an area that is worthy of 
further research. 
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1981 (like Pakistan under Prime Minister Z. A Bhutto), agencies like the EPU lost 
some of their authority (Gomez and Jomo, 1999).  In spite of this, the political and 
bureaucratic elites were able to achieve a workable degree of technocratic expertise 
that enhanced state capacity. 
Malaysia’s relatively high score on the Auto-Synergy scale comes as 
somewhat of a surprise, as the case study literature tends to suggest that there was 
lack of synergistic state-society relations in Malaysia. They draw attention to the 
exclusion of the Chinese business community, the dominant part of the domestic 
bourgeoisie, from the policy process as evidence of a lack of state-society synergy. In 
addition, according to Crouch (1996), the Chinese entrepreneurs were disqualified 
from playing a dominant role in politics because of their ethnic background. The 
increased role of the state also put them at the mercy of the Malay-dominated 
government that was committed to the expansion of Malay participation in business.  
The state-Chinese business relationship was anything but cordial.63  This and similar 
other criticisms might have missed the point. A major plank of the NEP was the 
creation of a Bumi business class.  To achieve this goal, the state entered into 
alliances with foreign capital rather than the local Chinese business class, as well as 
facilitated Bumi-foreign capital alliances. 
Because the state did not see the Chinese business community as a crucial 
partner in the realisation of its objective, Chinese business associations were excluded 
from the economic policy-making process. In other words, the absence of a joint 
project with the Chinese business elite forced the Malaysian state, like its East Asian 
neighbors, to create and nurture a social group, a Bumi business class, with which it 
shared a joint project of transformation.  Still, subject to various interpretations, the 
state achieved its goal.64  The state and the Bumi business class had institutionalised 
relationships based on a common agenda – joint project – of restructuring state and 
society in favour of the Bumi community and eradicating poverty, the two central 
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 See Jesudason (1989) and Pek Koon (1997) for detailed analysis of the acrimonious relationship that 
existed between the Bumi-dominated state and the Chinese business class. 
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 Most of the existing literature including Jesudason (1989) and Crouch (1996) questioned whether the 
Bumi business class could be seen as a class onto itself.  The thrust of their argument is that because of 
the Bumi business dependence on the state, they lacked the power to constrain the state and stressed 
that the latter dominated the former.   
 
 
  201 
objectives of NEP. Emerging Bumi entrepreneurs exercised considerable leverage 
with government as far as the promotion of the NEP goals was concerned.  Not 
surprisingly, they were avid supporters of the UMNO. In the words of Jesudason 
(1989: 65): 
 
[t]he Malay business leaders had much leverage with government officials because 
many were either at present members or in the past high UMNO officials and top 
civil servants… These business leaders enjoyed close ties with the government and as 
potentially important opinion makers, found a receptive ear among politicians and 
bureaucrats.  
 
The link between the UMNO and the Bumi business class became a 
foundation for state-informed public-private cooperation. Furthermore, through 
various measures, the state strengthened the Bumi business class and organised them 
into business associations, which they used as a platform to contribute to the policy 
process.  
This suggests that due to the ethnic heterogeneity of the Malaysian society, the 
state became selectively synergistic with the Bumi business class which it regarded as 
its partner in the tasks of restructuring the state and society. The fragmented nature of 
business association along ethnic lines, the absence of a shared transformative project 
between the state and the dominant Chinese business elite, all contributed to the 
relatively low degree of synergy that we find in this study. But as highlighted 
previously, when both independent variables are combined, Malaysia has a high 
degree of Auto-Synergy. This institutional factor in no small way enhanced the 
capacity of the state to pursue its goal of economy transformation as encapsulated in 
the NEP earlier discussed.  
But Pakistan, though sharing similar institutional attributes like Malaysia, with 
a score of 0.53 on the Auto-Synergy scale, took a different turn by recording a low 
economic growth rate. It has been shown in chapter 7 that non-institutional factors 
accounted for its low growth rate. As such, it is not worth repeating here. 
As have been shown in chapters 7 and 8, most of the countries with low 
degrees of Auto-Synergy such as Nigeria and Kenya lacked the capacity to formulate 
and implement a cohesive developmental agenda and to mobilise interest groups 
around such an agenda. It is therefore not surprising that, unlike the highly synergistic 
autonomous countries, they achieved low economic growth rates.  
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In Figure 9.1, Chile approaches outlier status and its deviance from the trend 
line can attract our attention.  Chile has a low degree (0.37) of Auto-Synergy, yet was 
able to achieve a high economic growth (6.2 percent) during the 1991 – 2001 period. 
As I have noted in chapter 7, its economic growth rate might be attributed to the neo-
liberal economic reforms promoted through the alliance between the state and 
organised business in the early 1980s (John, 2005). This propelled Chile’s economic 
recovery in the same period and hence its impressive economic growth rate. In other 
words, non-institutional factors might account for Chile’s high economic growth rate.  
This discussion points to a simple conclusion. As a general rule, countries with 
high degrees of organisational form that closely approximate the Auto-Synergy scale 
enjoy higher rates of economic growth during the period under consideration. The 
converse is the case for countries with a low degree of synergistic state autonomy.  
 
9. 2: Synergy Autonomy and Inequality 
 
Like section 9.1, this section is divided into two parts. In the first part, the 
results of the model and analyses are presented. The second part deals with narrative 
analysis of the results.  
 
9. 2. 1: Modelling Inequality on Synergistic Autonomy 
 
Though not significant, there is a weak but negative correlation between Auto-
Synergy and inequality, which implies that a high value of Auto-Synergy is 
accompanied by low inequality. The Pearson correlation coefficient is –0.293, with a 
p-value of 0.406.  
The relationship is vividly captured by a simple linear regression. Based on 
our theoretical specification, the following regression equation is derived: 
 
Inequality = a - ßAuto-Synergy 
 
+ εt 
 
 From the estimated regression, the following equation is obtained: 
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Inequality = 0.529    - 0.166 (Auto-Synergy) 
  (6.108)      (.968) 
        R2  = 0.086 
The estimated t-ratios are in parenthesis. The equation shows poor goodness of 
fit. This is revealed by the estimated R2 of 0.086. This means that the model explains 
less than nine percent of the total variations in inequality. Besides, the main 
explanatory variable, Auto-Synergy is insignificant in explaining inequality as 
exhibited by a t-ratio of -0.968.  
 
9. 2. 2: Descriptive and Narrative Analysis 
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Figure 9.2: Auto-Synergy and Inequality
R Sq Linear = 
0.086
 
The countries in Figure 9.2 can be categorized into five groups, namely those 
that are (a) highly synergistic autonomous with egalitarianism – Singapore, Korea, 
India, Pakistan and Thailand, (b) highly Auto-Synergy with inequality – Malaysia, (c) 
lowly Auto-Synergy but egalitarian – Egypt, (d) lowly Auto-Synergy with high 
inequality – Chile and Mexico, and (e) lowly Auto-Synergy with inequality – Brazil, 
Nigeria and Kenya.  With the exception of Malaysia and Pakistan, there is no country 
in the sample that is highly synergistic autonomous without E-Growth.  
Given that Auto-Synergy is insignificant in explaining E-Growth, there is no 
need to proceed with further interpretation.  
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9. 3: Synergistic Autonomy and E-Growth 
 
This section will be divided into two parts. In the first part, the results of the 
model and analyses will be presented. The second part will deal with narrative 
analysis of the results.  
 
9. 3.1: Modelling E-Growth on Synergistic Autonomy 
 
I will now proceed with the analysis of the associations between Auto-Synergy 
and E-Growth. There is a positive but modest correlation between Auto-Synergy with 
E-Growth. The Pearson correlation is 0.582, and it is significant at the 0.05 level, with 
a p-value of 0.47. 
The combination variable, Auto-Synergy, which combines autonomy and 
synergy, is now used as a predictor variable of E-Growth. We expect this model to fit 
better than the model using Synergy as a predictor variable, but it is likely that the fit 
of this model will not be as good as the model using Autonomy as a predictor based 
on the way the variable Auto-Synergy was constructed.  Recall that synergy is a poor 
predictor of E-Growth. 
 
The logit equations for the model are: 
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Table 9.1: Parameter Estimates (Auto-Synergy) 
E-Growth B 
Standard 
Error P-Value 
Lower 95% 
Confidence 
Bound 
Upper 
95% 
Confidence 
Bound 
Intercept 5.409 3.476 0.120   0.25 
 Auto-Synergy -11.914 7.193 0.98 5.048E-12 8.882 
Intercept 3.189 3.634 0.380   0.50 
 Auto-Synergy -8.092 7.238 0.264 2.113E-10 443.468 
Intercept -0.060 4.650 0.000   0.75 
 Auto-Synergy -2.796 8.385 0.111 4.454E-09 836996.637 
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The parameter estimates for Auto-Synergy are given above. From the 
classification table below (Table 9.2), we see that this model did well in predicting E-
Growth categories 0.25 and 1.00; but failed to predict E-Growth categories 0.50 and 
0.75 correctly. 
 
Table 9.2:  Classification, Model vs. Observed (Auto-Synergy) 
 0.25  
Predicted 
0.50 
Predicted 
0.75 
Predicted 
1.00 
Predicted 
Percentage 
Correct 
0.25       Observed             3 0 0 1 75% 
0.50       Observed 1 0 0 1 0% 
0.75       Observed 0 0 0 1 0% 
1.00       Observed 1 0 0 4 80% 
Overall Percentage 41.7% 0% 0% 58.3%  
 
The model fitting table indicates the weak significance of Auto-Synergy as a 
predictor variable, but since this p-value, 0.181, is still fairly low, the model is 
examined further. All the pseudo R2 values are low as seen in Table 9.3, indicating 
that around 16 - 37% of the variation of E-Growth is explained by the predictor Auto-
Synergy.  
 
Table 9.3: Pseudo R2 (Auto-Synergy) 
Cox and Snell 0.334 
Nagelkerke 0.365 
McFadden 0.164 
 
The estimated fitted model may thus be written as 
 
1
4
2
4
3
4
log 5.409 11.914 Auto-Synergy,
log 3.189 8.092 Auto-Synergy,
log 0.060 2.796 Auto-Synergy.
e
e
e
pi
pi
pi
pi
pi
pi
 
= − × 
 
 
= − × 
 
 
= − − × 
 
 
 
Interpretation of this model will be done in a similar manner to the model 
using Autonomy as a predictor. Comparing E-Growth categories 1 and 2 we use the 
estimated logit equation 
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2
1
log (3.189 5.409) ( 8.092 ( 11.914)) Auto-Synergy
2.220 3.822 Auto-Synergy.
e
pi
pi
 
= − + − − − × 
 
= − + ×
 
 Assuming that a country has an E-Growth category of 1 or 2, the odds of the 
country being of category 2 rather than category 1 with value of Auto-Synergy 
(r+0.1) is 2.220*(0.1) 0.80e− =  times the odds for countries with Auto-Synergy r. This 
means that when a country’s Auto-Synergy is increased by 0.1, it becomes 
approximately 20% less likely (on the odds scale) that the country will be classified 
into E-Growth category 2 rather than category 1. 
 
Comparing categories 2 and 3, we use the estimated logit equation  
    
3
2
log ( 0.060 3.189) ( 2.796 ( 8.092)) Auto-Synergy
3.129 5.296 Auto-Synergy.
e
pi
pi
 
= − − + − − − × 
 
= − + ×
 
Given that a country has an E-Growth category of 2 or 3, the odds of the 
country being of category 3 rather than category 2 with value of Auto-Synergy 
(r+0.1) is 5.296*(0.1) 1.70e =  times the odds for countries with Auto-Synergy r. Thus, 
when a country’s Auto-Synergy is increased by 0.1, it becomes approximately 1.7 
times more likely (on the odds scale) that the country will be classified into E-Growth 
category 3 rather than category 2. 
Given that a country has an E-Growth category of 3 or 4, the odds of the 
country being of category 4 rather than category 3 with value of Auto-Synergy 
(r+0.1) is (0 ( 2.796))*(0.1) 3.75e − − =  times the odds for countries with Auto-Synergy r 
using the same method as was used above.  
These relationships may be seen from the scatter plot of estimated 
probabilities for each E-Growth category. 
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Figure 9.3: Scatter Plot of Fitted Probability of E-Growth on Auto-Synergy 
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The scatter plot of fitted probabilities versus Auto-Synergy is noticeably quite 
similar to the scatter plot of fitted probabilities versus autonomy. This is most likely 
the influence of autonomy in the variable Auto-Synergy. It is once again clear that E-
Growth categories 1 and 4 are the most likely categories for a country with low and 
high Auto-Synergy respectively. Also, for values of Auto-Synergy around 0.4 - 0.5, 
the distinction between the E-Growth categories is not so marked. Thus, as with 
autonomy, it seems that extreme values of Auto-Synergy separate the E-Growth 
categories. This is consistent with a priori expectations. The model does poorly at 
predicting likelihood of being in E-Growth categories 2 and 3, as evidenced by the 
failure to observe a likelihood of being in either of these categories greater than 0.30. 
Looking at the classification table for this model, there exists an overall 58.3% 
successful prediction rate – the same as the model with autonomy as a predictor. 
However, it is clear that this model does not explain nearly as much variation as the 
model using autonomy as a predictor, and so the latter model would be preferable. 
This is to be expected, as the model using autonomy as a predictor was significant, but 
the model using synergy as a predictor was not significant; and so a variable 
combining autonomy and synergy in the variable Auto-Synergy would most likely not 
be as good a predictor of E-Growth as the variable autonomy. 
We infer from the above that the combination of autonomous state institutions 
and synergistic state-society relations has a lower impact on E-Growth than autonomy 
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alone on E-Growth. Put differently, autonomy on its own has a more powerful and 
significant impact on E-Growth than when it is combined with synergistic relations. 
This observation is due to the fact that synergy is not a good predictor of E-Growth. 
Taken to its logical conclusion, countries might as well try to increase their degree of 
autonomy to achieve almost the same rate of E-Growth than to expand the degrees of 
both autonomous state institutions and synergistic state-society relations, at least at 
the same time.  
 
9. 3 .2:  Descriptive and Narrative Analyses 
 
At this juncture, it is pertinent to proceed with a narrative analysis to shed light 
on the cases.  
It is important to note that countries in Table 9.4 can be classified into the 
following six categories, namely those with (a) highly synergistic autonomous and 
equitable growth (E-Growth) - Singapore, Korea, India, and Thailand; (b) high degree 
of Auto-Synergy with equity but low growth – Pakistan; (c) high degree of Auto-
Synergy with inequitable growth -  Malaysia; (d) low degrees of Auto-Synergy with 
equitable growth – Egypt; (e) low degrees of Auto-Synergy with inequitable growth – 
Chile and Mexico; and (f) low degrees of Auto-Synergy with low growth and high 
inequality – Brazil, Nigeria and Kenya. 
 
Table 9.4: Auto-Synergy and E-Growth Scale  
Country Auto-Synergy Degrees E-Growth 
Category 
E-Growth status 
Singapore .76 High Degree 4 E-Growth 
Korea .70 High Degree 4 E-Growth 
Thailand .62 High Degree 4 E-Growth 
India .54 High Degree 4 E-Growth 
Pakistan .53 High Degree 3 Equity with low 
growth 
Malaysia .50 High Degree 2 Inequitable growth 
Egypt .27 Low Degrees 4 E-Growth 
Mexico .49 Low Degrees 2 Inequitable growth 
Chile .37 Low Degrees 2 Inequitable growth 
Brazil .42 Low Degrees 1 Low growth and high 
inequalities 
Nigeria .38 Low Degrees 1 Low growth and high 
inequalities 
Kenya .17 Low Degrees 1 Low growth and High 
Inequality 
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It can be observed in Table 9.4 that a majority of countries in our sample with 
institutional infrastructure that most closely approximates Auto-Synergy have 
achieved E-Growth. This holds true for the population in the study. Singapore is 
exemplary in this regard. Similarly, in conformity with a priori expectations, South 
Korea’s combination of a very high degree of autonomy (score of 0.80) and a high 
level of synergy (with 0.60 score in synergy scale respective) also achieved E-Growth. 
Overall, in the Auto-Synergy scale, it ranked second (with 0.70 score).  Thailand also 
combines a high degree of state autonomy (scoring 0.70 in the autonomy scale) with 
high degree of synergy (with 0.54 score in the synergy scale) and achieved E-Growth. 
It has a very high degree of meritocracy (with 0.83 score – second most meritocratic 
country in the sample) and high degree of career pathing (score of 0.78 – the highest 
in the sample). Thailand combined these features with moderate degree of policy co-
ordination (with a score of 0.50 in the super ministry scale) and it achieved equitable 
economic growth. Its growth rate was 4.4 percent and a Gini index of 0.43. Overall, it 
has an Auto-Synergy score of 0.62.   
In light of the above, we can conclude that a majority of countries in the 
sample with high degrees of Auto-Synergy achieved E-Growth during the 1991 – 
2001 period. The exceptions are Malaysia and Pakistan (with inequitable growth and 
equity with low growth, respectively). In chapter 7, we alluded to some of the factors 
(institutional and non-institutional) that account for Malaysia’s inequitable growth 
status and Pakistan’s low growth with equitable status.  The experiences of both 
Malaysia, India and Pakistan point to the fact that when high degree of autonomy is 
combined with low degree of synergy, the development outcome is unpredictable – 
the outcome can be inequitable growth (Malaysia),  equity with low growth (Pakistan) 
or equitable growth (India). The following analysis will suggest that when high degree 
of autonomy is combined with high degree of synergy, equitable growth is the most 
likely outcome.   
After years of denial and maligning of the role of the state in development, 
even the World Bank (1997) has come to accept the conclusion that state autonomy 
and state-society synergy are crucial explanatory variables for the economic success 
story of the Asian NICs. In its U-turn, the Bank commented on state-society relations 
and economic performance as follows:  
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In successful countries, policymaking has been embedded in consultative processes, 
which provide civil society, labour unions, and private firms opportunities for input 
and oversight. In East Asia public-private deliberation councils – such as Korea’s 
monthly export promotion meetings, Thailand’s National Joint Public Private 
Consultative Committee, and Malaysian Business Council – have provided 
mechanisms for feedback, information sharing, and co-ordination (World Bank, 
1997: 11).  
 
In its awakening, however, the Bank failed to dissect and disaggregate the 
degrees of state-society synergy in the respective countries, partly because of the lack 
of comparable data. This said, the rebirth of institutional analysis was, in part, due to 
the spectacular economic performances of countries such as Korea and Singapore. 
Institutional factors were also said to have accounted for the economic performance of 
Malaysia, Thailand and India. In other words, the phenomenal economic 
performances of these countries have been attributed to the organisational autonomy 
of the states. As I have pointed out in chapter 7, there is a general consensus in the 
case studies’ narratives that these countries had meritocratic recruitment and 
competence-driven promotions for the bureaucratic elites. Although there are some 
minor variations, they also enjoyed greater policy co-ordination, the result of a 
concentration of economic policy management in key lead agencies – super ministries 
(e.g. the EPB in Korea, the EDB in Singapore, the EPU in Malaysia and the NESDEB 
in Thailand). It should be observed that the EPU and NESDEB were not as dominant 
as the EPB in Korea and the EDB in Singapore. This was because the political elite in 
Malaysia, Pakistan and Thailand played a more active role in policy-making than their 
counterparts in Korea and Singapore. In addition, compared to Korea and Singapore, 
policy co-ordination was also much more fragmented in Malaysia and Thailand 
because a number of agencies coordinated economic policies. In spite of this, there 
was greater policy coordination in all the four countries. This coordination enhanced 
the bureaucratic competence of the economic bureaucracy and insulated it from 
particularistic interests.  
At the same time, their degrees of autonomy enabled the Korean, Singaporean 
and the Thai states to penetrate society in a cohesive fashion and regulate the 
parameters governing relations with organised interests. As remarked earlier, the 
relationship of the economic bureaucracy with societal actors was at an interpersonal 
level and was driven in a programmatic fashion, by organisational goals. The result is 
that it enhanced the capacity of the state in Korea, Singapore and Thailand to 
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selectively intervene in the economy in a way that contributed to optimal economic 
outcomes, which for the purpose of this study is E-Growth. 
In addition, as discussed in chapter 8, these countries established intensive and 
extensive connections with societal groups (predominantly organised business), 
although this alliance included trade unions in Singapore. Synergistic ties in Korea, 
Singapore and Thailand were rooted in a joint project of enhancing national security 
and more importantly of catching up with the industrialised countries – these became 
the national ethos and society as a whole was mobilised towards the realisation of 
these objectives. In Korea where the state also had personal contacts with the 
chaebols, such relationships complemented the dominant institutionalised state-
society relationship with economy-wide, encompassing business associations.  
Auto-Synergy afforded the Korean state the capacity to channel national 
resources into activities where the state had comparative advantage, and in generating 
cooperation (rather than conflict) that complemented capital in their industrial 
expansion endeavors. Also autonomy made it possible for the Korean state to provide 
the economic infrastructure necessary to push the economy into high-technology 
industries. 
High degrees of Auto-Synergy made it possible for the states in Korea, 
Singapore and Thailand to recognise that high investment in technical education was 
instrumental to their economic success.  As Evans (1995) has observed, “Technical 
education is the most basic infrastructure for informatics development, and Korea 
excelled in its expansion. In the late 1980s, Korea, with less than one-third of Brazil’s 
population, had one and a half times the number of postsecondary students studying 
mathematics, computer sciences and engineering” (Evans, 1995: 147). One of the 
likely consequences of this was that the state provided the requisite economic 
infrastructure required by the high technology sector. This would have been almost 
impossible without its Auto-Synergy status.  
The empirical results also support the hypothesis that countries with a low 
degree of autonomy and a low degree of synergy will achieve low growth and high 
inequality. In this study there are three countries, namely Brazil, Nigeria (which I 
have discussed in details in chapters 7 and 8) and Kenya that exhibit these 
institutional characteristics and economic outcomes. This finding is at variance with 
some of the prominent case study literature on Nigeria and Brazil. Take for example 
the most recent work by Atul Kohli (2004) which places Nigeria and Brazil in two 
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different institutional and developmental landscapes. While Kohli’s evaluation of the 
Nigerian state and economic records are confirmed in this study, it departs from his in 
terms of the different classifications assigned to Nigeria and Brazil.  The former was 
classified as a developmental failure with poor institutional attributes. In contrast, the 
latter was seen to have a better developmental outcome. It is also said to have 
combined institutional attributes of both successful and failed states. The results of 
this study put Brazil and Nigeria in the same institutional and developmental columns 
as both exhibit low degree of Auto-Synergy of 0.42 and 0.38, respectively, in the 
scale.  On the dependent variable side, Brazil has a growth rate of 2.6 percent and has 
the notorious distinction of being the most unequal country in the sample with a Gini 
index of 0.61. This is somewhat similar to Nigeria’s economic growth rate of 2.7 
percent and a Gini index of 0.51.  Not surprisingly, both countries ended up in the 
column of countries with low growth and high inequality. Given this comparisons, it 
may be somewhat misleading to classify Brazil as an intermediate state (e.g. Evans, 
1995).  
One of the likely consequences of the low degree of Auto-Synergy in Brazil, 
Nigeria and Kenya was that the state was unable to adopt high wealth-sharing 
mechanisms with a view to addressing the gross imbalances in income and wealth. On 
the contrary, government policies—or their absence—reinforced existing ownership 
patterns and by so doing entrenched high inequalities in these countries.  
Another country that requires a close examination is Mexico. Mexico has a 
low degree of autonomy (scoring 0.58 in the autonomy scale) combined with a low 
degree of synergy (scoring 0.40 in the synergy scale) and it is highly inequitable and 
recorded low economic growth. Evans (1995), like many others, has alluded to the 
absence of meritocracy in Mexico. Kleinberg (1999) and Schneider (2004) point out 
that Mexico is legendary in what Schneider calls state corporatism, with trade unions 
and business being the junior partners, and were controlled by the state. But that is not 
all. Until recently, the Mexican state had ad-hoc engagements with the private sector, 
mostly based on personal contacts between state officials and non-state actors. 
Kleinberg’s (1999) work illuminates this point: “Personal ties and informal contacts 
between the state and individual entrepreneurs helped to bring private sector goals to 
the decision making table” (p. 73). To shed more light on the weak role of business in 
influencing economic policy, she further observed that “Often, business was neither 
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consulted nor given prior notice of government decisions on issues of import policies, 
quantitative controls and other economic policy” (p. 73). 
The trade unions had even less contacts with the state, and minimal influence 
on economic policy. In their work for the World Bank, Biddle et al. (2000) point out 
that “prior to 1987, party-unions link had been the key access trade unions had to the 
negotiating table” (p. 12).  
By 1982, the fraught relationship between the state, business and trade unions 
had come to a head following the nationalisation of banks. But in the context of 
economic crisis, with inflation skyrocketing, demand grew for the institutionalisation 
of state-business-trade unions’ relations, with all the social partners willing to co-
operate. Thus, like in Chile, economic crisis gave birth to a joint project between the 
state and business. Institutionalisation of state-society relations only happened in 
December 1987, following the signing of the Pact for Economic Solidarity (PES), 
which was followed a year later by the Pact for Stability and Economic Growth 
(PACE) between the government,  (autonomous) business and trade unions. In the 
new relationship, which matured in the 1990s, trade unions were the junior partner 
and loser.  Describing the role of unions in the pacts, De la Garza Toledo (1994) 
observed that they merely ratified agreements already reached between business and 
the state. This is consistent with the comment of another observer, Cook, (1995: 80) 
that “unions played little role in shaping the content of such agreements”.  
But why did India and Malaysia that have almost the same level of 
institutional characteristics (Auto-Synergy) achieve different development outcomes? 
It is to this question that I now turn to. 
India is an interesting case that requires closer examination. This will be done 
through unpacking its institutional attributes.  We will complement that with a 
comparative analysis of the Indian state’s institutions and state-society relations. The 
Indian state displays a high degree of autonomy (with 0.77 score in the autonomy 
scale – the second most autonomous state in the sample). But it has one of the lowest 
levels of synergistic state-society relations (with a score of 0.31, in the synergy scale). 
This is because, as earlier discussed, there was no joint project in India, the crucial 
determinant in establishing synergistic state-society relations. To reiterate, the 
business elite, for example, did not share the state project of being a major player in 
the economy. As a result, India has a low degree of synergy. Taking the two variables 
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together, India scored 0.54 on the Auto-Synergy scale, and achieved E-Growth – 5.5 
percent economic growth rate and a Gini index of 0.38. 
These findings, in terms of the individual independent variables, are consistent 
with some of the existing literature. Indeed, most of the illuminating scholarship on 
Indian institutional dynamics (coming from the institutional perspective) reached 
similar conclusions as the findings of this study. In his comprehensive seminal work, 
Embedded Autonomy, Evans (1995: 67) concludes that, “India’s bureaucratic 
apparatus still seems a … rough approximation of the Weberian ideal type…, and not 
qualitatively worse one than the bureaucracies in the developmental states”. Evans 
(1995), Herring (1999), and Schnieder (1993) point to the meritocratic recruitment of 
civil servants in India (a tradition inherited from the British colonialists). In the words 
of Herring, civil servants “recruited on the basis of highly competitive and 
meritocratic…exams…they circulated widely across agencies and could expect 
superior performance at each level to result in promotions until retirement from the 
civil services, at least to a degree” (Herring, 1999: 322, emphasis mine).65  These 
were reinforced by the establishment of a planning commission chaired by the Prime 
Minister, which ensured co-ordination of economic policies but whose efficacy was 
undermined by the federal structure of governance. Federalism limited the reach of 
the national government’s economic policies and programmes. This was particularly 
so as some economic policies were shared by the national and state governments. 
However, Schneider (1993) concluded that the Indian state could be characterised as 
corporate and autonomous. 
Overall, as shown above, India has a high degree of Auto-Synergy with a 0.54 
score on this scale. In accordance with a priori expectations, these provided the 
institutional foundations for its economic performance of equitable growth - the 
second most egalitarian country in the sample for the 1991 – 2001 period.  Taking this 
as a point of departure, the classification of India as an intermediate state (Evans, 
1995) or fragmented state (Kohli, 2004) may be somewhat misleading. The findings, 
however, reinforce the central hypothesis of this project that highly synergistic 
autonomous states’ institutions are associated with E-Growth. Its autonomy allowed 
the state to forge and implement a developmental project of E-Growth. It prevented it 
                                                         
65
 This qualification is necessary because of what Evans refers to as the rapid rotation of staff that 
characterised the Indian bureaucracy. 
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from being captured by particularistic interests and, to that extent, allowed it to 
undertake agrarian reforms that changed the production relations in society by 
providing access to land to millionaires of the peasantry. 
Although Malaysia has almost the same degree of Auto-Synergy with India, 
its development outcome was inequitable growth. I have noted earlier how the 
Malaysian state promoted economic growth but that is it a highly unequal society. 
This is despite the fact that Malaysia is a classic case of a state that undertook policies 
to redress the gross imbalances in income distribution in an attempt to end the 
identification of race with economic status. Consequently, the state invested enormous 
resources in Bumi education (initially, general education but shifted as from the mid 
1980s to technical education/vocational training, which consequently increased the 
number of Malays in education). Although, the children of the Bumi elite benefited 
most from the scholarship schemes, Jesudason (1989) notes that about 5 percent of 
families with income less than $300 had children in universities. The state did not stop 
with the provision of educational opportunities for Malays. It went further to ensure 
that they were gainfully employed, in both the public and private sectors, on 
completion of their studies. Furthermore, the state invested massively in housing and 
health (including setting up rural clinics and providing safe drinking water for rural 
dwellers).  All of these contributed to narrowing the income gap at the initial stages, 
but as noted in chapter 7, began to change from the mid-1980s, following economic 
liberalisation.66 This suggests that non-institutional factors contributed to its 
inequitable status. 
But the explanation for Malaysian inequitable status may also be due to 
institutional factors. Although Malaysia has almost the same degree of Auto-Synergy 
as does India, the Indian degree of autonomy (0.77 score) closely approximates the 
autonomy scale while the Malaysian score of 0.66 is much closer to our median. What 
these two cases tend to suggest is that even where a country’s degree of Auto-Synergy 
is high but closer to the median, if such a country’s score on the autonomy variable 
approximates the autonomy scale, as we have seen in the case of India, it is likely to 
achieve E-Growth. The Indian case therefore illustrates the fact that countries that 
approximate the autonomy scale even with low degrees of synergy are likely to 
achieve E-Growth. In contrast, where a country has a high degree of Auto-Synergy, 
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 See Chapter 7 for some of the factors that contributed to Malaysian high levels of inequality.  
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but which is closer to the median combined with a high degree of autonomy closer to 
the median, such a country, as we have seen in the case of Malaysia, is likely to 
achieve inequitable development.  We should not be surprise by this conclusion given 
that autonomy is a powerful predictor of E-Growth while synergy is not.  
But contrary to a priori expectations, the results show that countries that are 
not synergistically autonomous can achieve E-Growth. In the sample, Egypt belongs 
to this group.  How do we account for this surprising development? As I have noted 
above, Egypt has the second lowest degree of Auto-Synergy in the sample (with a 
0.27 score on the Auto-Synergy scale). Though Egypt had a low degree of autonomy, 
there was a complete absence of synergy. The latter was primarily because of the 
socialist ideology of the state and its consequent unwillingness to forge alliances with 
private capital. At the same time, the state—through deliberate social engineering—
incorporated the lower classes into its developmental agenda. The elements of the 
latter included land redistribution, massive welfare programmes – subsidized food, 
health care, housing, free education and guaranteed employment in the vast public 
sector – resulting in an overstaffed bureaucracy (Harik, 1997; Abdelazim 2002; and 
Al-Sayyid, 2003).   
In addition, the state initially repressed organised labour, but later co-opted it 
and small private manufacturers as favourite social groups that it patronized. But this 
had negative effects on state-society synergy. First, organised business was virtually 
repressed and marginalised. Second, trade unions ceded their autonomy and decision-
making ability in return for favours that labour received from the Egyptian 
government. It is therefore significant to note that, in the period under consideration, 
the state’s deliberate policies and programmes to accommodate the poor compensated 
for the access to economic policy-making that was closed to non-state actors. These 
policies, together, accounted for the equity status of Egypt (the second most 
egalitarian country in the sample with a Gini index of 0.34, next to Korea), even in the 
absence of synergy. In this respect, Egypt used the same mechanisms as the Asian 
NICs to incorporate the lower class into its developmental agenda. These were the 
conjunctural and historical factors that explained Egypt’s record as a country with E-
Growth status. In conclusion therefore, Egypt attained egalitarianism and achieved a 
high rate of economic growth due to historical conjunctural factors rather than its 
institutional characteristics as explained in chapters 7 and 8.  
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Chile has the same institutional attributes as Egypt and recorded inequitable 
growth. The analysis that follows will show that like Egypt, its inequitable growth 
status is both a product of institutional and non-institutional factors. Again, I resort to 
comparative analysis. We can understand this at various levels. Chile has a history of 
voluntary autonomous societal interests, due to a number of factors that are beyond 
the scope of this study (See Schneider, 2004 for an exhaustive analysis of this 
development). Dating back to the 1940s, organised societal actors, especially business 
associations, participated in economic policy-making. In some instances by the 1960s, 
they had actually drafted legislation on policy matters pertaining to specific sectors 
(Menges, 1966). Such was the degree of influence of business associations on national 
economic policy.  But its drawback was that participation tended to favour and 
encourage sector-wide business associations, rather than economy-wide peak national 
business associations. This factor, according to Schneider, explains the weaknesses of 
the economy-wide encompassing peak national association, the Confederation for 
Production and Commerce (CPC). 
State-business relations dramatically changed in the early 1970s following 
Pinochet’s military coup, which led to the personalisation of power around him and 
the appointment of market fundamentalists - the Chicago boys, the latter who 
immediately seized control over economic policy-making. As a consequence, the door 
to the policy-making table was closed to business associations. From that period to the 
early 1980s, the only access business had were essentially informal (ad-hoc) ties 
between big conglomerates and the Chicago boys. Why was this the case? According 
to Silva (1998: 227, cited in Schneider, 2004: 164), this is because “Top economic 
policy makers were generally wary of contact with organised interest groups and 
worried that consultation would contaminate their reforms”. Thus, like in Nigeria, the 
economic bureaucrats were sceptical about the impact of organised business on 
economic policy. In consequence, they forged a narrow, personalised and clientelistic 
alliance with few individual businesspersons, which in turn tended to undermine the 
collective well-being of the economy. Silva (1997: 165) summed up the nature of the 
Chilean state-society relations and its consequences for economic development thus: 
 
…inflexible outside ideologues with a small circle of capitalists contributed to policy 
rigidity in Chile between 1975 and 1982. The emphasis was on quick stabilization and 
recovery based on investment in highly volatile short-term financial investments. By 
the same token, investment stayed low until 1979 in part because capitalists excluded 
from the policy loop were uncertain. The incomplete feedback loop – the fact that 
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officials only talked to a narrow businessmen- contributed to policy rigidity and 
financial collapse in 1982 – 83. 
 
Following the economic crisis that swept through Latin America in the early 
1980s, coupled with labour and leftist mobilisation against the military regime, 
organised business and the Pinochet dictatorship recognised the need for a joint 
project. Organised business recognised that it had to work with the regime to 
overcome the economic crisis. The dictatorship realised that the economic and 
political crisis was eroding its legitimacy and hence constituted a threat to its political 
survival. This confluence of interests forced both parties to change their disposition 
towards each other. To be effective, the regime recognised the need to work with the 
CPC (an economy-wide encompassing business association). On the other hand, 
business leaders also recognised that their effective participation in economic policy 
depended on their capacity to forge consensus proposals, which they would table 
before the government. This led to a revival of the CPC, as the main interlocutor 
between organised business and the government. Henceforth, organised business was 
brought to the economic policy-making table. In addition, CPC leaders had regular 
access to senior economic bureaucrats on a range of economic policies, including 
interest and exchange rates.  Like in Korea and Singapore, access was not limited to 
senior leaders – middle level business people also had regular engagements with their 
counterparts in government. As a sign of their influence at the time, most of the 
economic reform proposals by the CPC – including a high real foreign exchange rate 
policy, a reduction of personal income taxes, a reduction of corporate taxes, tax 
credits on retained profits, internal debt rescheduling – all in an attempt to stimulate 
investment – were adopted by the state (Silva, 1998). This was designed as an 
alternative economic stimulation to the radical neo-liberal policy previously pursued 
by the Chicago boys, which, as noted above, resulted in the 1982–83 economic crisis. 
Compared to Mexico therefore, institutionalisation of state-society relations took 
place much earlier – in the early 1980s – and this may have provided the basis for a 
shared project. Its pursuit led to the revival of the Chilean economy in the early 1980s.  
The military regime took the institutionalisation of the participation of societal 
actors so seriously that General Pinochet himself presided over meetings between the 
regime and organised business. Remarkably, in the context where governments in 
developing countries ruled out macroeconomic policies outside the purview of 
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participatory and consensus-seeking structures and processes, the agreements reached 
between the Pinochet regime and organised business covered a broad range of 
macroeconomic policy issues, including the size of the fiscal deficit, devaluation and 
interest rates, and so on. It also covered specific measures for the protection of 
industry and agriculture. Thus, Chile's economic recovery was based on some form of 
state intervention and not on unbridled market fundamentalism as is the predominant 
logic of the current form of globalisation. 
Throughout the period, however, trade unions and civil society organisations 
were repressed and therefore excluded from participating in economic policy-making. 
Against this background, one might refer to the alliance between the Pinochet regime, 
the Chicago Boys and business as the pro-growth (without equity) coalition. As noted 
above, this was driven by the need to overcome the economic crisis as well as for the 
survival of the military regime. That Chile has a low degree of synergy is precisely 
because for almost ten years, 1975 – 1983, business was frozen out from the 
economic policy-making process. But for the years it participated, especially as from 
the last quarter of 1983 onward, it had a significant impact on economic policy as 
state-society relations gradually became more programmatic than personalistic, 
clientelistic or coercive. In the words of Silva (1997), economic policy henceforth 
came to be based on strict technical and economic criteria. It is from this period that 
the Chilean economy started a remarkable turn around, from low growth to high 
growth. The pro-growth coalition between the state and business pushed through neo-
liberal economic reforms, including liberalisation. These reforms partly explain 
Chile's remarkable growth in the period covered by this study. Therefore, the Chilean 
case suggests that non-institutional factors may have contributed to explain some of 
its high economic growth rate.  
In conclusion, the results of the bivariate regressions discussed so far suggest 
that the economic dynamism – E-Growth – of Korea, Thailand, Singapore and India 
are derived from the robustness of the organisational characteristics of the state, as 
well as the intense connections between the state and society. This means that state 
institutions and state-society relations are important predictors of a country’s E-
Growth status. It needs to be pointed out at this stage that civil society organisations, 
that is NGOs and CBOs, have been excluded from economic policy-making in all the 
twelve countries covered in this chapter. I have also noted that in two countries, 
Malaysia and Pakistan, highly synergistic autonomous institutions were unable to 
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achieve equitable growth. The former was marked by inequitable growth while the 
latter was equitable but with low growth. I have suggested some non-institutional 
factors for the status of the two countries.  The analysis also suggest that when a 
country has a high degree of Auto-Synergy but its score on the autonomy variable 
approximates the autonomy scale, it is likely to achieve E-Growth. In contrast, when a 
country’s Auto-Synergy score is high but its score on the autonomy variable is closer 
to our median combined with a low degree of synergy, such a country is likely to 
achieve either inequitable growth (as Malaysia) or equity with low growth (as 
Pakistan).   
 
9. 4: Multivariate Analysis  
 
I attempted to run a multivariate analysis to compare these arguments with the 
results of the bivariate regressions, but none of the variables proved to be significant 
in the multivariate analysis. This is probably due to colinearity problems between the 
two independent variables (autonomy and synergy). The same problem may have also 
accounted for the fact that unlike in the bivariate analysis, the synergy coefficient 
becomes significant when we tried to explain inequality as a function of autonomy 
and synergy. As noted in chapter 7, the Pearson correlation between the two variables 
is significantly high at 0.69. The various attempts, including transforming the synergy 
variable, failed to remove this colinearity problem. Consequently, I did not proceed 
with multivariate analysis.   
 
 
9. 5: Conclusion 
 
It is clear from the results that high degrees of autonomy, combined with high 
degrees of synergy, leads to E-Growth. The results also show that both low degrees of 
autonomy and low degrees of synergy lead to low growth and high income inequality. 
In the highly synergistic autonomous countries (Singapore, Korea, Thailand, India and 
Malaysia), internal organisational features, meritocracy, performance-based 
promotion and well co-ordinated economic management enabled them to selectively 
intervene in the economy. Autonomy in these states was characterised by 
professionalisation of economic policy-making. It was also central to the state’s 
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capacity to forge synergistic ties with societal actors that were programmatic or based 
on joint projects of economic development, and thus removed from political capture 
by interest groups that could have had the negative effects of undermining the state’s 
transformation objectives. High degrees of Auto-Synergy were at the heart of the 
state’s capacity to guide, steer and at times control the activities of the private sector 
to meet (set) national goals, and in the process to raise the international 
competitiveness of domestic industries. In promoting domestic entrepreneurs, the 
states in Singapore, Korea, Thailand, India and Malaysia sometimes promoted 
competition—and sometimes cooperation—among private enterprises, under the 
supervision of the state.  This would have been near impossible without high degrees 
of Auto-Synergy.  In contrast, an uncertain and unstable political climate mediated the 
effects of synergistic autonomous institutions in Pakistan. 
Synergistic relations were instrumental to the state’s capacity in Korea, 
Singapore and Thailand to negotiate and re-negotiate goals and policies associated 
with their industrialisation project (transforming their economies from primary-sector 
based to secondary and tertiary sectors), penetrating new markets, adapting to fast-
changing global economic circumstances, as well as creating the incentive structures 
for capital to expand. In addition, high degrees of Auto-Synergy were the institutional 
architectures for the state to single-mindedly pursue egalitarian goals in these 
countries. Also, Auto-Synergy enhanced the capacities of the Korean, Malaysian, 
Singaporean and Thai states to push and entice capital to investment in R&D, and in 
sectors they considered critical to the state’s industrial transformation strategy. These 
contributed to their spectacular economic growth rates, the fruits of which were 
shared equally by all segments of their societies (except in Malaysia).  The E-Growth 
status was therefore not an accident, but a product of domestic institutional 
configurations.  
Four contrasting cases encourage us to be cautious. Egypt achieved E-Growth 
in spite of its low degree of Auto-Synergy, suggesting that non-institutional factors 
can also result in E-Growth.  While these exceptions are rare, we need to understand 
why this is the case. We can do so by taking a closer look at the correlation between 
state autonomy and E-Growth (on the one hand) and state-society synergy and E-
Growth (on the other). As pointed out in chapter 7, the resulting Pearson correlation 
coefficient between autonomy and E-Growth is strong and significant, with a Pearson 
correlation coefficient of 0.82. In contrast, the Pearson correlation coefficient between 
  222 
synergy and E-Growth, as noted previously, is moderate but not significant, as it is 
estimated at 0.343. In fact autonomy on its own has a much greater impact on E-
Growth than when it is combined with synergy. This is because there is little 
association between synergy and inequality. This indicates that autonomy is a better 
predictor of E-Growth than synergy (as indicated in chapter 8). By implication, 
countries might as well enhance their degree of state autonomy than try to increase 
their degree of autonomy and synergy at the same time to have more E-Growth status.  
The findings and analysis in chapters 7 and 8 lead us to conclude that the 
institutional structures of the state and state-society relations, in the period and sample 
under consideration, do contribute to their economic outcomes.  Most of the countries 
in the sample that approximate the Auto-Synergy index achieved E-Growth. In 
contrast, a majority of those that lacked such institutional attributes had poor 
economic records of low economic growth and high income inequality.  
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Chapter Ten 
 
Conclusion 
 
 
In this concluding chapter I intend to highlight the major findings of this 
study. On the basis of this, I will draw some of the main conclusions that emanated 
from the study.  
In the last three decades, developing countries have gone through different 
developmental trajectories. While most have been characterised by underdevelopment 
evidenced by low economic growth, poverty, high unemployment, diseases and 
inequalities, few others have witnessed high rates of industrialisation resulting in near 
unprecedented economic growth coupled with a qualitative improvement in the 
population’s living standards. Remarkably, the latter set of countries has been 
characterised by high economic growth and egalitarianism (E-Growth). These 
divergent development outcomes continued into the 1991 – 2001 period covered by 
this study. From an institutional perspective, this study has primarily sought to explain 
the differing developmental contours or variations in national economic performance 
among developing countries in this era of extensive and intensive globalisation. 
In undertaking this study, I have relied on quantitative data, drawn from 
different sources. For the dependent variables, I have relied on accessible public data. 
With respect of the independent variable, I relied on existing data to construct the 
autonomy indicator while I used my own survey to collect data on the synergy 
indicator. The analyses that followed were aimed at showing the relationships 
between state autonomy and economic growth, autonomy and inequality, and 
autonomy and E-Growth; state-society synergy and economic growth, state-society 
synergy and inequality, and state-society synergy and E-Growth; as well as the 
relationship between the combined independent variables and the three dependent 
variables. All of these analyses were bivariate. The bivariate analyses were 
complemented by comparative historical analyses. In this way I was able to 
demonstrate the relationships between the independent and dependent variables. 
This study has attempted to develop a comprehensive state capacity theory to 
fill the gap in the existing literature. It has done so by focussing on the transformative 
capacity of the state, that is, the capacity of the state to contemporaneously foster 
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growth and equity.  To do this, I adopted the concept of the Synergistic Autonomous 
State (SAS), and suggested that an explanation for the state’s transformative capacity 
lies in the internal capacity of the state’s institutions and in its synergistic relations 
with societal actors. Put differently, the institutional characteristics of the SAS are its 
high degrees of (synergistic autonomy) Auto-Synergy. One of the first findings of this 
research is that (with the exception of India and Pakistan), the most highly 
autonomous countries (namely Singapore, Korea and Thailand) are the most highly 
synergistic countries. The converse is the case for those with low degrees of synergy 
(such as Brazil, Chile, Mexico and Nigeria). 
The highly synergistic countries established cooperative relations between the 
state and its social partners. This, in turn, ensured accountability and consensus that 
made governments responsive to the needs of their people.  At the same time, this 
created a climate for economic growth. The states in these countries premised their 
legitimacy on successful economic performance. The study has therefore sought to 
incorporate the notion of state-society synergy into a theory of state capacity.  Like 
Campos and Root (1996), we find that the experiences of these countries offer a new 
perspective on the kind of political institutions and their association with economic 
development. 
One of the findings of this study is that consultative mechanisms (CMs) have 
greater influence on the determination of economic policy where there is an 
institutionalisation of societal participation in economic policy-making. This is a 
reflection of the fact that one finds a shared project of national transformation 
between the state and its social partners. It is also a reflection of the government’s 
commitment to inclusive economic policy-making as part of the economic reform 
process in order to make it globally competitive. As shown in chapter 6, this was the 
case in Korea, Singapore and Thailand. The converse is the case in countries such as 
Brazil, Chile, Nigeria, etc., where governments were unwilling to institutionalise 
social partners’ participation in economic policy-making. In this latter set of countries, 
the participation of interest groups had minimal influence on economic policy. As we 
have seen in chapter 8, this result reflects both a lack of government commitment to 
participatory democracy and the absence of a shared project. From these findings, it 
can also be concluded that the institutionalisation of societal participation is more 
important than the range of interest groups represented in the economic policy-making 
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process. In other words, the nature of the consultative structure is more important than 
the number of interest groups represented. 
On a related note, I was rather surprised to find that none of the twelve 
developing countries covered in this study included Non-Governmental Organisations 
(NGOs) and Community Based Organisations (CBOs) in their processes of economic 
policy-making (in the period covered in the study). The only civil society groups 
represented in participatory and consultative structures and processes are the trade 
unions.  Despite the fact that an increase in size and scope of NGOs and CBOs is 
often seen as a major feature of globalisation, these sorts of institutions have proven to 
be insignificant in shaping or influencing the economic policies of these states. This 
has mostly been confined to government and business. This finding appears to support 
the thesis that globalisation is driven by capital. At the same time it questions the 
position of extreme globalists, with respect to their opinion about the diminution of 
the state. Indeed, this dissertation has demonstrated the central role of the state in 
shaping the economic direction of the countries under study. As Evans (1997b) 
emphasized: more stateness is needed in the context of globalisation.  This is because 
even global capital requires a state that can provide infrastructure and predictable sets 
of rules to promote investment, and competent policy-makers with whom to dialogue. 
Most of the sample that experienced remarkable economic performance were those 
with strong states and consequently effective capacities to intervene in the economy.  
Conversely, countries with less autonomous state institutions were mostly unable to 
shape their economy in order to take advantage of the opportunities offered by the 
integration of the global economy.   
The main hypothesis of this study is that countries with better economic 
performances (measured by high economic growth rates and low inequality, or E-
Growth) are those with high degrees of autonomous state institutions and those that 
have established intensive connections (synergistic relations) with societal actors. The 
hypothesis is supported empirically in this study. In an era of globalisation, the 
strength, dynamism and wondrous economic performances of India, Korea, Singapore 
and Thailand can be seen as the result of their cohesive state apparatuses and state-
society relations – Auto-Synergy.  They succeeded on the basis of a coordinated and 
cooperative approach to national economic management and adjustment. In fact, the 
association between state autonomy and economic growth is clearly evidenced in this 
study. It shows that autonomy is a significant determinant of growth, inequality and 
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E-Growth. With some exceptions, the converse is the case for countries suffering 
from an autonomy deficit. However, unlike the direct relationship between autonomy 
and growth, there is an inverse relationship between autonomy and inequality, 
meaning that as autonomy increases, inequality decreases. Similarly, we saw clear 
evidence of the relationships between state-society synergy and growth, and that 
between synergy and inequality. While there is a strong and powerful relationship 
between synergy and growth, there is weak but negative relationship between synergy 
and inequality. Importantly, synergy is statistically insignificant in explaining equity. 
Also, we saw that synergy is a poor predictor of E-Growth.  
The above findings might come as a surprise to most observers (including 
development agencies such as the United Nations Development Programmeme 
(UNDP) and the World Bank) who have advocated societal participation in economic 
policy-making on the grounds that it should produce equity effects. But as we have 
seen in this study, the empirical claim for this connection is weak.  Consequently, 
autonomy becomes a better predictor of E-Growth than synergy. It is however unclear 
whether the weak association between synergy and inequality is because of the 
predominance of the state and business in consultative and consensus seeking 
structures and the exclusion of NGOs and CBOs. 
This study has shown that variations in national economic outcomes (growth 
with equity) are to a degree dependent on domestic institutions. In particular, 
institutional autonomy is shown to be a better predictor on economic growth than 
synergy.  In the highly autonomous countries, state institutions were characterised by 
meritocratic recruitment of senior economic bureaucrats with clear and predictable 
career paths. Also, these states enjoy centralised yet flexible coordination, core 
economic ministries that are responsible for planning, gathering and analyzing 
information in-house, the capacity to target of industries which the state deemed as 
necessary for the long-term welfare of the economy, and so on. It is because of their 
institutional autonomy that states in India, Korea, Singapore and Thailand were able 
to develop in-house capacities and to generate information to formulate and 
implement policies consistent with their transformative projects of E-Growth. In fact, 
these countries were able to coordinate change in their economic structures, forge and 
adapt policies to meet changing global circumstances primarily because of their strong 
in-house capacity. In addition, there were strong ties and interconnections between the 
state and interest groups, which enabled them to regularly exchange information, 
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build consensus around the transformative project of equity with growth. In sum: 
autonomy and synergy, as the sources of state capacity, contributed to the E-Growth 
status of these states.   
But as we noted in chapter 9, Auto-Synergy has a lower impact on E-Growth 
than autonomy alone. In other words, autonomy on its own is a more powerful and 
significant predictor of E-Growth than when it is combined with synergistic relations.  
It his hoped that this work can contribute to enrich the debate on state 
transformative capacity and our understanding of the variations in economic outcome 
between countries. It takes as a point of departure the notion that state-society 
relations are crucial determinants of E-Growth. Highly synergistic countries are able 
to tap into networks or Consultative Mechanisms (CMs) and consequently generate 
information to formulate and implement policies to upgrade industries, adopt new 
technologies, take advantage of new market opportunities while at the same time 
minimise the destructive impulses of current global markets. These are the 
foundations for the global competitiveness and consequently the remarkable economic 
growth of the highly synergistic autonomous states of Korea, India, Malaysia, 
Singapore and Thailand. By jointly making economic policy with key economic 
actors, governments gained the confidence of the business community to invest and 
secured the support of the trade union component of civil society around the 
transformation agenda.  
I might close with one important caveat that the reader, especially students of 
institutions, should not overlook:  it is not always the case that countries with low 
degrees of Auto-Synergy will always achieve low economic growth and high 
inequality. The Egyptian experience shows that it is possible for a country with an 
institutional deficit to achieve E-Growth. Non-institutional factors could therefore 
play a role in a country’s economic performance. In the case of Egypt, its economic 
achievements were due to other historical factors (such as prior distribution of income 
in the form of land redistribution that altered the ownership structure). In addition, 
natural resource endowments, such as crude oil, accounted for a significant part of 
Egypt’s economic growth, as well as remittances from its citizens in oil-rich Arab 
neighbour states. All of these are non-institutional factors that accounted for Egypt’s 
high economic growth rate. The implication of this is that in rare cases, countries 
without, or with low degrees of, Auto-Synergy can still achieve high economic 
growth rates and egalitarianism. Non-institutional factors, e.g. a prior land reform, 
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also contributed to India’s egalitarianism. In other words, other conjunctural factors 
can lead to E-Growth. Institutionalists should be cognizant of these facts.  
For countries that hope to emulate the most successful cases, the appropriate 
focus should be on developing similar organisational institutions suitable to their own 
contexts. As we have seen in this study, in spite of the commonalities, there were 
certain variations in national institutional characteristics. 
The main conclusion derived from the analysis is that domestic institutions – 
state institutions and state-society relations – matter for a state’s capacity to transform 
and integrate its economy into the global economy, as well as in making its 
development outcomes more equitable. Countries with enfeebled institutions are 
unlikely to become globally competitive, to grow, and/or to share equitably the fruits 
of integration into the global economy.  Overall, therefore, the quality of domestic 
institutions is an important determinant in the ability of developing countries to 
engage with economic globalisation. The point here is not whether or not 
globalisation has led to a diminishing role of the state. Rather, the central argument is 
that states can—given the proper institutional context—successfully adapt to 
globalisation and even shape it to benefit their citizens. Following Evans (1997), we 
can agree that globalisation’s “eclipse of the state” is more of a myth than an 
empirical reality.  
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Appendices 
 
 
Appendix 1: Data on GDP and GINI for selected 40 Developing Countries, 
1991 - 2001 
Country GDP GINI Country GDP GINI 
China 9.9 0.40 Egypt, Arab Rep. 4.2 0.34 
Vietnam 7.5 0.36 Iran, Islamic Re 4.2 0.43 
Singapore 7.0 0.43 Ethiopia 4.2 0.57 
Malaysia 6.6 0.49 Guatemala 3.9 0.56 
Mozambique 6.5 0.40 Pakistan 3.8 0.33 
Chile 6.2 0.58 Gambia, The 3.7 0.48 
Korea, Rep. 6.0 0.32 Bolivia 3.5 0.45 
Dominican Republ 5.6 0.47 Malawi 3.3 0.50 
India 5.5 0.38 Mexico 3.2 0.52 
Cambodia 5.4 0.40 Honduras 3.2 0.59 
Yemen, Rep. 5.4 0.33 Morocco 2.8 0.40 
Jordan 5.1 0.36 Nigeria 2.7 0.51 
Costa Rica 4.9 0.46 Brazil 2.6 0.61 
Bangladesh 4.8 0.32 Colombia 2.6 0.57 
Burkina Faso 4.7 0.48 Ecuador 2.2 0.44 
Guyana 4.6 0.45 Madagascar 2.2 0.46 
Thailand 4.4 0.43 Paraguay 2.0 0.58 
El Salvador 4.4 0.51 Kenya 1.6 0.45 
Ghana 4.3 0.40 Jamaica 0.5 0.38 
Indonesia 4.3 0.30 Burundi -1.2 0.33 
Source: World Bank (2003) 
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Appendix 2: Questions Used from the Evans and Rauch Dataset 
 
Bureaucratic Structure and Economic Performance: 
Codebook 6/23/97 
Introduction: 
This codebook explains the coding of the variables in the data set produced by 
the Bureaucratic Structure and Economic Performance project. After the country 
name and country abbreviation, the next 29 variables (q101-sq20) are derived from 
the questionnaires filled out by the 126 country experts who participated in this 
project. (The original questionnaire is reproduced as the Appendix to "Bureaucratic 
Structure and Bureaucratic Performance in Less Developed Countries," by James E. 
Rauch and Peter B. Evans.) For convenience we have also included in the data set on 
this web site variables (sq2_rc-inv6570) used in "Bureaucracy and Growth: A Cross-
National Analysis of the Effects of 'Weberian' State Structures on Economic Growth," 
by Peter B. Evans and James E. Rauch, and variables (corrupt1-ethfrac) used in the 
Rauch and Evans paper already cited. For descriptions of these variables see the 
respective papers. 
Overview: 
Narrative and Standard Answers: In order to make comparisons across 
countries more feasible we have provided some standard alternative answers to each 
question, but we are well aware that these standard answers can't capture the full 
complexities of real bureaucratic structures. Therefore, we hope that in addition to 
indicating which standard alternative comes closest to describing your case, you will 
offer a separate, complementary narrative discussion of how the state bureaucracies 
you are describing look with regard to these issues. Time Period: We are interested 
primarily in what these bureaucracies looked like in the recent past roughly 1970 - 
1990. If there have been important changes within this period, or between this period 
and the present please indicate the sub-period to which your answers apply. We would 
also appreciate any commentary you could add on changes over time in your narrative 
responses.  
Core Economic Agencies: 
1. List the four most important agencies in the central state bureaucracy order of their 
power to shape overall economic policy. (e.g. Ministry of Finance, Ministry of 
Industry and/or Trade and/or Commerce, Planning Board, agency or Ministry)? 
To aggregate these responses for the country-level data, nine variables were created: 
Variable Names: 
Q101 = President's office, Prime Minister's office (or Royal Palace) 
Q102 = Ministry of Finance  
Q103 = Central Bank 
Q104 = Ministry of Economics (Economics and Finance, Economic Affairs, 
National Economy, etc.)  
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Q105 = Planning Ministry, Secretariat, Commission or Board (Development 
Board or Council or Development Bank) 
Q106 = Ministry of Trade, Ministry of Commerce, Ministry of Industry (Trade 
and Industry, Industry and Commerce, etc.) 
Q107 = Ministry of Defense, Military 
Q108 = Monetary Authority 
Q109 = Other (Ministries of Public Works, Mines and Energy, Agriculture, 
Privatisation, Communication, Social Development, Foreign Investment 
Committee, etc.) 
Codes: 
0 = Not mentioned 
1 = Listed as 2, 3, or 4 by less than half of the respondents 
2 = Listed as 2, 3, or 4 by at least half of the respondents, OR, ranked first by 
at least one respondent but listed as 2, 3, or 4 by less than half of the others 
3 = Ranked first at least once and listed as 2, 3, or 4 by at least half of other 
respondents 
4 = Ranked first by at least half of the respondents 
 
Recruitment and Careers: 
[In answering the following questions, assume that "higher officials", refers to those 
who hold roughly the top 500 positions in the core economic agencies you have 
discussed above.] 
 
4. Approximately what proportion of the higher officials in these agencies enter the 
civil service via a formal examination system? 
Codes:  
1 = less than 30% 
2 = 30 - 60% 
3 = 60% -90% 
4 = more than 90% 
Variable Name: SQ4 - Country Average on Q4 
 
5. Of those that do not enter via examinations, what proportion have university or 
post-graduate degrees. 
Codes:  
1 = less than 30% 
2 = 30 - 60% 
3 = 60% -90% 
4 = more than 90% 
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Variable Name: SQ5 - Country Average on Q5 
 
6. Roughly how many of the top levels in these agencies are political appointees (e.g. 
appointed by the President or Chief Executive)  
Codes:  
1 = none.  
2 = just agency chiefs. 
3 = agency chiefs and vice-chiefs. 
4 = all of top 2 or 3 levels. 
Variable Name: SQ6 - Country Average on Q6 
 
7. Of political appointees to these positions, what proportion are likely to already be 
members of the higher civil service? 
Codes: 
1 = less than 30% 
2 = 30 - 70% 
3 = more than 70% 
Variable Name: SQ7 - Country Average on Q7 
8. Of those promoted to the top 2 or 3 levels in these agencies (whether or not they are 
political appointees), what proportion come from within the agency itself or (its 
associated ministry(ies) if the agency is not itself a ministry)?  
Codes:  
1 = less than 50% 
2 = 50 - 70% 
3 = 70% - 90% 
4 = over 90% 
Variable Name: SQ8 - Country Average on Q8 
9. Are the incumbents of these top positions likely to be moved to positions of lesser 
importance when political leadership changes?  
Codes:  
1 = almost always 
2 = usually 
3 = sometimes 
4 = rarely 
Variable Name: SQ9 - Country Average on Q9 
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11. What prospects for promotion can someone who enters one of these agencies 
through a higher civil service examination early in his/her career reasonably expect? 
Assuming that there are at least a half dozen steps or levels between and entry-level 
position and the head of the agency, how would you characterise the possibilities for 
moving up in the agency? [ NB. more than one may apply.] 
1. in most cases, will move up one or two levels but no more.  
2. in most cases, will move up three or four levels, but unlikely to reach the level 
just below political appointees.  
3. if performance is superior, moving up several levels to the level just below 
political appointees is not an unreasonable expectation.  
4. in at least a few cases, could expect to move up several levels within the civil 
service and then move up to the very top of the agency on the basis of political 
appointments.  
Codes:  
=2, if 3 and/or 4 are circled, but not 1 and not 2 
=1, otherwise 
Variable Name: SQ11d - Country Average on Q11d 
 
The individual responses to the above questions were aggregated to create a country-
level data set, in which each country received a score equal to the average of the 
responses of all experts answering each question for that country. 
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Appendix 3 
 
Questionnaire for Analyzing  
State-Society Relations and Economic Performance in Developing 
Countries  
By 
Omano Edigheji 
Visiting Fellow 
Centre for the Study of Globalisation and Regionalisation 
University of Warwick 
UK 
Fax: +44(0)24 76572548 
E-mail: o.edigheji@warwick.ac.uk 
  
  
  
Background: In the recent period, participatory governance has received increased scholarly 
and policy attention. In particular, development and donor agencies are impressing upon 
governments in developing countries the need to forge cooperative relations with social and 
economic actors. Also donor organisations are spending a lot of funds on civil society to 
enhance their participation in policy formulation. Yet, no measurable indicators and datasets 
exist to assess the impact of associational participation in economic policy making. Even 
major development agencies such as the World Bank and the United Nations Development 
Programme (UNDP) have not been able to develop measurable indicators on state-society 
relations, on the basis of which they could assess their impacts on economic performance 
across countries.  In the absence of comparable data, it is, difficult to draw a direct link 
between synergistic state-society relations and economic outcome.  
This survey constitutes an attempt to operationalise the link between interest groups 
participation and socio-economic performance. It intends to do so by developing measurable 
indicators for the purposes of comparability across countries. Development of comparable 
indicators and the creation of a dataset on state society-relations will enable researchers and 
development agencies to explain variations in national economic performance between 
developing countries. 
  
Objective: The aim of this survey is to develop cross-country comparable data on state-
society relations in developing countries. As you will notice, I have provided some standard 
alternative answers to each question, but I am aware that these standard answers may not 
capture the full complexities of organised interests’ participation in economic policy-making. 
Therefore, I hope that in addition to indicating which standard alternative is closest to your 
answer, you will offer a separate, complementary narrative of how the organised interest 
groups participate in economic policy making at the national level.  
  
Policy Areas: I am interested in organised societal interests’ participation at the national level 
in the formulation of fiscal policy, monetary policy, investment, overall industrial policy, 
trade policy, job creation and training, and employment law.  
  
Time Period: The time period I am mostly concerned with is 1970 – 1990. But for the 
purposes of detecting whether or not there have been important changes in associational 
participation in economic policy making, please indicate to which sub-period your answers 
apply.   I would appreciate your answers to these questions and any additional commentary on 
state-society relations in developing countries. 
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QUESTIONNAIRE 
 
Respondent: E-Mail: 
Country:  
  
State-Society Relations (Synergy) 
  
1. Is there a consultative forum for government to have dialogue with organised interest 
groups around economic policies (e.g. fiscal policy, monetary policy, investment, 
industrial policy, trade policy, job creation and training policy, and employment law)?  
  
  1970 – 1990 1991 – 2003 
(a)  Yes 
  
(b)  No 
  
  
2. Which of the following best describe the nature of the consultative mechanism?  
  
  1970 – 1990 1991 – 2003 
1.  No consultative mechanisms. 
  
2.  Ad hoc consultative mechanism (not based 
in law and meet at irregular intervals).   
3.  Informal Consultative mechanism 
(although not based in law, participation of 
organised interests is institutionalised 
through regular dialogue and consultations 
by government). 
  
4.  Statutory consultative 
Mechanism/standing body (based in law, 
and there are regular consultations). 
  
  
3. How would you characterise the composition of the forum of dialogue and 
consultation?  
  
  1970 – 1990 1991 – 2003 
1.  No consultative mechanisms. 
  
2.  It is made up of representatives of 
government and peak business 
associations. 
  
3.  It is made up of representatives of 
government, peak business associations 
and peak trade unions organisations. 
  
4.  It is made up of representatives of 
government, peak business associations, 
peak trade unions organisations and 
NGOs/civic organisations. 
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
4. Which of the following description best fits the outcome of such consultations?  
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  1970 – 1990 1991 – 2003 
1.  No influence on final economic policy. 
  
2.  Minimal influence on final economic 
policy.   
3.  Moderate influence on final economic 
policy.   
4.  Influential in determining economic 
policy.   
5.  Very Influential in determining final 
economic policy.   
 
5. How would you characterise the relationship between the economic bureaucracy and 
civil society organisations (NGOs and Civic organisations) on a scale of 1 (=Hostile) to 
6 (=Cooperative)?  
  
  Hostile         Cooperative 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 
1970 – 1990 
                        
1991 – 2003 
                        
  
6. Are civil society organisations (NGOs and civic organisations) consulted by the 
economic bureaucracy around major economic policy?  
  
  1970 – 1990 1991 – 2003 
(a)  Yes 
  
(b)  No 
  
  
7. Which of the following best fits the outcome of such consultations?  
  
  1970 – 1990 1991 – 2003 
1.  No influence on final economic policy. 
  
2.  Minimal influence on final economic 
policy.   
3.  Moderate influence on final economic 
policy.   
4.  Influential in determining final economic 
policy.   
5.  Very Influential in determining final 
economic policy   
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Appreciation 
  
Thank very much for sharing your expertise with me. I would appreciate any thoughts you 
might like to add on the relations between the government, trade unions, business 
associations and civil society. 
  
(Limit to 800 characters) 
 
Submit Questionnaire
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Appendix 4  
 
Synergy Indicators for the 1970 – 1990 and 1991 – 2003  
Country Types (SW) Types (DW) Representations Influence SS (SW) SS (DW) 
 70-90 91-03 70-90 91 –03 70-90 91 -03 70 - 90 91 -91 70 - 90 91 - 03 
Singapore 0.67 0.67 1.33 1.33 0.67 0.67 1.00 1.00 2.33 3.00 
Korea 0.67 0.67 1.33 1.33 0.33 0.67 0.75 0.75 1.75 2.42 
Thailand 0.67 0.67 1.33 1.33 0.33 0.33 0.50 0.25 1.50 2.17 
Brazil 0.33 0.67 0.67 1.33 0.67 0.67 0.25 0.25 1.25 1.58 
Malaysia 0.33 0.33 0.67 0.67 0.67 0.33 0.25 0.25 1.25 1.58 
Pakistan 0.67 0.67 1.33 1.33 0.33 0.33 0.25 0.25 1.25 1.25 
Mexico 0.33 0.67 0.67 1.33 0.67 0.67 0.25 0.75 1.25 1.58 
Chile 0.33 0.67 0.67 1.33 0.33 0.33 0.25 0.50 0.92 1.25 
India 0.33 0.67 0.67 1.33 0.33 0.33 0.25 0.50 0.92 1.25 
Nigeria 0.33 0.33 0.67 0.67 0.33 0.33 0.25 0.50 0.92 1.25 
Egypt 0.00 0.33 0.00 0.67 0.00 0.33 0.00 0.25 0.00 0.00 
Kenya 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
SW = Single Weighted, DW = Double Weighted and SS = Synergy Score 
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